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Abstract
This thesis examines the use of statistical techniques in credit portfolio
management, with emphasis on actuarial and risk theoretic pricing and
reserving measures. The bank corporate loan portfolio is envisaged as an
insurance collective, with margins charged for credit risk forming premium
income, provisions made forming claims outgo, and variation over time in
provisioning and profitability producing a need for reserves.
The research leads to the computation of portfolio specific measures of risk,
and suggests that a value-at-risk (VAR) based reserve computation has
several advantages over current regulatory reserving methodology in bank
capital adequacy regulation (CAR) with respect to non-residential private
sector loan portfolios. These latter, current CAR practices are invariably used
by banks to compute the respective capital adequacy backing required on
loans. A loan pricing model is developed that allocates capital required by
reference to observed provisioning rates across a total of 64 differing
combinations of rating factors. This represents a statistically rigorous return
on risk adjusted capital (RORAC) approach to loan pricing.
The suggested approach is illustrated by reference to a particular portfolio of
loans. The reserving and pricing measures computed are portfolio specific,
but the methodology developed and tested on the specific portfolio (dataset)
of loans has a wider, more general applicability. A credit market comprising
portfolios which are both more and less risky than the original particular
portfolio is hypothesised, and existing regulation is compared to VAR
regulation in the context of the hypothesised credit market. Fewer
insolvencies are observed using the VAR framework than under existing
regulation, and problem portfolios are identified earlier than under existing
regulation.
For the particular portfolio of loans, existing algorithm-based loan pricing is
compared with the proposed loan pricing model. Significant differences are
observed in loan pricing by reference to gearing and collateral, and the
elimination of observed inefficiencies in pricing is recommended. Although
the proposed model has some limitations, it is argued to be an improvement
on existing regulatory and banking practice.
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Introduction
This thesis develops portfolio choice models of asset allocation for
commercial bank corporate lending. It does not specify a complete model of
the banking process. Statistical and specifically actuarial techniques are
applied to produce both global value at risk and individual loan pricing
procedures, and these are proposed as an alternative to present practice in
these areas.
A wealth of microeconomic banking literature exists, chiefly dating from the
mid-1960s; the early literature attempts to model the bank as a complete
financial intermediary. Subsequent literature focuses on individual
component operations. A significant breakthrough in terms of credit pricing
was Black and Schole's development in 1973 of option pricing formulae,
based on stochastic calculus, which enabled the valuation of a wide range of
contingent claims. Merton's development of Black and Schole's original
approach led in 1974 to a closed form mathematical evaluation of credit risk.
Subsequent development has led to a rich literature on deposit insurance.
Independently of the banking literature, insurance theorists had already
developed a collective theory of risk, building portfolio models of collectives of
independent risks from consideration of the mathematics of individual risks.
The insurance literature uses conventional calculus in constructing its building
blocks, and although the two literatures have obvious parallels, their
development has been separate. Thus, for example, option pricing formulae
were in common use in insurance applications from the mid 1950s, although
their introduction into the finance literature did not occur until the early 1970s.
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The application of insurance pricing and solvency techniques to the
evaluation of credit risk is a central focus of this thesis. If that part of loan
margin dedicated to credit risk coverage is envisaged as an insurance
premium, then this part of a bank's operations may be considered as being
directly equivalent to those of an insurance company. The premium income
is the sum of credit risk margins payable by borrowers; the claim outgo is the
sum of losses incurred by the bank on individual loans; and the underlying
reserve is that sum of money which will ensure the continued solvency of the
credit risk process at some acceptable probability.
This approach allows the application of insurance theory directly to bank
lending, and provides fresh insights into capital adequacy backing for loans
and individual loan pricing.
These insights are illustrated relative to present practice by reference to an
actual loan portfolio, comprising approximately 20% of the United Kingdom
corporate bank lending market. Where substantial differences exist between
the results of the insurance based approach and current practice, these
differences are examined.
Banks have a medium to long term involvement in lending. The objective in
using insurance pricing methodology to price credit risk is to price correctly
default risk in the medium term, and not for a specific time interval. The
overall premium sufficiency of the model is of paramount importance. The
responsiveness of the model to current credit conditions is dealt with by the
application of linear control theory, with the speed of response being dictated
by the extent to which reserves can absorb systemic shocks. Reserves and
loan pricing are interconnected in many ways, so that one cannot be
considered independent of the other. The approach adopted in this thesis is
to quantify required reserves from observation of past loan loss experience,
and to price loans so as to remunerate adequately the quantified reserves.
14
Chapter I
Aims, Methodology and Structure
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the main research questions to be
addressed, to describe clearly the methodology to be applied in addressing
the research questions, and to set out a guidemap illustrating the progression
of the research.
1.1	 Aims
The main research question is the following: can statistical, and specifically
actuarial techniques of risk measurement, be used to improve the present
measurement and treatment of credit risk in bank corporate lending
portfolios?
15
This immediately devolves into two related sub-questions, as credit risk is
priced both with respect to its portfolio impact and with respect to the
individual loan generating a specific credit risk. The portfolio sub-question
becomes: can actuarial techniques be used to develop a value at risk (VAR)
model of capital adequacy, with loan pricing structured to reflect this value at
risk? The individual loan sub-question becomes: can actuarial techniques be
used to improve present practice in loan pricing?
In addressing the above sub-questions it is necessary to review relevant
literature, to consider the present treatment of credit risk, to develop
alternative capital adequacy backing and loan pricing models, to compare the
results of these models in the context of an actual loan portfolio, to consider
the differences observed, and to simulate the future operation of such
models. These requirements are dealt with in succeeding chapters.
The application of methodology from outside of mainstream banking literature
is a key to the development of alternative models in this thesis. In this sense,
the thesis develops a kind of inter-disciplinary (banking, insurance, finance
and statistical) model framework. This methodology is now discussed.
1.2	 Methodology
The proposed methodology is to use the collective theory of risk to value
credit risk as if the bank were operating as a credit risk insurance company,
independent of its loan granting activities. As will be seen in the relevant
literature, Merton and Bodie (1993) describe the fundamental identity:
Loan Guarantee = Default Free Loan - Risky Loan 	 (1.1)
16
which specifies that the price of a loan guarantee is simply the price of a
default free loan less the price of an identical loan with credit risk attached. A
bank could invest entirely in default free assets, in which case no loan
guarantees would be issued. Banks choose to make risky loans in the belief
that income in the form of their charges for loan guarantees will in aggregate
compensate them for the inevitable outgo in the form of losses on defaulting
loans.
If the issue of loan guarantees is separated from the physical transfer of
money to the borrower, then the former, the "unbundled lending" as described
by Asay and Albertson (1990 p16), has a very small balance sheet (when
compared to the total lending balance sheet) composed primarily of reserves
and credit enhancements. Assets which previously appeared as loans on the
bank's balance sheet now appear as "securities", with lending retaining only
the credit risk on loans originated and sold. The sale of loans may be merely
an intercompany securitisation.
The default free loan referred to in (1.1) is generally taken to be a domestic
government security of similar term and payment type (fixed or floating
interest rate) to the risky loan being considered. If liquidity risk is charged to
depositors and serviced out of an existing portfolio of readily realisable
assets, then the cost of a loan guarantee may be regarded as the price of
credit risk.
This leads directly to the conclusion that the cost of a loan guarantee, given
that loans are certified at face value, must be the value of the yield margin
over comparable government securities charged for the loan by the bank.
Note that liability composition or cost is not discussed. The only interest is in
the returns available to the bank for its issuance of loan guarantees, and not
the overall profitability of the bank. Of course, the return on equity (ROE) on
the "unbundled lending" balance sheet described above may be calculated.
17
1.2.1	 The Collective Theory of Risk
A brief introduction to the collective theory of risk is given here-under, since it
is integral to the methodology of this thesis. This introduction is paraphrased
from Daykin Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994, pp1-63). Specific applications
will be discussed in fuller detail later as and when they are introduced.
Early risk theory was mainly concerned with life assurance and was based on
individual risks, with the behaviour of a portfolio of such risks being deduced
as the sum of individual outcomes (Bohlmann (1909)). The studies of
Lundberg (1909, 1919) and Cramer (1926, 1930, 1954) became known as
the collective theory of risk: the occurrence of claims was dealt with
collectively, without reference to individual risks.
Using the collective theory, in terms of probability calculus, we construct a
doubly stochastic aggregate claim amount model, where both the number of
claims and the size of each claim are stochastic variables. In the specific
applications within this thesis, a claim may be considered to have occurred
when a loan moves into default - defined as more than 90 days overdue with
no rescheduling agreement in place, and the claim may be considered to be
of positive amount when final and specific provision of some monetary
amount greater than zero has been made.
Consider the accumulated number k(t) of defaults occurring during a time
period 0 to t as a function of (t). k(t) is a stochastic process, postulated to
satisfy the following three conditions:
1. The number of defaults occurring in any two disjoint time intervals
are independent.
2. No more than one default may arise from the same event.
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3. The probability that a default occurs at a given fixed time point is
equal to zero.
If this is the case, then the number of defaults occurring within a given fixed
time period is Poisson distributed (proof given in Daykin Pentikainen and
Pesonen (1994 Appendix A.)), with probabilities corresponding to different k
values given by:
PK = PK (n) = " LK	 where n = E(K)	 (1.2)
Examining each of these conditions in turn:
1. The condition of independence seems to be immediately violated in
practice, as loan performance is known to co-vary through time (see,
for example Bennett (1984), Chirinko and Guill (1991), Sinkey (1992)).
If loan default probability can be characterised as being independent
over short time periods, but subject to similar changes in background
risk intensity over longer time periods, then a generalised form of the
Poisson distribution is applicable.
In this case, observed covariance over time is a function of the time
period over which loan defaults are assumed independent, and the
volatility of changes in background risk intensity. In general the longer
the former and the lower the latter, the closer the portfolio is to
satisfying the original Poisson condition; the shorter the former and the
higher the latter, the larger the positive covariance, and the closer the
portfolio is to the generalised Poisson model. Changes in risk intensity
are often handled by introducing an auxiliary variable, generating what
is commonly known as a mixed Poisson distribution.
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2. It is possible for a loan default in one company to produce a domino
effect, causing a chain of subsequent defaults linked to the first. In
banking, this effect is referred to as "associated risk", and loans are
generally grouped to exclude its effects. If all default costs arising from
a single event are treated as a single default cost, then condition 2 will
not be violated. In practice, unrecognised associated risk may cause
condition 2 to be approximately rather than exactly satisfied.
3. It is a characteristic feature of defaults that they occur randomly in
such a way that their exact times of occurrence are unpredictable, thus
automatically satisfying condition 3.
Poisson variables have the useful properties of being additive with respect to
both size and time, of having moments which are a function of only one
parameter, of having successive values which may be recursively calculated,
and of asymptotically approaching the normal distribution as n increases.
It has been mentioned previously that the standard Poisson law premises
may not be valid because of external background factors, such as economic
conditions, the credit cycle, etc. The default process can in fact be composed
of trends, cycles, short-term seasonal oscillations and pure random
fluctuation.
When the variation of default risk intensity is random, the stochastic variation
can be interpreted as random changes of the Poisson parameter from its
expected long run average n. The changes may be described by a
multiplicative factor q such that E(q)=1. If q>1, default risk intensity is higher
than expected and vice versa. If the value of q is fixed in any time period and
equal to some value (q), then the first condition is again satisfied and the
20
conditional default number variable k is a mixed Poisson variable. In this
case:
r	 (n
Pk = E(Pk (11.0) =
	
q)
1 e-Nq 	 dH(q)
Lk
where H(q) is the distribution function of the mixing variable (q).
Specifically, where H(q) is defined as gamma (h,h), that is gamma with mean
value as expected equal to 1, then:
11(q) = 1 	 rhq1 e -z z h-1 dz
F (II)
with variable h open to choice by fitting. As h —> co we reapproach the simple
Poisson distribution, and as h —› 0 the distribution flattens as the mixing
variable implies a very large range for (q). Where this form of mixing
distribution is used, the resulting point probabilties are given by the
distribution:
p _ ( h+k-1 ) _ h	 e )k
k - k k	 xp x 1- p
where p — 11 , also known as the Polya distribution.
n + h
Note that the mixing distribution and its moments may be described in terms
of its two parameters n and h.
Similar auxiliary variables may be defined for differential risk within a portfolio;
in such applications they are described as structure, rather than mixing
variables.
(1.3)
(1.4)
(1.5)
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(1.6)
The default process is now generalised to include consideration of default
cost amounts. Let k denote the number of defaults from a portfolio of loans in
a certain time period. The aggregate default cost X during that time period is:
where Z i is the cost of the ith default during the period. If there are no
defaults, then k=0. Variables of the form (1.4) are known as random sums,
since the number k of the summands is a random number as well as the
individual value of the summands.
The distribution of total portfolio default cost may be constructed as:
F(x)= PROBV 	 = Pk X PRORCEZ1 x}
k=0	 i=1
For this result to hold, it is necessary for the default cost variables to be
independent of the random number of defaults k. When this distribution has
been constructed, ruin probabilities may be specified and required reserves
calculated.
1.2.2	 Pricing of Individual Insurance Risk
In order to avoid adverse selection, the general insurance approach to risk
classification is to sort individual risks into subsections which are as
homogeneous as possible with regard to rating factors likely to influence the
probability of occurrence of the insured event. The pure risk premium
charged represents the observed historic cost per unit adjusted for inflation
and known risk effects, for risks subject to an identical combination of rating
(1.7)
22
factors. This is analogous to, but more statistically rigorous than the banking
practice of using classification and regression trees: for example as in
Frydman Altman and Kao (1985), or Marais, Pattel and Wolfson (1984).
The differences between banking and insurance practice in this area will be
discussed as they arise.
1.2.3	 Research Methodology
The research methodology used in this thesis is summarised as follows:
1. To apply the collective theory of risk to an existing corporate loan
portfolio.
2. To deduce required capital adequacy using a VAR approach.
3. To develop a multiplicative, multi-factor loan pricing model,
designed to compensate VAR capital adequacy as previously
calculated.
4. To compare the proposed loan pricing model results to current
loan pricing within the portfolio.
5. To compare the proposed VAR capital adequacy requirement
with present practice, using a simulation based approach.
In order to make comparison relevant, in the case of the existing corporate
loan portfolio, total VAR is constrained to be equal to existing regulatory
capital requirements, and total VAR return is constrained to equal historic
average return on regulatory capital requirements. This has implications for
both VAR and loan pricing measures.
The research is broadened to include hypothesised portfolios varying with
respect to risk, profitability and size, and the implications for VAR and loan
23
pricing are discussed. The applicability and limitations of the research are
then discussed.
1.3
	 Structure
The present chapter is a statement of research aims, a brief description of the
underlying methodology, and a presentation of the structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2 consists of a sectioned literature review, with individual reviews of
the following relevant areas of the literature:
1. Modelling the banking firm
2. Information, credit rationing and collateral
3. Portfolio allocation
4. Option pricing deposit insurance, and regulatory capital
5. General insurance
6. Regulation
Each of these subsections of the overall literature review will be indexed as to
its relevance to subsequent chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 3 consists of a review of present practice with respect to bank credit
pricing, including a discussion of its operational significance, its strengths and
weaknesses and how the proposed approach might be used to address
identified weaknesses. The thesis as a whole aims to improve on present
practice so that this chapter is required to establish the baseline on which
improvements are to be generated and compared.
Chapter 4 is a discussion of trends in bank credit risk, with specific reference
to the dataset to be used in empirical comparisons. It sets out the dataset
employed, carries out exploratory data analysis and comments on the
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applicability and generalisability of results to be derived using the dataset as a
test bed. Chapter 4 also contains a clear specification of the uses of the
dataset in developing the framework proposed in this thesis.
Chapter 5 establishes that the building blocks of the process, i.e. individual
risks, are identical in mathematical terms, subject to common assumptions.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that the difference between
current practice and that proposed in this thesis is a difference in architecture
rather than raw materials. The use of insurance methodology enables the
elimination of a known bias in option pricing, and permits the numerical
computation of stochastic collateral/stochastic firm value solutions, which had
not been possible under previous formulations.
Chapter 6 develops the value at risk (VAR) portfolio model, demonstrates that
riskier banks will have larger VAR, and that actuarial soundness in deposit
insurance schemes would be achieved using a combination of VAR and level
insurance premiums. The extent of moral hazard and adverse selection may
be reduced by comparison with existing capital adequacy schemes, and may
be further reduced by the application of linear control theory to smooth
surplus capital and loan pricing.
Chapter 7, equipped with VAR calculated in the previous chapter, allocates
return on VAR by proportion to observed default losses across a range of
rating factor cells. A transition matrix is used to reflect prior probabilities of
cell movement, in order to charge correctly a two period loan for its average
credit risk throughout its term. Proposed charges for credit risk using the
above approach are compared with charges currently being levied in the
dataset introduced in Chapter 4. Where significant differences exist these are
discussed.
Chapter 8 simulates the operation of a number of credit portfolios under 2
approaches: the first representing current practice and the second
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representing the approach proposed in this thesis. With an equivalent
starting reserve, and subject to similar feedback loops, the improvement
associated with the proposed methodology should be represented by fewer
observed insolvencies, and a tighter stochastic bundle, than is experienced in
present practice.
Chapter 9 summarises the thesis, identifies conclusions which may be drawn
from the research contained therein, and points to limitations of this research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to chart the chronological development and
current state of research effort in those areas which have a bearing on the
research developed in this thesis. Table 2.0 below sets out the subsections
into which the literature review is divided, with the final column in the table
providing an index of subsequent chapters to which the specific subsection is
directly relevant. In essence, the current chapter outlines the "broad chart"
from within which the subsequent "routes" taken by the thesis will be traced.
Table 2.0
Breakdown of Literature Review
Section	 Topic	 Relevant
Number	 Chapters
1	 Modelling the banking firm 	 1, 3, 5, 6
2	 Information, credit rationing and collateral 	 3, 4, 5, 7
3	 Portfolio allocation 	 3, 6, 7, 9
4	 Option pricing and deposit insurance,
and regulatory capital	 5, 6, 8
5	 General insurance	 1, 5, 6, 7
6	 Regulation	 4, 6, 9
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Thus, for example, the information based-literature is of relevance to thesis
chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7; the option pricing, deposit insurance and regulatory
capital literature to thesis chapters 5, 6, and 8 etc.
Each finance section of the literature review is prefaced by a chronological
table giving year, author and main research area. The purpose of these
tables is to order the progression of research in the relevant area.
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2.1	 Modelling the Banking Firm
Table 2.1 summarises the chronological progression of the literature
modelling the banking firm.
Table 2.1
Modelling the Banking Firm Literature
(Chronological progression)
Year Author Brief Description / comment
1888 Edgeworth Foundation of mathematics of banking
1963 Schull Monopoly, multiple product, price discrimination
1970 Brucker Microeconomic approach
1971 Klein Monopoly model describing size and structure
1971 start of Portfolio allocation literature
1973 start of Option pricing and deposit insurance literature
1977 start of Information literature
1980 Fama Banking in general equilibrium in finance theory
1980 Baltensperger A survey of alternative approaches with emphasis on partial
models
1980 Sealey Complete model with risk aversion, resource costs, and deposit
rate setting
1981 start of Credit rationing and collateral literature
1982 Langhor A defence of Klein's work against Baltensperger's criticisms
1983 O'Hara A dynamic model of the banking firm
1984 Diamond Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
1984 Santomero Survey on models to date
1986 Devinney Credit rationing in a complete theory of the banking firm
1987 Lefebvre Financial intermediation viability from deposit contract viewpoint
1987 James Empirical evidence on banks as delegated monitors
1987 Bryan Process model of banking
1989 Bernanke and
Gertler
A neo-classical economic model of bank behaviour
1990 Asay and Albertson Process model of banking
1994 Raj an Fluctuations in bank credit policies
1995 6 Berger Capital and earnings in relationship banking
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The basic mathematics of banking were set out by Edgeworth (1888).
Microeconomic research into the banking firm in the modern era began with
Schull (1963). Schull viewed a bank as transforming a pool of deposit funds
into credit products in a manner designed to maximise profit: banks extend
credit in any product until its marginal revenues equate to the marginal cost of
general credit extension. The marginal cost of general credit extension in
equilibrium was seen by Schull to be equal to the average revenue in the
short-term government securities market.
Brucker (1970) extended Schull's analysis and used an analysis of the
competitiveness of loan classes in a bank's asset mix as a proxy for
monopoly power enjoyed by banks in various loan markets. Brucker (1970,
p6) makes the first specific reference in the literature to the riskiness of loan
portfolio when he refers to "The ratio of net loan loss to total loan "used" as an
ex post proxy measure for the level of risk within a state economic area".
Klein (1971) produced the first complete microeconomic model of the banking
firm. He stated that the expected return on loans must be less than the
contracted rate of interest since the latter represents the maximum the bank
can receive. Generally:
E L < r if ci - L > 0	 (2.1)
where r is the contracted rate, E L is the expected loan return and (5L is the
standard deviation of the probability distribution of loan payments. All
borrowers were assumed to be identical and non-interest terms of loans were
assumed exogenous, leading to his conclusion that default risk was
exogenous to the bank. He did point out that such a conclusion was unlikely,
but he wanted to abstract from problems connected with loan risk appraisal in
the development of his model.
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Fama (1980) regarded banks as issuing deposits and using the proceeds to
purchase securities, a loan being merely another form of (closed-market)
security. Banks operate to fashion portfolios of such securities as will appeal
to their depositors, receiving in return a competitively determined fee for their
services. The willingness of banks to provide access to the accounting
system of exchange in the face of reserve requirements is what differentiates
them from other financial intermediaries. Reserve requirements are viewed
as a tax on depositors leading banks to attract funds for access to the
accounting system of exchange at lower interest rates than those payable on
outside investments.
Baltensperger (1980) presented a survey and discussion of banking literature
up to that time. Many of the deficiencies of early models had been addressed
by then and his paper represented the then contemporary theory. He
postulated (1980, p1)
	 "the main economic functions of financial firms are
those of consolidating and transforming risks, and of serving as dealers or
'brokers' in the credit markets (the basis of which is the existence of
transaction and information costs in these markets)". Uncertainty,
informational problems and adjustment costs had now moved centre stage.
This paper is the first to acknowledge explicitly information and administration
costs and to associate costly portfolio adjustments with liquidity risk. The
paper consolidates the work of many academics, chief among them Orr and
Mellon (1961), Poole (1968), Frost (1971) and Koskela (1976), in treating the
banks reserve and liquidity management decision as involving inventory
optimisation under stochastic demand.
Treating the rate of interest charged on loans, r, as net of information and
transaction costs, a declining demand function for loans is postulated. Allying
this demand function to Schull's original model produces marginal lending
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until the risk adjusted return on lending equals that obtained on Government
securities. Government securities are regarded as effectively a kind of
dumping ground for excess liabilities.
The chief criticism of complete models of the banking firm in Baltensperger's
view is their reliance on monopoly power (i.e. banks operating as price
makers in markets), and the model tendency to collapse under competitive
forces. A model based on resource costs, on the other hand, can function
regardless of market behaviour.
Baltensperger advocates the consideration of costs involved in different credit
contracts, default risks and overall insolvency risk, and the consideration of
similar costs on the liability side. He points to the conclusion by Pyle (1971)
that intermediation can only occur if there is a positive dependence between
net rates of interest on loans and deposits. He notes that the probability for
intermediation to be profitable increases with the yield difference between
loans and deposits - allowing for resource costs- and the degree of positive
correlation between them.
He concludes by specifying a model based on expected profit maximisation
and price taking in all markets, and uses the model to determine jointly asset
structure, liability structure and firm scale. Langhor (1982), in a reply to
Baltensperger, points to the fact that liability recomposition by a bank leads to
asset adjustment if necessary, occurring in its Government securities portfolio
rather than its loan portfolio. Thus, in his view Klein's (1971) original
assertion that the estimated density function of deposit outflow is independent
from the size of the loan portfolio is in fact correct, to the extent that the bank
has not exhausted its portfolio of Government securities.
For the purpose of this thesis a fully specified complete bank model is not
necessary, as we are concentrating solely on the credit management
process. However these models provide important insights and contributions
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to the latter. From this point on, models will be summarised algebraically, as
the more current literature is surveyed.
Sealey (1980) in an important contribution used the following assumptions
1). Deposit rate setting by bank (to fix liability price)
2). Random deposit supply
3). Stochastic loan rates
4). Perfectly competitive loan markets
5). Single period planning horizon
6). Liquidity costs
to specify a deposit supply function
\ dD ) › 0. ( dD
. )>-0D s
 = D(RDU); (dR D
 - ' dU
where Ds is the quantity supplied; RD is the interest rate; U is not known ex
ante, but has a known subjective probability distribution, and reflects random
supply; and RL is the random return on loans which has a known subjective
density and range 0 .^ R, ^ 00.
The simple balance sheet composition is: L= D P +Z
where L = Loan, Z= a composite variable measuring the difference between
money market borrowing and lending and DP = quantity of deposits
purchased.
Decisions as to the quantity of loans and interest rate on deposits are made
prior to the start of the 1-period horizon. At the start of the horizon period the
quantity of deposits and return on loans become known. Ex post liquidity
costs are imposed equal to /(Z).
(2.2)
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(2.4)
(2.5)
The objective is assumed to be the maximisation of utility of profit, defined as:
max E{max [U(R L L – RD D P –1(Z)– C D ( DP ) - C L(L))1}
L,RD
DP ,z
CD (DP ) and CL (L) are the resource cost of servicing deposits and loans.
E is an expectations operator and U is the utility function assumed by the
present author to have U '>-- 0, U "-.< 0 i.e. the bank is risk averse.
The first order condition specifically applying to loans is:
—cr E [U]= EFU'[R L – P – C ' L (L)1]= 0
al,
P being the rate of adjustment of Z to ex post liquidity.
The last equation may be rearranged as:
E [Rd= C ' L (L)+ P	 Coy (Eft,RL)
E[U ']
Where Coy
 (U', RL ) is the covariance between the marginal utility of profits
and the marginal revenue on loans.
The last term is the risk premium due to risk aversion by the bank and it is an
increasing function of loan extensions. Under the model the utility of profit
prevents the bank from equating marginal revenue with marginal cost on the
lending process as long as covariance is negative. If profit is an increasing
function of loan interest rates then this will be the case. Further, under the
above conditions the risk of profit is increasing in total loans.
(2.3)
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If the random loan rate is purely the result of loan default, then it is
reasonable to assume positive correlation between the loan rate and deposit
level. Essentially Sealey (1980) is proposing that risk averse management
will stop short of equating marginal revenues to marginal costs, its stopping
point being dictated by the size of negative covariance between utility of profit
and loan rate.
O'Hara (1983) presents a dynamic model of the banking firm. She
discriminates between management and shareholders, and characterises
management as defining the risk averse stance of banks. This is a direct
result of agency problems, causing management to depart from the simple
profit maximisation which may be sought by shareholders. Management is
viewed as maximising its utility subject to regulatory and shareholder
constraints. A further appeal is given to the model by its endogenous
determination of the composition of the banks asset portfolio.
The manager's problem is defined as:
max ErE a 1 U(X , )1
0
Where U is the management's (risk averse) utility function and a is a discount
rate applied to future time periods. A direct result of this problem is that the
manager, because of utility of positive value in future time periods, increasing
in value as time progresses, will not have any incentive to drive a solvent
bank into insolvency. Management is assumed to be prevented by regulation
or otherwise from asset stripping the bank.
The first major conclusion is that if the return on loans increases,
management will increase the bank's holding of loans. In setting up the
partial derivative, O'Hara (1983, p130) refers to 1, as being either "the stated
interest minus expected loan losses or simply the level of interest rates". The
model is flawed in that an increase in I caused by a reduction in expected
(2.6)
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loan losses will have a very different effect on customer behaviour than one
caused by a move in general interest rates. O'Hara's model is insufficiently
dynamic in that it fails to describe customer response to bank actions.
The second major conclusion is that as interest rates paid on deposits
increase, the manager will reduce bank holdings of risky debt, responding to
management's own decreasing absolute risk aversion, due to the fact that
loan riskiness is an increasing function of interest rates.
The final major conclusion is that changes in regulation will not necessarily
produce predictable results in bank behaviour. O'Hara notes that the
increased collateral paradox noted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) may also
influence banks to choose riskier portfolios when faced with higher capital
requirements. This paradox has led to a rich banking regulation literature.
O'Hara's basic construct is postulated as a real world (or more inductive)
approach. However, she appears to underestimate the impact of customer
behaviour on management's freedom of action.
Diamond (1984), in a major contribution to the literature develops a theory of
financial intermediation that fits in many ways the present author's purpose.
This is the most recent "complete" theory in the literature and is deserving of
detailed discussion. Diamond focuses on minimum cost production of
information useful for solving incentive problems. Cost, information and
incentives had previously been discussed, but this paper draws the strands
together in a powerful and significant way.
The information production task is delegated to the intermediary, giving rise to
incentive problems. In analysing the determinants of delegation costs
Diamond develops a model in which a financial intermediary has a net cost
advantage over borrowing and lending direct, and answers the basic question
as to why banks exist. Diversification proves the key.
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Diamond's model envisages N risk neutral entrepreneurs, each endowed with
the technology for an indivisible investment project with stochastic returns.
These entrepreneurs have zero wealth, but their project output has expected
value greater than R, the competitive interest rate within the economy.
Individual project returns are denominated j7, 0 ^
 y) < co . Everyone agrees on
the distribution of 51, but the actual realisation of 51 is observed only by the
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur must choose an incentive contract which
depends only on observable (by the intermediary) variables and makes the
lender anticipate a competitive expected dividend. Positive penalties are
assumed to attach to bankruptcy, e.g. loss of reputation, management time,
etc.
The optimal contract maximises the risk-neutral entrepreneurs expected
return, given a minimum expected return to lenders of R. By specifying a
non-pecuniary penalty function dependent on Z (assuming project returns
normally distributed and Z as the standard normal variable), the optimal
contract for the entrepreneur is shown to be a debt contract with face value H
where H is the smallest value providing an expected return of r to the lenders.
Positive probability of non pecuniary penalty means that the optimal contract
is costly. As long as this cost is less than the cost of the lender observing y ,
the optimal contract will be preferred.
If K> 0 is the cost of observing 51, then possible situations are no monitoring,
each lender monitoring separately, and delegated monitoring by all lenders to
one or more, acting as agents. The last pays when
K+ D ^ min[E5,- {0 * (..T.1)](m' k)]
	
(2.7)
Where there are M Lenders, D is costs of delegation, E j,_ is the expectation
operator, and 0* 0 is the non pecuniary penalty probability density function.
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A financial intermediary having zero wealth is envisaged as acting as
delegated monitor for its depositors. The intermediary will receive payment
gi() in respect of the i th of N entrepreneurs monitored g,(yi).^ .y,. Total
payments are:
GN =g1(})
	
(2.8)
i=1
The intermediary must pay away R. N. For the intermediary to remain in
business P(G N N.1?) = 1. Since the entrepreneur can pay at most Y, then
P(G N N. R) P(i j7; N. R)	 (2.9)
t=1
Any entrepreneur with P(71 R) = 1 will finance directly.
The intermediary will only contract with entrepreneurs whose monitoring costs
exceed the intermediaries physical and delegation costs.
The model thus far provides evidence that delegated monitoring can justify
the existence of financial intermediaries in certain specific situations. When
the benefits of diversification are superimposed, the prevalence of
intermediaries as providers of funds, particularly to small and medium sized
entrepreneurs, is clearly understandable. The diversification benefits about to
be discussed are central to this thesis.
For a financial intermediary to be viable, the depositors must receive r per unit
deposited, the intermediary must receive an expected return after all costs of
at least zero, and each entrepreneur must retain an expected return at least
as high as that obtainable contracting directly with depositors.
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With independent and identically distributed projects, the per entrepreneur
cost D, is a monotonically decreasing function of N as the probability of
average returns per project being in the penalty zone decreases. In reality
projects may be neither independent nor identically distributed, but to the
extent that they are not perfectly correlated, diversification benefits may still
accrue to the intermediary. If projects are independent, then as their number
grows without bound the cost of monitoring converges to its physical cost K.
Leverage in any intermediary will be high, as the net worth of the intermediary
will be:
1‘(1? D N IC) - AT(R -pm)
	D 2N +	 (2.10)
As D„ —› 0 the net worth of the intermediary will be simply N.K.
Diamond (1984) extends the model to exclude exogenous observable
correlative factors such as economic variables, assuming these to be hedged
in futures markets. The residual uncorrelated risk is assumed independent.
The statistical procedures in Chapters 6 and 7 will test for correlation of risk,
thereby indirectly testing Diamond's conclusions.
Assuming risk averse agents implies a constant payment to lenders.
Assuming risk averse depositors also implies a constant payment to them by
the intermediary. The intermediary must inevitably charge its depositors a
lower risk premium than the entrepreneur. This can only occur if the
intermediary has a less severe trade off between risk sharing and incentives
than the depositor (i.e. a less concave utility function), and can thus be
delegated the monitoring task.
Essentially this is an indirect application of a utility inequality, which directly
parallels its application in general insurance. Financial intermediaries;
specifically banks, may be considered as default risk insurers. This can again
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be observed empirically, by applying general insurance principles to the
valuation of credit portfolios.
At the individual bank level, the intermediary consists of a single agent, and
diversification is sought by adding risks. This will only be justified when
adding independent risk reduces per entrepreneur risk aversion, a situation
which seems to correspond to reality.
Decreasing absolute risk aversion is characterised by a similar type of utility
function to that chosen by O'Hara (1983) i.e.
U(.)>O, U'<0	 (2.11)
With the additional conditions that
U"(.).^ 0, U"(.) ^ 0	 (2.12)
with one inequality strict.
These results are less testable than those previously commented on, but do
seem to confirm more closely to real world conditions.
A direct implication of delegated monitoring is that intermediary assets are
illiquid. Interestingly Diamond (1984 p 410) mentions both commercial banks
and insurance companies as being the most obvious applications of his
model. Thus he draws a direct parallel between the activities of both types of
intermediary, suggesting that similar methodologies are applicable to each.
In an appendix, Diamond (1984 pp 411-414) proves that if the agent has an
exponential utility function, adding independent identically distributed risk will
not reduce the per project risk premium in the single agent case, and thus a
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high order polynomial utility function is required for this form of diversification
to add value.
Santomero (1984) provides a complete literature survey. He refers to the
information literature (then) as still in its formative stages, and identifies the
flow of information as being a key element in the market for financial assets.
Specifically relating to portfolio choice models of asset allocation (one of
several which he surveys) Santomero (p 587) views this type of model as the
result of the following type of maximisation process:
max r = E R A; A i - R Di D	 (2.13)
A,D
where dRAi 0 V
dA;
dR DJ
dItin
dD.
These first order conditions result in:
LIR Ai ) ,	 dR Di
dp +R
D J+ R A, - D 11" Djd Ai	 m 
(2.14)
that is, one market is perfectly competitive. Klein (1971), for example, uses
the government security market. Separation exists between asset allocation
and deposit structure. Variation in demand for loans of one type does not
affect other loan decisions, as all loan rates balance at a marginal rate
dictated by the perfectly competitive market.
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A minor adjustment to this model would have:
dR ,0;	 dR„,	 0
dDi	dD„,
Vi	 m	 (2.15)
In this case, excess demand for funds from the competitive market produces
some upward move in rates, but this move would be less than that caused by
similar demand in the less competitive market of the bank's own deposit
base.
This formulation produces a dynamic equilibrium, whereby the bank will
resource from the less competitive market until its cost of funds exceeds that
in the more competitive market. Thereafter the bank will resource from the
more competitive market, until marginal costs equate to marginal revenues.
If the government securities market is identified as the more competitive
market, then the return on government securities must be bounded on the
upside by the return on low risk loans ( to prevent "round tripping",
creditworthy customers arbitraging against the bank by borrowing to invest
profitably in government securities) and on the downside by the return on
deposits ( to prevent existing government securities holders from accessing
the beneficial aspects of the deposit contract at zero or negative cost).
In this modified model, returns generated by the bank would be by means of a
variable spread defined as follows:
max 7z- =	 R Ai A i + R„,D„, - ERDi Di	 (2.16)
Ai D iD„,
Where the bank has a government security portfolio. The actual returns may
be subdivided into a) those generated by asset allocation to assets other than
government securities, and b) those generated by deposits being sourced at
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all-inclusive costs below the prevailing government security yields. As
Santomero (1984) observes, the factoring of resource costs into the above
models does not alter their underlying logic.
This interpretation underlies this thesis, which concentrates on the first part of
the subdivision, that is, a). Consideration of this type of model leads
inevitably to a process view of the bank: its consideration as the sum of
several businesses. The fact that loan margins are in practice quoted by
reference to some benchmark government yield would imply that the
variability of spread largely depends on the second part of the subdivision (i.e.
b)), as loan rates on floating rate advances would immediately adjust to
prevailing government security yields. However, a major source of variability
in asset allocation-driven returns remains to be considered. This source is in
fact the deviation of actual loan losses from those expected, and is the main
research focus of this thesis.
Much of the research after 1984 has focused on information properties of the
banking firm.
Lefebvre (1986) makes the point that random consumption patterns of
individuals gives rise to early liquidation, and that this itself may be sufficient
to raise individual return variance sufficiently above bank return variance to
justify the bank deposit contract, even if there exists no difference between
the portfolio alternatives available to the bank or investor. However,
economies of scale in evaluation, plus the existence of financial
intermediaries as sorters of projects, will give a better selection of projects
than blind diversification on the part of the investor. Lefebvre advances the
latter two arguments as giving banks a higher expected return than
individuals, but does not comment on any variance impact. His arguments
may provide other reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries,
centring on the individual's consumption function and economies of scale in
the selection process. This may be seen as strengthening Diamond's
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diversification case, but from the deposit contract viewpoint. Thus, even if the
benefits of asset diversification are disputed, consumption diversification may
help the overall diversification case.
James (1987) finds empirical evidence that borrowers pay the cost of reserve
requirements on certificates of deposit (CDs). He concludes that banks
provide some special service with their lending activity which is not available
from other borrowers. The implication of James' findings are that banks may
be able to charge a greater than economically justifiable interest rate to
borrowers because of the existence of information effects in bank borrowing.
This would imply that market equilibrium should lie at some point above the
yield on prevailing government securities in a credit process model.
Bryan (1987) advocates a business process view of the banking firm, with the
firm providing deposit, lending, investment and fee based advice services.
He models each of these services as a separate business process, and his
lending service model is closely analogous to the basic credit process
modelled in this thesis.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop a neo-classical business cycle model
which may equip bank credit models with an interactive capacity. Traditional
bank models have the deficiency that the bank is viewed as operating in a
perfectly competitive loan market. However, the dynamics of the loan market
may also be affected by customer decisions, which may in aggregate contract
or expand the total loan market independent of banker's actions. In this
respect a simple illustration is appropriate. Suppose an entrepreneur
perceives an improvement in business conditions, which he interprets as
reducing his default probability. The bank through which he finances remains
unaware of the improvement, and continues to charge him based on his
historic default probability.
44
Given that in a perfect market for loans the bank will now be overcharging the
entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may decide to repay part of his loan. The
bank may respond by lowering its interest rate to a level corresponding to the
new loan level, but continue to overcharge by not reflecting the original
improvement in creditworthiness. The entrepreneur continues to repay the
loan, with equilibrium only being restored when the entrepreneur has either
fully repaid the loan or has exhausted other sources of capital. The key point
is that instability in volumes of loans can result from customer as well as
banker action. Therefore, not only can credit rationing arise from customer
action, but the total size of loan market is itself stochastic, and may lead to
equilibrium substantially prior to the declining demand curve equating to
returns on Government securities. This effect could, of course, also be
produced by decreasing absolute risk aversion. Empirical evidence suggests
the former, which means that a fully developed microeconomic model of the
credit process needs to allow for customer, as well as bank action. The
causation argument presented by Bernanke and Gertler is disputable (in fact
causation can run the other way), but their paper does add a new dimension
to the analysis of bank credit.
Asay and Albertson (1990) develop Byan's (1987) approach, and advocate
the notional securitisation of all loans, leaving the lending business to be
modelled as the sum of reserves plus credit enhancements. Their model of
the bank's lending business is identical to that used in this thesis, although
this thesis proposes a differing form of analysis for both reserves and credit
enhancements.
Rajan (1994) develops an interactive model of bank managers with short term
horizons influenced by both other managers and demand conditions. The
model hypothesises the acceptance, in certain conditions, of negative net
present value projects for credit extension by such managers. Development
of the model leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by
bank credit policies. Rajan points to the fact that credit policies change over
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time as evidence that loans are a product of more than pure financial
calculations. In the short term, bank management may attempt to manipulate
current earnings in an effort to boost its reputation. In the long term, such
efforts are doomed to failure, but this short term model does at least
behaviourally help to explain observed credit cycles. It may be viewed at an
extension of Bernanke and Gertler's (1989) neo-classical model.
Berger (1995)b
 investigates the relationship between capital and earnings in
banking. He finds a positive relationship through the 1980's in the US, with
evidence that this relationship has changed during the early 1990s. He inters
that banks may have "overshot" their optima) capita) ratios, as reduced rea)
risk lowered optimal ratios while regulatory changes and higher earnings
raised actual capital ratios. This conclusion implies that optimal capital ratios
are a product of fluctuating real risks borne by banks. If this is the case, then
value at risk (VAR) models should enable banks to target these ratios more
accurately than blanket capital adequacy requirements.
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2.2	 Information, Credit Rationing and Collateral
Table 2.2 below summarises the chronological progression of information,
credit rationing and collateral literature.
Table 2.2
Information, Credit Rationing and Collateral Literature
(Chronological Progression)
Year Author Brief description / comment
1977 Leland and Pyle Information deficits and bank structure
1980 Campbell and Kracaw Signalling hypothesis and information production
1981 Stiglitz and Weiss Loan price as information source
1982 Thakor Commitments and bank risk
1985 Bester Screening versus rationing
1985 Chan and Kanatas Asymmetric valuation and collateral
1986 Chan, Thakor and
Greenbaum
Information acquisition by banks
1986 Devinney Credit rationing in a theory of the banking firm
1987a Besanko and Thalcor Asymmetric information model of credit market
1987° Besanko and Thakor Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria
1989 Greenbaum, Kanatas and
Venezia
Informationally advantaged lender policies
1989 Diamond Reputation acquisition
1989 James and Weir Relationship information
1990 Sharpe Informational capture by banks
1990 Berger and Udell Collateral and loan quality
1992 Berger and Udell Evidence of credit rationing
1992 Holden and Subrahmanyam Information and imperfect competition
1992 Raj an Informed banks bargaining power
1992 Calem and Rizzo Hospital lending as evidence of banks informational role
1994 Petersen and Rajan Relationship lending
1995 Berger and Udell Relationship lending in small firms
1995 Antzoulatos Credit rationing and rational behaviour
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Leland and Pyle (1977) discussed information asymmetries in the context of
financial intermediation, observing that borrowers will always be better
informed than lenders, resulting in a lender requiring to charge for his
information deficit. Economies of scale in information production encourage
the emergence of financial intermediaries.
Campbell and Kracaw (1980) developed a signalling hypothesis, which stated
that the upper bound for the costs of financial intermediation given information
asymmetries could not exceed the costs of a direct credit quality signal by the
borrower to the capital markets. Borrowers would issue debt directly if it were
cheaper for them to do so. As the costs of a direct signal of credit quality
would be lower for larger companies, financial intermediaries concentrate
their efforts in the area where credit quality signals are most expensive to
generate, i.e. in lending to small and medium sized companies.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point to the possibility of multiple equilibria in
markets where banks use the interest rate payable as a screening device. As
interest rates increase, borrower creditworthiness may decrease, with the
possibility of lower overall returns from high interest rate lending. Further the
level of interest rate payable may itself have a direct bearing on the riskiness
of projects undertaken by borrowers. The authors use a simple model to
present many, often counter-intuitive conclusions. Specifically, they identify
default probability as acting to reduce expected returns in a similar way to
bankruptcy costs in the Modigliani Miller corporate capital structure model.
If interest rates are set by the bank, then only projects above a certain risk
threshold will be considered by entrepreneurs. This risk threshold is
increasing in interest rates. The expected return to the bank on a loan is a
decreasing function of its riskiness. The adverse selection effect outweighs
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rising interest rates due to the change in mix of applicants. Market
equilibrium can feature either a single interest rate at or below market-
clearing or several interest rates with excess demand for credit at each one.
Collateral requirements may have an adverse selection effect in encouraging
less risk-averse borrowers. Banks will seldom seek to steal competitor
customers, because they will only attract the least profitable. In equilibrium,
each bank may have excess loanable funds, but no bank will lower its interest
rate. The large number of conclusions drawn are a direct result of the simple
observation that the expected quality of a commodity is a function of its price.
This paper is of particular appeal due to its large number of empirically
testable conclusions, which may be incorporated into credit process models.
Thakor (1982) is of direct interest in that he presents a valuation model for
variable rate loan commitments. A less than fully drawn loan facility may be
regarded as a commitment in this sense. The unsurprising conclusion is that
commitments increase in value in an uncertain interest rate environment.
This paper relates to fee based commitments, but a minor model alteration
can be made in order to adjust the model to UK conditions. The paper points
to the partial takedown phenomenon as being deserving of study and indeed
this will form part of our later empirical research in this thesis.
Bester (1985) argues that where information asymmetries exist, banks may
eliminate credit rationing (which results from pooling different risks at one
offer level) by simultaneously setting both the applicable rate of interest and
required collateral. At any given interest rate level, borrowers will be sorted
by collateral and vice versa. An assumption necessary for this argument to
hold is that higher collateral enforces selection of less risky projects.
Investors with low bankruptcy probability are shown to be more willing to
accept higher collateral requirements at any given interest rate, and will thus
be sorted into acceptable risks from the banks viewpoint. Investors with high
bankruptcy probability will be sorted into higher interest rate contracts with
lower collateral requirements. Providing all applicants for credit are within
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acceptable boundaries with respect to interest rates payable and collateral
levels, sorting will ensure that credit rationing does not occur in equilibrium.
Bester's argument relies heavily on the role of collateral in lending
agreements.
Chan and Kanatas (1985) examine the role of collateral in terms of marginal
lending decisions. The existence of high collateral levels may encourage
lenders to back projects with relatively high default probabilities; the collateral
will make good their potential losses. Thus collateral does not act as a
sorting mechanism in the monotone sense suggested by Bester (1985). The
reader is referred to Devinney's (1986) conclusions (section 2.1) with regard
to collateral, which agree with those of Chan and Kanatas.
Chan, Thakor and Greenbaum (1986) view the bank as possessing an
information processing technology which gives it a cost advantage over other
lenders in screening loan applicants. They submit that the durability of
information has reduced in recent times because of inter-temporal fluctuations
in borrower credit ratings. Also they argue that a narrowing of interest rate
spreads has increased banks ruin probability and has reduced screening
expenditure which has led to poorer quality loans becoming more common.
Specifically, they postulate that screening is a matter of choice for an
individual bank, denoted by a real value scalar a and with feasible set
A =(0,a) , and cost strictly increasing, strictly convex V (a) . This screening
expenditure is financed by bank equity and equilibrium is reached when
expenditure on screening is exactly offset by expected savings in default
costs.
Economies of scale may exist through cross sectional re-usability as well as
temporal re-usability of information.
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Chan, Thakor and Greenbaum ascribe the disimprovement in bank asset
quality to the reduction in screening expenditures, and the reduction in output
from those expenditures. However, there is no empirical evidence of
screening expenditures being reduced; in fact, given the increasing default
costs being experienced, it is equally likely that screening expenditures have
in fact increased. A much more likely explanation for the undoubted
disimprovement in asset quality is in fact the improvement in information
technology, enabling borrowers to signal their true creditworthiness to the
market directly, and in a more cost effective fashion than heretofore. This has
led to the self selection of larger corporates away from bank borrowing as a
means of finance, and evidence of this selection would be a relative lack of
quoted companies in the loan portfolio under study. Thus, increased
competition may be directly responsible for better risks leaving bank portfolios
and thus disimproving average asset quality.
Devinney (1986) has examined the economic role of collateral. He defines
collateral as "that amount which the bank receives, with certainty, at no cost
when a borrower defaults". Thus, his discussion is limited to fixed collateral.
Many forms of collateral are not fixed e.g. shares or property pledged as
security, so that Devinney's definition is restrictive. He regards fixed collateral
as moving the bank's income distribution to the right.
Devinney also assumes that no bad borrower will accept a collateralisation
requirement of more than 100%. (Most mortgagees might disagree!)
Essentially Devinney argues that substitution would enable a potential
borrower to avoid borrowing by liquidating his/her collateral. In a real world
sense this does not appear to be the case. Devinney also refers to collateral
in escrow, so perhaps his definition assumes a borrower redepositing against
a loan.
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Devinney also argues that collateralisation cannot be used as a signal since
non-defaulters will exit the market before defaulters. Thus while collateral has
a direct impact on risk, it cannot directly signal default probability. Therefore,
it acts only to reduce bank losses on default, given that default has occurred.
Only if collateralisation costs poor credits more or if asset levels are positively
correlated with ability to repay will collateralisation be a positive quality signal.
Besanko and Thakor (1987) a
 study a credit market with risk neutral agents
and ex ante uninformed lenders. They sort by loan quantity, interest rate, and
collateral. They conclude that credit will not be rationed, low risk borrowers
pay higher interest rates than high risk borrowers, low risk borrowers obtain
higher quantities of credit than they would if they disclosed full information,
and, finally, low risk borrowers pledge higher collateral amounts than high risk
borrowers. Their conclusions derive from the ability of the lender to sort
borrowers into as many risk classes as there are types of borrower through a
suggested four-dimensional sorting process, relevant dimensions being credit
granting probability, loan quality, loan interest rate and required collateral.
This sorting process is closely analogous to the loan pricing model developed
in our subsequent chapter 7, although the sorting criteria differ. Besanko and
Thakor (1987) b
 consider two types of loan market, monopolistic and
competitive. In monopolistic markets they find that collateral will not be used
unless it makes the loan riskless, and that increasing interest rates may
cause high risk borrowers to exit the market prior to low risk borrowers. This
second conclusion runs counter to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and is a result of
sorting allowing ex post good borrowers to be observed as opposed to
pooling and credit rationing, which does not permit such observation.
In competitive loan markets, sorting occurs through the inverse relationship
between interest rates and collateral, permitting the identification of risk
classes. Credit rationing may occur even where deposit supply is elastic and
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collateral is available.	 As collateral increases, the probability of the
occurrence of credit rationing tends toward zero.
The above strand of the literature closely parallels this thesis. However, the
interest rate is not used as a direct sorting mechanism herein. By using
financial gearing, loan utilisation and collateral as sorting variables, risk
groups are identified which are hypothesised to be homogenous with respect
to default probability. The historic cost as a proportion of funds lent in these
risk groups is then used to provide a pricing mechanism. Similar sorting
techniques are used, but interest rates are derived, as opposed to the above
models that take interest rates as exogeneously determined. In this thesis
interest rates are a conditional sorting device, conditioned on loan utilisation,
with low utilisation rate attracting lower interest rate charges.
Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) examine a loan market in which an
incumbent lender is better informed than other potential lenders. They find
that the incumbent lender's interest rate, given client search costs and
heterogeneous potential offers of credit, will exceed the incumbent lenders
cost of funds, and will be higher than the average of competing potential
offers. Potential lenders are prepared to make "loss leading" credit offers
lower than their cost of funds. The expected remaining duration of a lender-
client relationship is decreasing in the length of the existing relationship.
Thus, clients are more likely to leave the longer their relationship with their
existing bank.
James and Weir (1990) examine the benefits of a borrowing relationship in
terms of underpricing of stock offers. They find that the existence of an
established bank borrowing relationship reduces investor uncertainty and thus
the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO's) in the borrowers stock.
Sharpe (1990) analyses the "informational capture" of a bank's existing client
base, and proposes implicit contracts whereby future period interest rates are
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implicitly contracted at the time the initial rate is set, subject to satisfactory
borrower performance. This makes possible loss leading by banks, backed by
reputation. "Informationally captured" clients yield their bank a profit in future
time periods, but will not in aggregate yield a new bank profit at similar
interest rates. This may explain the "stickiness" of credit customers, and
applying Bernanke and Gertler's (1989) logic could explain the downward
spiral associated with intermediary insolvency in the depression of the 1930s.
Once again, the stickiness of credit customers is empirically testable. Banks
although ex ante competitive in the credit market, may be ex post monopolists
due to their ability to offer "informationally captured" clients interest rate terms
below markets to the extent that their being poached is economically sub
optimal for an ex ante competitor.
Berger and Udell (1990) examine collateral as an indicator of loan quality.
They distinguish between the sorting by private information paradigm which is
prevalent in the literature and the sorting by observed risk paradigm evident in
conventional practice. Essentially they argue that previous models only
allowed sorting by reference to variables set by the lender, while denying the
lender any ability to sort a priori. They point out that observable risky
borrowers may be required to pledge more collateral, rather than being
offered an interest rate/collateral trade off as postulated by earlier sorting
models.
Using an empirical portfolio of 1,000,000 loans made by 460 US banks, over
the years 1977-1988, they establish that collateral is most often associated
with riskier borrowers, riskier loans and riskier banks. Thus, riskier than
average firms borrow on a secured basis, the average secured loan tends to
be riskier than the average unsecured loan, and banks which make a higher
fraction of unsecured loans tend to have riskier portfolios.
Berger and Udell's findings suggest that the value of recourse to collateral
less than offsets the sorting by observed risk effect associating higher risk
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borrowers with higher collateral. These findings will be discussed in the
context of the development of loan pricing models in Chapter 7.
Calem and Rizzo (1992) examine lending to hospitals perceived to be
financially weak. They find a strong positive relationship between bank loans
(as a share of borrowing) and profitability. This they present as evidence of
hidden factors enhancing the bank borrowing hospital's financial standing.
This study may be taken as further empirical evidence on the ability of banks
to sort risk, and on the unique nature of bank lending agreements in terms of
their existence as an information source.
Rajan (1992) discusses the fact that although the information benefits of bank
financing are well covered in the literature, the costs associated with the
bank's power to influence firms profits are not well understood. He examines
how firm's choice of source and priority of debt attempts to limit these costs.
This may lead firms into multiple sourcing project finance, and setting differing
priorities for differing source payments. The effect of this may be to weaken
the information benefits while simultaneously reducing the costs of
relationship banking. Over time this may contribute to a disimprovement in
loan quality.
Berger and Udell (1992) use the same portfolio as in their previous paper to
examine empirically the significance of credit rationing. They would expect
that if credit rationing were significant, the proportion of loans issued under
commitment should rise in tight credit market conditions. They find no
evidence of this, and conclude that credit rationing is not a significant
macroeconomic phenomenon.
Moore (1993) revisits the ground covered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and states that a borrower will seek to improve his credit status by retaining
earnings to the extent that his/her resulting credit savings exceed his/her
opportunity loss in retaining earnings in the first place.
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Petersen and Rajan (1994) use a small business administration U.S.
database to show that single banking relationships increase the availability of
finance over time but do not necessarily reduce its price. As in Rajan (1992)
they find that any attempts to use multiple sources of credit both increases
price and reduces availability rather than price.
Berger and Udell (1995) use the same data-source as Petersen and Rajan
(1994) to solve the asymmetric information problems associated with small
firm finance. With specific reference to letters of credit (UC's) they find that
borrowers with longer relationships pay less, and are less likely to pledge
collateral. These results are consistent with relationship banking generating
valuable information about borrower quality.
Berger and Udell comment on transaction-driven rather than relationship-
driven loans, and identify L/C's as an example of the latter. This may explain
the different results derived by them to those of Petersen and Rajan (1994),
given their specific focus. A composite result would suggest that L/C's in
relationship banking reduce in price over time, but this effect may be masked
by other loan transactions which increase availability of finance over time,
though not necessarily at a reduced price.
These last results imply that a durable single relationship may be valuable,
and appear to contradict Greenbaum, Kanatas and Vanezia's (1989) model
and Sharpe's (1990) informational capture model which predict increased
interest rates over time. The debate seems likely to continue, and the
eventual resolution may lie in the sorting paradigms first mentioned by Berger
and Udell (1990). If loan sorting is by difference to observed risk, then this
risk should reduce over time as lenders reduce information asymmetries, thus
producing cheaper loans for given collateralisation levels. If, alternatively,
loan sorting is primarily by private information, then information asymmetries
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will persist, and loans will not cheapen. With reference to the present thesis,
the proposed sorting mechanism is firmly by reference to observed risk, so
that the models therein belong (in a taxonomic sense) to the observed risk
side of the debate, although empirical reduction in interest rates by duration of
relationship would only be produced by the introduction of a new risk class,
which requires statistical justification.
As the quality of data available improves, more risk should become
observable, and less should remain in private hands for given risk quanta. It
seems reasonable to suppose that improvements in information technology
and risk classification will produce an improvement in data quality, leading to
observable risk growing and private information risk decreasing over time.
Thus the sorting by observed risk paradigm is likely to dominate.
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2.3	 Portfolio Allocation
Table 2.3 below summarises the chronological progression of portfolio
allocation literature.
Table 2.3
Portfolio Allocation Literature
(Chronological Progression)
Year Author Brief description / comment
1952 Markowitz Portfolio selection, mean variance, efficiency
1971 Pyle Modern portfolio theory, hedging, quantity setting
1974 Hart and Jaffee Portfolio theory, quantity setting, random deposit rates
1979 Kane and Buser Diversification by government security holdings
1981 Brealey, Hodges and Selby Simulation of loan portfolio risk
1984 Bennett Diversification in global loan portfolios
1991 Gelles Risk measurement for banks
1991 Avery and Berger Loan commitment risk
1992 Sinkey Management of loan portfolios
1994 Glantz Management of loan portfolios
Following Markowitz's (1952) path-breaking development of a mean variance
framework for asset portfolios, Pyle (1971) used such a framework to
determine necessary conditions for financial intermediation. He used a 3-
asset model featuring a riskless asset in addition to loans and deposits. His
results imply that covariance of lending and deposit rates is extremely
important, and a positive loan premium and /or a negative deposit premium
must exist for the firm to make risky loans and to intermediate deposits. In
this thesis we concentrate only on the positive loan premium. As previously
discussed, a modification of the competitive asset market model should
produce a variable loan premium which will have a minimum value of zero, as
a value less than zero would permit loan arbitrage.
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The specification for the optimal solution in these models is critically
dependent on the returns to assets and/or liabilities and in most cases these
are assumed exogeneously given. This does not apparently give the bank
any role in determining asset returns through its lending policies. The banks
own objective function must play a part in establishing the feasible portfolio
set, and return maximisation may not be a first best solution. Hart & Jaffee
(1974) first postulated that the Markowitzfrobin/Litner model of an efficient
portfolio could directly be applied to financial intermediaries. The
intermediary is assumed to maximise a utility function defined over the mean
and standard deviation of returns. The authors recognised a shortcoming in
their own approach in respect of quantity setting by banks as opposed to
stochastic quantities, and confined their considerations to portfolios of traded
securities. They showed that if the intermediary has a Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function and if the terminal value of portfolio assets are multi-normally
distributed, then a unique efficient portfolio solution exists.
Hart and Jaffee (1974) develop a separation theorem under some restrictive
assumptions, which may work in an environment in which no risk-free asset
exists i.e. a fully liability-funded bank. Arguably all banks which maintain
portfolios of government securities are already fully liability-funded if
government securities are viewed as a risk free asset.
Kane and Buser (1979) theorised that financial intermediaries are specialised
producers of diversification services. They examined bank holdings by
number of U.S. treasury securities as evidence of diversification, and
concluded that stockholders were prepared to pay considerable diversification
costs to increase confidence that actual portfolio variance was at or below an
acceptable level. Marginal diversification benefits were found to be a
decreasing function of size. Their work pointed to information risk as being a
possible cost element mitigating against "home made" diversification, and
paved the way for the delegated monitoring/agency theory of banking which
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prevails today (Diamond (1984) et al). They again concentrated only on
marketable securities, and did not discuss diversification of credit portfolios.
Bennet (1984) suggests the direct application of portfolio theory to bank loan
portfolios, with banks pricing aggressively to secure business acting as a
relative hedge to other portfolio components. According to his reasoning,
banks should focus on the absolute variability of returns on their entire loan
portfolio. However, apart from referring to hypothetical simulations by Brealey
et al (1981) and constructing a simple illustrative example, Bennet provides
only a recipe for what banks might do. The effectiveness of diversification
remains to be tested. The present author intends inter alia to assess directly
how diversified an actual loan portfolio is.
Gelles (1991) proposes a simple risk measure %, the coefficient of
variation of profit, being the standard deviation of profit divided by the
average realisation of the random variable profit. This will be an appropriate
measure for any risk averse bank, and the author contends that it is relevant
regardless of the nature of the risky asset distribution. He maintains that any
exogenous action on the part of regulators which increases the probability of
negative bank profit is to be avoided. The measure is simple, observable and
appears to make practical sense. However, the author's assumption that if R
is normally distributed then the measure is monotonically positively related to
the probability that bank profit (and thus end-period wealth) will be less than
zero deserves examination if only because no evidence is given that R is in
fact normally distributed, and because not all risky options are linear
transformations of a given distribution.
Chirinko and Guill (1991) analyse industry loan losses in the United States;
they link these losses to macroeconomic and industry variables in order to
derive a loan loss equation. They downgrade financial markets alone as
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unlikely to prove useful in assessing depository institution risks. It is argued
that existing capital standards, decided by broad asset group allocation, focus
on the wrong target. Diversification ignoring covariance can lead to a
substantial mis-statement of risk exposure.
The authors focus on portfolio characteristics allied to cash flow
characteristics for specific industries and macroeconomic variables in order to
produce risk measures of mean, standard deviation and to locate area to the
right of some critical level (representing excessive loan losses) for the loan
losses of a particular bank. Assuming loan losses normally distributed the
mean and standard deviation characterise the distribution. This may be an
heroic assumption.
The authors conclude that much is lost by ignoring industry-specific
information when analysing loan portfolio risk. They also conclude that
covariation of portfolio risk is of great importance, specifically in terms of the
critical region of the loan loss distribution, which is likely to be of interest to
regulators.
This study closely parallels the main body of this present thesis. However
industry-wide loan losses are not available to the present author, so that
emerging information is confined to that provided by the specific portfolio
used to develop and test the proposed methodology. Further Chirinko and
Gull (1991) are concerned more with areas of concern to regulators, rather
than the efficient portfolio required for ongoing management. However, both
as an indication of an alternative methodology and as a reference point for
loan loss distribution analysis, their study has merit. The extent to which the
loan loss distribution may be skewed could have important implications for
just those probabilities with which the authors are most concerned. The study
is therefore incomplete, but will be referred to in Chapter 6.
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Avery and Berger (1991) examine bank commitments, or agreements to lend
in some future period at a price agreed now. They conclude that
commitments increase a bank's risk exposure, but may or may not have a
disproportionate effect depending on the sorting of borrowers to whom
commitments are to be given versus the moral hazard and adverse selection
activities of the borrowers themselves. This paper is of interest in the area of
facility utilisation, which will prove to be a risk determinant later in the current
study.
Sinkey (1992) identifies four major drawbacks in closing the gap between
research and practice in loan classification, which is vital in mean variance
analysis of asset portfolios. These are:
1. The inability to quantify the relationship aspect of the lending process.
2. The reluctance of lenders to share information with researchers.
3. The lack of data on rejected borrowers.
4. The backward looking nature of classification studies.
He suggests that: "Timely and accurate pro forma information on the decision
inputs required by lenders combined with similar forecasts of competitive and
economic conditions would be ideal for the prevention, identification and
resolution of borrower problems at commercial banks" (Sinkey (1992 p 514)).
Recent work on bank relationships by duration and the availability of some
databases are beginning to make inroads into the first two drawbacks, but the
last two are more problematic. In terms of competitive loan pricing the last
drawback is particularly significant. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is
less on highly responsive loan pricing than on the solvency of banking
institutions given some control mechanism allowing banks to respond to
default experience within their own portfolios. Sinkey describes a highly
competitive and responsive loan market, which would imply a rapid
adjustment of loan pricing to current economic developments. This is one
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end of a loan pricing spectrum, the other end of which is permanently fixed
loan margins.
The problem is to produce a loan pricing framework which is sufficiently
responsive to current conditions, while not so responsive as to jeopardise the
solvency of the lender. This topic will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
Glantz (1994) refers to an expected default frequency model (EDF) which will
be seen to be one of the key building blocks of the insurance approach to
pricing credit risk. His model depends on the existence of publicly traded
stock, from whose performance the value of debt may be inferred. As most
bank loans are made to firms whose stock is unquoted, the EDF model
proposed by Glantz is unsuitable for valuation of most bank loans. This
thesis relies on the past performance of similar loans to estimate asset
volatility. Thus asset volatility is inferred directly from examination of relevant
portfolio risk groups, given that no market value is readily available for the
computation of such volatility in the case of single borrowers. This marks a
key difference between the two approaches to loan pricing.
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2.4	 Option Pricing and Deposit Insurance
Table 2.4 summarises the chronological progression of option pricing and
deposit insurance literature.
Table 2.4
Option Pricing and Deposit Insurance Literature
(Chronological Progression)
Year Author Model Description / comment
1973 Black and Scholes Option pricing of corporate liabilities
1974 Merton Option pricing of corporate default risk
1977 Merton Option pricing of deposit insurance
1978 Sharpe Variable capital fixed premium deposit insurance
1981 Buser, Chen and Kane Optimal capital under existing regulation
1983 Horvitz Variable premium deposit insurance feasibility
1986 Brickley and James Stock price response to deposit insurance
1986 Goodman and Santomero Variable premium deposit insurance
1989 Acharya and Dreyfus Pricing deposit insurance with variable reorganisations
1989 Furlong and Keeley Regulatory influences on risk taking
1990 Gorton and Santomero Quoted debt response to bank risk
1990 Goudreau and King Recent banking profitability
1990 Keeley Charter value as a risk determinant
1991 Genotte and Pyle Regulation and bank risk
1991 Avery and Berger Risk based capital
1991 Bradley, Wambeke and
Whidbee
Risk weights and risk based capital
1991 Flannery Error in regulatory measurement systems
1992 Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor A fair deposit insurance system
1993 Allen and Saunders Deposit insurance reform
1993 Merton and Bodie Deposit insurance reform
1993 Benston and Kaufman Deposit insurance reform
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Black and Scholes (1973) made a significant breakthrough in the
mathematical evaluation of corporate liabilities by enabling the valuation of
equity as a call option on firm value. Merton (1974) developed Black and
Scholes work, using the isomorphic relationship between levered equity and a
call option on firm value, to develop a valuation model for corporate debt and
thence to deduce a risk structure of interest rates dependent on the volatility
of firm value and the ratio of indebtedness to firm value. Merton
acknowledges a bias in his work, since his use of stochastic calculus did not
permit a unique solution, without his use of a discount function at the risk-free
(as opposed to the risky) rate of interest.
Merton (1977) applied option pricing theory to the problem of deposit
insurance and completed the basic product analytics. However, Merton did
not specify the process whereby volatility of either bank or firm value might be
computed. Merton provides a blueprint for what would be done if these
volatilities were available. This present thesis provides a framework for the
computation of these volatilities.
Merton (1978) investigates who pays for deposit insurance. He concludes
that in a competitive banking industry, the equilibrium return on deposits will
be reduced by the auditing costs of the intermediary, with the actual put
option price of deposit insurance being paid by the shareholders.
Sharpe (1978) examines fixed premium deposit insurance, and concludes
that an equitable insurance system must allow capital requirements to vary
between banks of varying risk. Sharpe's main argument is closely analogous
to that in this thesis. We do not attempt to price deposit insurance, but our
methodology equates ruin probability between banks of varying risk using a
VAR approach. Our methodology directly implies variable capital
requirements coupled with deposit insurance premiums which would vary little
between banks.
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Buser, Chen and Kane ((1986) point out that deposit insurance and regulation
are closely linked, and that regulatory authorities may charge an implicit
insurance premium by their activities. They argue that contingent regulatory
interference is an implicit premium, the size of premium increasing as the
probability of such interference increases. Optimal bank capital is that which
minimises the cost per dollar deposited of the sum of implicit and explicit
premiums. Banks operate close to the interference threshold (as is
evidenced by US banks frequently shifting on and off the FDIC's problem list
in large numbers) in response to their capital positions weakening or
strengthening due to unanticipated cyclical swings in economic activity.
Horvitz (1983) argues against variable deposit insurance premiums on the
basis that risk intensity is likely to be inherently far less stable than in
conventional insurances. The effect of this would be to have banks agreeing
to insure deposits when they perceived such insurance to be to their
advantage, and not otherwise. Deposit insurance premiums would increase
as banks could least afford to meet their cost. The overall effect would be a
deficit for the insurance fund, due to adverse selection by banks, and
substantial reliance on deposit insurance in times of economic difficulty. The
maintenance of a solvent, relatively stable fund would be extremely difficult.
Horvitz concludes that capital standards, rather than deposit insurance
premiums, should vary. Although not considering the issues in the same light
as Horvitz, the methodology proposed in this thesis would avoid the
difficulties mentioned by him.
Brickley and James (1986) investigate whether access to the deposit
insurance system has a discernible effect on the stock prices of financial
intermediaries during periods of financial stress. Specifically, by reference to
savings and loan institutions in the United States, they find that stock returns
reflect investor expectations concerning the reaction of insuring agents to
changes in risk (in terms of insurance availability). Changes in portfolio
values need not be reflected fully in changes in the equity value of the
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institution. This has implications for studies such as those by Marcus and
Shaked (1984), which utilise estimates of the variance of equity returns in an
option pricing approach to the cost of deposit insurance. The use of this
methodology may understate the true price of the insurance, which is portfolio
rather than equity-based.
Goodman and Santomero (1986) examine variable rate deposit insurance in
a wider social context. They argue that such a scheme has costs in the real
(as opposed to the financial sector), by increasing the cost of funds to the real
sector, and thus increasing the probability of social costs associated with the
bankruptcy of borrowing firms. In addition to being actuarially fair, the social
costs referred to must also be taken into account. The authors do not
recommend a scheme of insurance, but confine their conclusions to the
above. An implication which may be drawn is that with positive social costs
and the difficulties already referred to by Horvitz (1983), variable rate deposit
insurance is problematic in costing and implementation.
Acharya and Dreyfus (1989) point to difficulties in pricing insurance when the
claim costs of such insurance is directly influenced by the actions of the
insurers themselves. Optimal policies pursued by regulators for both bank
closures and deposit insurance premiums may be derived as functions of rate
of flow of bank deposits, the interest rate on such deposits, the risk free
interest rate, and audit/administration costs. The insurer must simultaneously
determine his/her optimal closure policy and respective level of premium. The
optimal closure level is found to be at an asset to deposit level of at least 1:
that is, some excess of assets over deposits. The authors point out that
these conclusions may be bank-specific in that they ignore possible "knock-
on" effects of bank closure.
Furlong and Keeley (1989) examine the response by banks to increases in
required regulatory capital; they conclude that a value-maximising bank will
have diminishing incentives to increase asset risk as capital increases. Such
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a bank will raise such increased capital, rather than reducing instead its
balance sheet size. The analysis requires that regulators do not relax efforts
to limit asset risk and size. In this environment, more stringent capital
requirements will reduce the risk exposure of the deposit insurance system.
Gorton and Santomero (1990) examine quoted bank subordinated debt to
establish whether financial markets enforce a risk discipline on banks by
reducing the value of such debt as the issuing bank increases its asset risk.
They do not find evidence of such discipline, implying that regulators should
not rely on financial market signals.
Both Keeley (1990) and Goudreau and King (1990) examine banking
profitability, the former over a longer timescale. Keeley analyses the US
banking problems of the 1980s as being due to moral hazard associated with
fixed rate deposit insurance availability as bank charter values fell, through
increased competition. He concludes that in an environment where bank
charters have reduced in value, thereby removing a barrier to unfettered
moral hazard, the then current deposit insurance system needed reform.
Genotte and Pyle (1991) analyse the effect of deposit guarantees on bank's,
loan portfolios. They view bank loans as market securities. It is concluded by
them that deposit guarantees lead to inefficient investment and that capital
requirements may lead banks to increase asset risk. The key difference
between their approach and that of Furlong and Keeley (1990) is their
consideration of bank loans as market securities, which will respond in value
to capital requirements. Loan portfolio payoffs are characterised by a present
value V and a risk index cr. Banks seek to maximise the net present value of
loan portfolios J(V, a). Deposit insurance allows the bank to fund such
portfolios at the riskless rate. The net present value of the bank is the value
of the subsidy represented by deposit insurance and the net present value
referred to above. The subsidy is strictly increasing in value as insured
deposits increase. Banks would buy traded assets without limit in the
68
absence of capital requirements. However, traded assets require inputs in
the form of information about relative risk.
The effect of an increase in capital requirements may be to reduce scale, but
to cause the bank to effect this reduction by reducing assets in increasing
order of risk in order to maintain or increase the subsidy value. If assets
already held have a risk elasticity greater than the risk reduction effect of
increasing capital, the perverse effect may be that an increase in capital
requirements may increase the probability of bankruptcy. This approach
requires the existence of risky securities in sufficient quantity to enable the
required elasticity to exist.
Avery and Berger (1991) examine the now current capital adequacy
requirement referred to as risk-based capital (RBC). They conclude that RBC
is an improvement, and is stricter than previous requirements for large banks
and for the system as a whole. Banks representing more than 25% of all
bank assets would have failed these standards in 1989. They observe that
the ideal dataset for the analysis of the effectiveness of RBC would include
information on the performance of individual loans, which was not available at
the time. They conclude that a risk-based deposit insurance scheme using
similar weights to RBC (plus some rewards for higher capital) would "likely" be
an improvement on flat rate deposit insurance. They point out the risk of
using data from a past regulatory environment to assess the effectiveness of
RBC, and mention that RBC penalises large banks because of their relatively
higher proportion of off balance sheet activities. RBC is an improvement, but
could itself be improved. This thesis proposes a VAR computation of capital
requirements which is argued to represent a further improvement on RBC.
Bradley, Wambeke and Whidbee (1991) calculate the required RBC to ensure
actuarial equity in the deposit insurance scheme over the 1985-88 period in
the United States. They conclude that RBC would have been insufficient, and
would need to have been set at a 20% standard rather than 8%. They also
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point out that losses may have been inflated over their chosen period by
resolution problems in savings and loans, so that 20% may represent an
overestimate of required capital on standard assets. They further point out
that interbank deposits and residential mortgages may be relatively safer than
20% and 50% of standard weightings, respectively.
Flannery (1991) examines the real world difficulties of establishing bank asset
values, and points out that errors in measurement can cause mispricing of
deposit insurance. In such an environment, Flannery shows that the impact
of these errors on private sector allocations can be minimised with a
combination of risk-related capital standards, and risk-related deposit
insurance premia. Key to this conclusion is that measured asset risk provides
a differing yardstick as it varies, implying that both leverage and insurance
premia should vary as asset risk varies. Flannery observes that moral hazard
could still exist between measures of asset risk. This could be countered by a
retrospective adjustment by regulators.
As error in asset risk measurement is reduced, the scope for "game playing"
is reduced. However asset risk will vary in any event due to underlying
economic conditions, so that variable leverage and premia would obtain even
if measurement error were eliminated. This thesis attempts to minimise
measurement error by specifying a VAR model unique to each bank, and
specifies insolvency probabilities of sufficiently small order as to concentrate
the adjustment to changing asset risk on the leverage component. Thus,
what is proposed herein is the reduction of measurement error, the risk
adjustment process to take place through varying capital, and a small residual
theoretical deposit insurance premium relative to preset measurement and
standards.
Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) examine whether deposit insurance
can be fairly priced in a deregulated environment. Where private information
and moral hazard exist, the former can be overcome by offering each bank a
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menu of choice whereby capital is inversely related to the required deposit
insurance premium. However, the moral hazard can only be overcome by the
introduction of subsidies, implying that fair deposit insurance is not possible.
These subsidies may be generated out of social cost savings (Goodman and
Santomero (1986)) so that fair deposit insurance may still be possible for
society as a whole, even though Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor indicate that
it is unlikely that a private sector insurer could provide this service. The
reduction of moral hazard associated with VAR models (where the
responsiveness of VAR to increased observed risk may be optimised) may
reduce the extent of required subsidy. If moral hazard were to tend toward
zero, then deposit insurance could be fairly priced with a variable deductible.
Allen and Saunders (1993) point out that the value of subsidy in deposit
insurance may be overstated by simply valuing the deposit insurance contract
as a put option. In fact the option is a callable put if the insurer can act to
close the bank prior to shareholders. This call provision has value,
represented by savings generated by early official closure. This value must
be subtracted from the simple put value in estimating the extent of the
subsidy. If the regulator rewards lower-risk banks by exercising forbearance
(delaying exercise of the call), then beyond some asset risk threshold deposit
insurance may be of diminishing value to shareholders.
Merton and Bodie (1993), Flannery (1993) and Benston and Kaufman (1993)
discuss functional reform of the deposit insurance system in the light of the
arrival of RBC. The main focus of this thesis is not, in fact, on deposit
insurance, although the author recognises that any VAR model must have
implications for deposit insurance as capital levels and deposit insurance are
substantially interrelated. Given these kinds of linkage, and bearing in mind
that deposit insurance is not a central issue in this thesis, the preceding
review is confined solely to the evolution of the literature, rather than its
present practical application.
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2.5	 Insurance
A chronological development of the insurance literature is not furnished,
because most of the mathematical functions associated with insurance were
completed by less well-known Scandinavian mathematicians like Bohlmann
(1909), Lundberg (1909),(1919) in the early part of this century. Whereas a
generalised theory of financial intermediation was required and sought in
order to examine the reasons for the existence and activities of banks, no
such theory was necessary to describe the benefits of risk pooling
arrangements embodied in insurance intermediaries. The latter focus was
essentially on statistical properties themselves in a particular context or
application.
More recent literature begins with Ammeter (1953) who investigated the
pricing of risk pooling between insurance companies. Cramer (1954) refined
the earlier models by establishing a mathematical framework for the existence
and operation of single period insurers, assuming inter-temporal stationarity
of risk.
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Subsequently the literature diverges into several branches:
1. Simulation models of insurance companies in operation. A basic model
was first completed by Sugars (1973). This model did not contain any
feedback, and limited itself to the consideration of stochastic bundles on
limited numbers of observations of random variation in the claims process.
Subsequently a detailed blueprint for insurance company simulation was
developed by Beard, Pentikainen, and Pesonen (1984). Their model
contained extensive interaction, developed by Daykin and Hey (1989) and
Daykin Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994).
2. Insurance Pricing: Wilson (1977) first modelled insurance product pricing in
a market where both moral hazard and adverse selection existed. Biger
and Kahane (1978) and Blazenko (1986) concentrated on the design of
insurance products which would minimise these twin problems. Hsaio,
Changseob and Taylor (1990), Bond and Crocker (1991) and Brockman
and Wright (1992) concentrated on the endogenous categorisation of risks,
providing a perspective on the relative magnitude of risks by reference to
past experience of similar risks. This enabled statistically rigorous
procedures to be adopted in pricing insurance risk, assuming broad inter-
temporal stationarity in risk intensity.
3. Implicit contracts: This literature concentrates on the implicit promise of an
insurer to review a short-term insurance contract at some price similar to
that being presently charged, provided there is no material change in the
insured risk. Lof (1983) investigates the problem from a linear control
perspective, with product price and reserves each partly absorbing risks
associated with the implicit contract. Rubenstein and Yaari (1983)
examine the emergence of moral hazard over a multi-period insurance
contract, which may not be present in single period insurances. Rosen
(1985) examines implicit contracts in general, and concludes that a first
period contract must be priced to reflect the implied option granted for all
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future periods, thus leading to higher prices for such contracts than for
genuine single period contracts.
Cooper and Hayes (1987) continue the development of the literature by
examining how the moral hazard problem may be overcome by allowing
the insured to participate in the benefits of his/her own good housekeeping.
A no-claims discount would be a specific example of such participation. As
part of the loan pricing model developed in this thesis, a similar
methodology is advocated, whereby clients of banks would be rewarded
with a lower interest rate payable for lower loan utilisation levels. This
represents a form of lower risk discount encouraging the borrower to
reduce his/her exposure to risk of default, and to participate in such
savings as result.
Underwriting cycles: Cummins and Harrington (1987) and Taylor (1988)
have investigated underwriting cycles, the former with respect to regulation
and the latter with respect to pricing and solvency. They both conclude
that underwriting cycles exist, and therefore such non stationarity of risk
intensity and/or insurance pricing must be allowed for in solvency
calculations.
Claim Payment: It may be many years before claims are finally settled, and
an increasing amount of practical work has gone into estimating the claim
"tail" in respect of payments to be made in the future on claims which have
already occurred. Renshaw (1989) uses generalised linear interactive
modelling to extrapolate such future claim costs from those incurred in the
past, adjusted for ensuing inflation and volume of business. Verrall (1989)
develops a state space representation of the chain ladder technique of
reserving for such claims. Verrall (1993) points out that these techniques
may be used even where negative incremental claims exist (as would be
the case if provisions were "written back", or if claim reserves were found to
be surplus to requirements). Verrall's approach is to transform the mean of
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the distribution being used to ensure that all claims are positive in the
transformed state, and then to calculate reserves reversing the
transformation after relevant calculations.
Provisioning in banking is similar to claims reserving in insurance, with full
provision in respect of default losses being completed approximately 15
months after default notification. Thus reserving techniques similar to
those used in insurance models are necessary to price loans accurately.
An excellent compendium of insurance literature is contained in the series
by Kluwer Academic Publishers (1985, 1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1991 and
1992).
2.6	 Regulation
A very extensive and rich regulation literature (much of it US based) exists,
dealing with reasons for and effectiveness of banking regulation. As this
thesis does not propose to enter directly the regulatory arena, and as
regulation insofar as it is interrelated with deposit insurance has been
discussed in Section 2.4, we confine our review to current regulations
embodied in the following:
EC 86/635
EC 89/643
EC 89/646
EC 92/30
EC 93/6
On the preparation of consolidated accounts
On solvency ratios
On European co-ordination of laws regulations and
administrative provisions
On supervision
On capital adequacy
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The Basle (1988) risk-based capital adequacy standards were incorporated
into European Community (EC) law in EC 89/643. These standards apply
to commercial bank "banking books", including unquoted loans to be held
to maturity.
Capital must be held in proportion to the weighted risk as determined by
the application of the above standards to a bank's holdings of earning
assets. Such capital requires remuneration (as it forms the "risk capital" of
the banking entity) and gives rise to a need to earn some target rate of
return on capital. This target rate of return is an integral part of loan pricing
calculation.
Subsequently EC 93/6 drew a distinction between assets held for resale
("traded assets") and assets which were to be held to maturity. In respect
of the former, it set out a building block VAR framework for calculation of
capital required to back bank trading books.
Essentially, this thesis argues the merits of applying a VAR-type approach
to both traded and non traded assets, and proposes a method of
computation in the case of non traded assets, that imputes VAR from
observable portfolio-specific inputs to a standard model.
Current regulation with regard to risk-based capital (EC 89/643) is
compared to that implied by a VAR model of credit risk, analogous in
operation to EC 93/6 which relates to traded assets. Discussion is
confined to differing implications for capital adequacy and insolvency risk,
and does not attempt to address regulation in terms of its own specific
literature and policy arena. This thesis is concerned with capital adequacy
regulation only to the extent that it requires that loan pricing has to recover
inter alia the minimum required rate of return on the bank equity "allocated"
(on risk adjusted criteria) to a loan. In short, regulation and the respective
regulatory capital are essentially a datum to this thesis.
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2.7	 Conclusion
The relevant banking and insurance literatures have has been reviewed
selectively under 6 main headings. These have set the proposed research
in context by reference to the evolving theory of financial intermediation
(which discusses the existence and methods of operation of banks); the
information asymmetries that characterise the activities of financial
intermediaries (with the use of credit rationing and collateral as means to
minimise the effect of such asymmetries); the portfolio allocation activities
of financial intermediaries ( this thesis sets out a framework for mean
variance efficiency and resource allocation using a VAR methodology);
option pricing and deposit insurance as a means of quantifying the risk of
loan portfolios (this thesis equates option and insurance pricing
methodologies, and develops a variable capital fixed insolvency probability
model to address the twin issues of deposit insurance and capital
requirement); insurance pricing with specific reference to multi-period
insurances; and finally regulation.
Some additional references are cited in the context of specific chapters of
the thesis. These are included in the full bibliography at the back of the
thesis.
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Chapter 3
Theory and Practice of Credit Risk Treatment
in Bank Loan Pricing
Introduction
The previous chapter selectively surveyed the main literature from which
important strands of the present thesis develop. This chapter focuses
more specifically on credit risk treatment in bank loan pricing, the central
concern of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature
and operational significance of credit and other loan-related risks. A
simplified bank loan-pricing function is presented and discussed in the
context of present theory and practice. The strengths and limitations of
present pricing practice are explored. The alternative bank-specific
approach in this thesis is introduced, and the key variables integral to the
proposed approach are identified.
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3.1	 A Simple Bank Loan Pricing Function
3.1.1	 Discussion of Loan Risks
The primary risk to which a lender is exposed is that the borrower will not
repay the loan either wholly and/or according to the agreed repayment
schedule; this risk is known generally as credit or default risk. Other risks
associated with bank lending are interest rate risk, (the risk that market
interest rates may differ from those implicit in the interest rate payable),
and liquidity risk (the risk that a bank may not have the resources to meet
legitimate liquidity demands).
Sinkey (1992) points out that banks acquire reputational capital as
monitors of credit risk. While this reputational capital is valuable, liquidity
risk is much reduced, as runs on banks, known as liquidity crises, emerge
only when markets devalue a bank's reputational capital. Recent US and
other banking experiences suggest that the underlying reasons for the
devaluation of banking reputational capital can usually be traced to
excessive credit risk, manifested as heavy loan losses e.g. Continental
Illinois (1982) and Bank of New England (1991). For a bank which does
not take on excessive credit risk, money management techniques are
generally sufficient to absorb short-term liquidity fluctuations, with
government security portfolios available as a backstop, before unquoted
asset portfolios require realisation. Thus, liquidity risk is not material to
loan pricing (although it may be material to a bank's ability to extend a
loan).
With respect to interest rate risk, loans may be priced at fixed or floating
interest rates. Given that most bank liabilities are short-term floating
interest rate sensitive, interest rate risk may exist when interest rate resets
on loans occur less frequently than resets on liabilities, so that an interest
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reset gap emerges. In practice, for example, fixed interest rates result as a
combination of floating interest rate loans with floating/fixed interest rate
swaps. The interest rate risk associated with fixed interest loans is priced
into the swap contract, which is separate from the loan.
Loans may be priced by reference to the bank's own cost of funds, by
reference to a benchmark rate of interest (e.g. prime rate or base rate), or
by reference to the interest rate prevailing on a floating interest rate
government obligation of similar duration to the loan being granted. With
respect to the first of these methods Sinkey (1992, p518) observes:
"If on a risk adjusted basis bond returns exceed loan returns, and if
a bank is not under regulatory pressure for not serving the lending
needs of its community, then, if the interests of bank shareholders
are to be served, the bank should be investing in bonds".
Asay and Albertson (1990 p14) note that when a bank chooses to hold a
loan
"...it is choosing to engage in money management, holding a
security with a yield commensurate with asset backed securities in
the capital markets, as well as choosing to be in the loan origination
business..., it may make perfect sense for the bank to sell its implicit
asset backed securities and replace them with higher yielding
securities of equivalent risk even if the banks funding costs are
lower than the yield on the asset backed securities created and
sold". The "sale" may be notional.
From a theoretical portfolio allocation viewpoint, basing loan pricing on the
bank's cost of funds is only strictly justified if a direct link can be
established between depositors prepared to accept lower than market
interest rates in the expectation of a future subsidised loan. Given
separated competition in both liability and asset markets, such a link does
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not appear plausible. Thus, for a profit-maximising bank, asset choice
should in theory be independent of liability choice; asset pricing, therefore,
should be independent of liability pricing.
With respect to the second method, the crucial question is, how
representative is the benchmark rate? If the benchmark rate is closely
correlated with short-term default free assets in the market in question it
and represents a competitive part of the portfolio choice open to the bank,
then pricing by reference to the rate is an option. Disintermediation in
financial markets has tended to make reference rates such as the US
prime rate, the UK base rate, or the German Lombard rate, for example,
less representative of prevailing asset market interest rates, thus making
such benchmark rates differ from the true rates available for asset
allocation purposes.
With reference to the last choice, prevailing government security rates
represent those applicable to a security free of default risk, and subject to
identical interest rate risk to that of the comparable asset which a loan
represents. If day-to-day liquidity risk is accepted as a money
management function charged to depositors, and that liquidity risk
compelling (forced) loan sales or realisations is of very low order, then the
difference between the interest rate payable on a loan, net of
administration costs, and that payable on a government security of similar
reset and duration, represents the charge payable to the bank in respect of
default risk. Thus the third choice is appropriate for this research, which
concentrates on default risk and is only concerned with developing a more
market-orientated (opportunity cost) system of practical bank loan pricing.
It also fits in with modern CAPM and other pricing methods which are built
around opportunistic, externally focused pricing.
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3.1.2	 Development of a Basic Loan Pricing Model
In equilibrium, Sinkey (1992 pp 517-525) proposes the following
generalisable loan pricing model:
(1 + r * )(1 — d) = (1 + r) 	 (3.1)
where:	 r* = interest rate on risky loan
d = expected loss per unit lent
r = risk free interest rate
The bank must generate sufficient interest income on its loans to
compensate itself for expected default costs and resulting earnings
uncertainty and to produce an identical return to that payable on a risk free
asset.
Re arranging, the respective default risk premium is
(r*-0= (1+ r") d	 (3.2)
This general type of approach is further developed in Chapter 5 of the
current thesis. Critical to the solution of this equation is the value of d, the
expected loss per unit lent. In practice this is a function of the well-known
'Cs' of credit (see next paragraph). The model should be forward looking,
as it relates to future expected values.
Sinkey (1992 p 522) extends the model to express d in terms of its
functional components which he identifies as "information quality,
character, level and stability of cash flow, real net worth and guarantees".
He further argues that each of the above is a function of a "state of the
economy" variable. This last variable leads to covariation of risk within
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loan portfolios necessitating the introduction of a further term, p,
representing the markup or markdown for portfolio risk.
Equation 3.2 is thus transformed to
r
.	 0
= 
(1+
1
1—d—p
Equation 3.3 decomposes to a respective risk premium:
r*—r=d+p-v(d+p)r*	 (3.4)
requiring investors to be compensated for "the time value of money (r),
default risk (d), portfolio risk (p), and interaction effects Id + pi r*. As "p is
difficult to compute", these latter equations 3.3 and 3.4 are "more
interesting for their theoretical insights than for direct and practical
empirical applications." Nevertheless, they do embody the essence of
practical loan-pricing in banks. Sinkey's model is the distillation of
widespread practical experiences and theory.
The approach adopted in this thesis has many close parallels with Sinkey's
model. The "state of the economy" variable corresponds to risk intensity;
the "level and stability of cash flow" to utilisation; the "real net worth" to
gearing; and "guarantees" to security. All of the above are 'rating factors'
within the model proposed in Chapter 7.
Typical credit analysis focuses on (1-d), the probability of full repayment.
Given that such probabilities in most banking applications will be close to
unity, apparent accuracy is relatively easily obtained. However, given the
(3.3)
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highly leveraged nature of lending, small percentage movements in (1-d)
occasioned by large percentage movements in d, can have serious
operational implications for underlying financial measures. Table 3.1
illustrates this point:
Table 3.1
Lending performance of 27 large U.S. banks (1986-89)
Return on
Equity %
Loan spread
over securitised
rates %
Provision as %
loans
Operating
Exposures as %
Revenues
Average of 27 13.5 2.56 0.84 47
Average of top 5 23.9 3.34
/
0.90 43
Average of bottom 5 2.0 2.19 1.23 54
Source: Asay and Albertson (1990)
Asay and Albertson examined 27 large U.S. banks over the period 1986-89.
These banks were of similar size and operated in a similar economic
environment. The average spread achieved was 1.72% for a)) banks, with
2.44% for the top 5 and 0.96% for the bottom 5. As measured by provisions,
the top banks made marginally riskier than average loans, with the bottom
banks making substantially riskier loans. While operational efficiencies were
greater for the top banks, the key determinant of their ability to produce
substantially higher return on equity was their ability to secure higher loan
spreads on loans of approximately average quality.
While this table is subject to many caveats vis a vis accounting policies,
heterogeneity of asset portfolios etc, it does illustrate that there is wide
disparity of achievement in the required default risk premium.
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N	 r	 N r
Ecis iri * — 71= E [c ,+p; +(1 i+pi)rislRARORAC (3.7)
3.1.3	 Modern Portfolio Loan Pricing Models
In a development of Sinkey's (1992) model, Wyman (1992) proposes two
possible variations applicable to individual categories of lending across a
portfolio. Wyman states that either the capital backing required or the return
required on capital is proportionate to the expected default cost per unit lent
in the category. In a further development, Coopers and Lybrand (1995)
maintain that both the size of capital backing and the return required on this
capital should be proportionate to risk (this fact had been recognised by
Wyman (1992), but he proposed two differing approaches rather than a single
integrated approach). The integrated approach is to be favoured as it allows
explicitly for both expected and unexpected risk. It is also reflective of current
basic thinking and practice (at least by the more sophisticated managements)
in this area.
The first approach produces a return on risk adjusted capital (RORAC); the
second a risk adjusted return on capital (RAROC); and the last a risk adjusted
return on risk adjusted capital (RARORAC). These may be represented
algebraically as follows:
RORAC
	 E c [r* r]. E Vi[cli+p;+(cli+Mr`]	 (3.5)
1.1	 1.1
RAROC
N	 r	 NE kVi [ri * —r]= E Vi [d i+pi +(ci	 (3.6)
i=1	 i=1
where
is the required capital backing for business type i
is the required return on lending defined for the
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entire portfolio
is the volume of lending in business type i
is the expected default cost per unit lent in business
type i
pi	 is the portfolio effect per unit lent in business type i
is a constant
is the required return on capital defined for business
type i
is the risk free rate of interest
and there are N business types in the portfolio
In this context, VAR (value at risk) is defined as the maximum amount of
capital backing which may be lost due to default, at some appropriate
probability threshold, either over the entire portfolio, or over portfolio
subsections. The calculation of VAR directly implies that a risk adjusted
capital (RAC) approach is appropriate, due to its expositional simplicity with
regard to capital requirements. While it is theoretically possible to compute a
risk-adjusted return on resulting RAC, this has not been attempted in this
thesis for the following reasons:
1. The portfolio has not been observed for long enough for meaningful
variance estimates to have emerged for specific lending categories.
2. The small size of certain lending categories (as few as 6 loans
exposed to risk of default) does not justify the additional precision
required.
Thus, the RORAC approach has been adopted, with uniform return on risk
adjusted capital. This thesis proposes the use of the collective theory of risk
to evaluate VAR in respect of the entire portfolio, and the decomposition of
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the portfolio into business areas, permitting loan pricing to incorporate both
VAR for the relevant area, and the portfolio effect due to covariance with the
remainder of the portfolio.
3.2	 Current Loan Risk Assessment
Historically, the credit granting decision was judgmental, with experienced
loan officers acting in an underwriting capacity. Wyman (1991), Maniktala
(1991) and Ferrari (1992), for example, refer respectively to "one or two
individuals" using "their judgement", to the "industry consistently failing to
adequately differentiate for risk in its pricing", and to "traditional rule of thumb
methods of loan pricing ineffective and unreliable".
Altman (1968) and Beaver (1968) analysed the predictive ability of financial
ratios in terms of forecasting bankruptcy probability, the former using multiple
discriminant analysis (MDA). Their approach was to examine samples of
financially healthy firms compared with failed firms of similar size and
industry.
It may be noted that MDA concentrates only on the probability of default
rather than its expected cost. Nevertheless, some form of MDA or credit
scoring is used by most banks, if only as a guide to credit granting decisions.
Dependent variables may be both non financial and subjective (Argenti
(1976)).
Mensah (1984) observed that many of the financial ratios used as a predictive
variables are themselves highly variable through time, thus rendering their
interpretation difficult at differing points in the economic cycle.
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Altman et a/(1981) suggest that a suitable application of a failure prediction
model could lie in the area of loan grading, where the lending decision had
already been taken. By implication, the model could afford to be less than
precise when allocating by risk within a portfolio, rather than the more
substantial precision required to reduce the costs associated with rejecting
good and accepting bad borrowers.
Most credit scoring models used internally by banks to grade corporate loans
for risk purposes rely on similar techniques to MDA. Specific ratios are given
weights, the actual value of these variables are then multiplied by the relevant
weights, and the result is a ranking score. If this score is set at an index level
of, say, 60 in respect of a barely acceptable loan applicant, and 0 in respect
of a risk free borrower, then what results is an ordinal ranking of credit scores,
corresponding to what the operator of such a system believes is the relative
risk of loans.
Typically in such a credit scoring system, there are 10 risk grades, with
grades 7-10 comprising loans which have disimproved in quality since the
loan granting decision (Foss (1992), Wyman(1992)). This structure is typical
of that encountered in major banking organisations with which the present
author has had employment experience (National Westminister Bank,
Citibank, Citicorp), and given its frequent reference in standard works (Sinkey
(1992), Glantz (1994)) on loan pricing, it is taken as part of industry standard
practice.
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The weaknesses in such credit scoring/failure prediction models are as
follows:
a) When one refers to the original studies in this area, the requirement of
paired samples (to eliminate size and industry effects) meant that
sample sizes were extremely small e.g. Altman (1968) sample size 33,
Deakin (1972) sample size 32, Dambolena (1980) sample size 23. The
number and extent of statistical inferences which may be drawn from
such small databases must be open to question.
b) Because of the nature of their construction, an implicit assumption exists
that relevant variables are linearly related throughout their ranges. This
is implausible, and must mean that loans are being classified
heterogeneously under such models, with respect to default risk.
c) What results from the application of these models is an ordinal ranking
of credit risk. Overall credit risk is not quantified, nor are the relative
magnitudes of risk grades. Users of such models state that the historic
experience of similar grade loans may be used in pricing (Charlton
(1991),Wyman (1992)), but if the loans have been incorrectly classified
in the first place, then the incorrect historic loss experience may be
applied to the pricing of specific loans.
d) As already mentioned, relevant variables may change over time, so that
coefficients and cut-off points may only be valid for short time periods.
Further, the long duration of original studies (e.g. Altman (1968) used
data over 20 years, Mensah (1984) over 9 years) meant that such
studies reflected moving averages of relevant variables, rather than
absolute values.
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Their strengths are:
a) they are relatively straightforward to apply;
b) they distinguish the economic cost of risk, as opposed to the regulatory
cost of risk, which is presently level for all private sector non-residential
mortgage, non interbank credits (Basle Committee (1988)).
The model proposed in this thesis addresses the above weaknesses in order:
a) the dataset used to develop and test the proposed model
comprises a large loan portfolio;
b) the relevant variables need not be linearly related;
c) loan pricing, together with required mathematical reserves result
directly from application of the model;
d) relevant variables are permitted to vary through time by means of
changes in risk intensity.
3.3	 Regulatory Versus Economic Capital Adequacy
3.3.1	 Regulatory Capital for "Other" Private
Sector Assets
The current regulatory environment (Basle Committee (1988)) requires
minimum capital adequacy ratios: that is regulatory defined (tier 1 and 2)
capital, of 0% in respect of government assets, 1.6% in respect of interbank
assets, 4.0% in respect of residential mortgages, and 8.0% in respect of other
private sector assets - defined as all private sector lending other than that
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covered by previous reference. These standards are referred to as risk-
based capital (RBC) relative to previous uniform standards, and apply only to
commercial banks 'banking books' (comprising assets generally to be held to
maturity).
In relation to other private sector assets, RBC standards fail to discriminate by
relative risk within the regulatory risk class categories, thus permitting banks
to select assets of varying risk but still subject to uniform regulatory capital
requirements (Foss (1992)). By similar reasoning, Maniktala (1991) points
out that regulators do not reward banks for engaging in less risky business
within a given sector.
If loan pricing were to remunerate regulatory capital, then the computation of
required loan margin would produce a uniform solution. If, for example,
banks target net ROE was 15%, the capital to asset ratio was 8%, the banks
tax rate was 30%, and yield on short-term government securities was 7%,
then this solution would be:
0.15 x 0.08 
0.08 x 0.07 = 0.0115
0.7
or 1.15% for all other private sector lending, prior to adjustment for overhead,
and provisioning cost. This size of margin could discourage more
creditworthy potential borrowers, who could raise capital more cheaply from
other sources.
Regulatory capital, then, may be quite a restricted version of 'real' or
'economic' capital banking needed. The latter is more specific to a particular
loan sub-section or individual loan (especially where substantial heterogeneity
of risk exists within the respective loan sub-section).
(3.8)
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3.3.2	 Economic Capital for "Other" Private
Sector Assets
Wyman (1992) discusses expected risk which he defines as "the average loss
on a particular category of loan over a credit cycle, taking the form of a risk
charge in basis points assigned to all loans within that category". Unexpected
risk is represented by the volatility of likely losses in any one year relative to
the expected loss; he correspondingly found that this volatility is directly
proportional to the expected loss. Given that capital is required to absorb
such volatility, he points out that capital should be differentially allocated to
each category of risk.
Allocation of capital in proportion to actual ('real') observed or expected
default cost across a portfolio produces "economic capital, and its
remuneration directly from relevant portfolio subsections, produces an
economic" cost of capital levied proportionate to risk (Wyman 1992, p 21).
Sinkey (1992) refers to the market value of equity as "cutting the veils", which
surround either the accounting or regulatory definitions of capital. Economic
capital is the marked-to-market value available to provide capital backing for a
bank's overall activities. When such capital is allocated in proportion to risk,
we have sectoral economic capital.
3.3.3	 Specific Bank Economic Versus
Regulatory Capital
For given insolvency probability, economic capital (as defined by Wyman
(1992)) may be greater or less than required regulatory capital. In the case of
a bank making high risk loans for which it is failing to charge an adequate
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margin, it is likely that for an acceptable risk of insolvency, regulatory capital
would be inadequate. The chief failing in RBC is that it is insufficiently
responsive to risk, and may facilitate adverse selection in banking. The
alternative idea of regulating economic capital is intuitively appealing for the
following reasons:
1) the scope for adverse selection by banks would be considerably
reduced; a bank increasing the risk of its assets within any risk category,
then, would be required to dedicate more capital;
2) banks which are currently relatively risky would be required to hold more
capital than relatively safe banks;
3) banks would be rewarded in terms of lower capital requirements for
directing lending toward safer projects;
4) loan pricing would be expected to be more efficient than at present as
specialised lending intermediaries evolved.
There are two major problems with regard to the use of economic capital for
regulatory purposes:
1) The statistically accurate measurement of such capital for individual
banks (Rajan (1994)).
2) The accurate reporting (identification and measurement) of credit quality
(Berger King and O'Brien (1991)).
These issues will be discussed in subsequent sections.
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3.4	 A VAR Model for Bank Loan Portfolios?
3.4.1	 Preliminary Discussion
Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1995) discuss the present trend towards
increasing reliance by bank regulators on capital requirements covering
particular risks. Such capital requirements limit the amount of risk that can be
taken, while distorting the behaviour of regulated institutions less than direct
controls such as restrictions on competition or asset choice. Merton and
Bodie (1993) argue that asset choice must be tightly constrained if the
underlying institution offers deposits which are effectively government
guaranteed.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1995) in a consultative
document (extending its earlier 1988 scheme for international bank capital
adequacy) has proposed two approaches for the calculation of capital
requirements for securities trading books: a building block approach which
concentrates on individual categories of traded assets, and combines these
as independent risks, and a model based approach which takes a "whole
book", simulation based approach to aggregate trading risks. The building
block approach is exemplified in the Capital Adequacy Directive
(1993/6/EEC), which deals with specific market risks, and aggregates
resulting capital requirements into a total trading book capital-adequacy
requirement. Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1995) explain that the building
block approach may be inherently flawed, because if its constraints bind,
banks may well select portfolios strictly inside the "whole book" mean
variance efficient frontier, which may have higher variance than portfolios
which would otherwise have been chosen.
The VAR approach adopted in this thesis imputes a value at risk for the loan
portfolio, as if loans were traded assets. When equipped with this value, VAR
may be calculated using identical methodology to that applicable to traded
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asset portfolios, though over a longer time period. Portfolio experience
provides a revaluation mechanism directly analogous to "mark to market" in
the case of traded assets.
The model-based approach takes as its starting point VAR analysis. Within
VAR analysis, the techniques may be parametric or non-parametric. The
parametric approach imposes distributional assumptions on the individual
asset returns, the most commonly used of which is that returns are stationary,
joint normal and independent over time. These assumptions are difficult to
justify. The non-parametric approach involves simulation using a long run of
historical data, and does not impose distributional assumptions. For market
data, Jackson Maude and Perraudin (1995) conclude that a non-parametric
model fits the observed risk distribution better than a parametric model.
This work on traded assets VAR indicates that if a VAR model is to be
constructed for untraded credit instruments, then a non-parametric, portfolio
based approach avoids many of the difficulties associated with parametric
VAR or building block approaches.
3.4.2	 Requirements for VAR Models of Credit Risk
The following conditions would require to be satisfied by any viable VAR
model of credit risk:
1. VAR as calculated to be directly proportionate to observed risk (Wyman
(1992));
2. VAR to be responsive to movements in observed risk, but not so
responsive as to cause capital requirements to fluctuate excessively
(Wyman (1992));
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3. a standard framework of calculation to be adopted (Jackson Maude &
Perraudin (1995));
4. methods of calculation to be "whole book" (i.e. taking all exposures
combined) and non parametric (Jackson Maude & Perraudin (1995));
5. results seen to be a justifiable improvement on present practice.
It is not proposed to enter the private information risk/observed risk paradigm
debate (Berger and Udell (1990)), except to comment that under a VAR
framework, private information should reduce as a proportion of total risk
relative to its present level, because of the conditional requirement that banks
report their total provisions to their regulators, as opposed to their total credit
outstanding, thus enabling regulators to observe defaults. Banks reporting
detailed specific provisions would rapidly provide a database for regulatory
use in assessing the "reasonableness" of specific provisions. Theoretically,
as the available information on observed risk improved, it would be possible
to subdivide the portfolio into its individual constituent loans and to price these
individually. However, such a detailed analysis would produce extremely
complex pricing models. Viewed pragmatically, what is required is a model
capable of subdividing the portfolio into homogeneous sub groups, while
retaining ease of application. Brockman and Wright (1992) describe this
problem as a "trade off between accuracy and simplicity." This issue is
discussed further in Chapter 7.
Observed risk should increase as a proportion of total risk due both to the
conditional requirement noted above, and because methods of calculation of
observed risk should improve as observed risk measurement becomes the
focus of regulators attention. Thus, adverse selection will be no larger a
potential problem than under present regulation, and may reduce as the direct
implications of risky lending feed through in resulting increased capital
required.
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Three immediately observable inputs into the calculation of observed risk are
the mean profitability of lending over time, the mean provisioning rate over
time, and the volatility of the provisioning rate. Both Rajan (1994) and Berger
King and O'Brien (1991) have referred to the ability of banks to "massage"
earnings and provisions on a short term basis. The mean profit and
provisioning rates should be chosen over a time period sufficient to
encompass one complete business cycle, thereby ensuring that such
techniques are difficult to employ. The volatility of the mean provisioning rate
may be understated due to the massaging activities referred to earlier, so that
a conservative approach may be required in VAR treatment, requiring higher
VAR than that indicated by a purely statistical observed volatility approach.
The responsiveness of VAR to movement in observed risk is a key feature of
any model. If the model is too responsive, a strongly pro-credit cycle lending
policy results. An under-responsive model, on the other hand, simply freezes
banks' relative risk, without supplying any incentive toward risk reduction.
The adverse selection problem continues much as before, with each bank
simply having a different starting point in terms of differential observed risk.
Conditions three and four, taken together, imply that measures of risk relating
to a bank's entire credit portfolio be input into a uniform regulatory stochastic
model, with a requirement being that not more than s% of insolvencies be
observed in X thousand iterations (e and x to be agreed).
The final condition requires that change should not be made for 'changes
sake'. Tangible improvements which might be observable are a reduction in
required capital for given e% insolvencies, indicating improved capital
efficiency; reduced numbers of insolvencies for given capital, indicating
improved capital allocation; or an arguable reduction in adverse selection due
to the responsiveness of risk measures to idiosyncratic bank action.
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If a VAR approach is to be viable, the questions are : what risk measures,
unique to a particular bank, are to be input, and what uniform stochastic
model is to be used?
3.5	 Variables for a VAR Model of Credit Risk
The relevant observable variables available in respect of a specific bank are:
1. The profitability of lending: Clearly a bank engaging in profitable lending
regardless of provisioning is of less regulatory concern than one which
is lending unprofitably.
2. The mean provisioning rate over time: by definition, riskier loans entail
higher provisions.
3. The volatility of provisioning rates over time: if provisioning rates vary
widely between accounting periods, less reliance may be placed on
mean profitability or provisioning rate, and correspondingly greater
reliance on reserves.
These variables permit the calculation of the distribution function of default
cost over time, using the kind of methodology outlined in Chapter 1.
In respect of a uniform stochastic model to be furnished by the regulators for
use by the banks, relevant inputs in addition to those above are:
1. Taxation assumptions: Since banks fund capital adequacy partially out
of retained earnings, after-tax profitability is the relevant measure.
2. Dividend assumptions: Since bank shareholders expect dividends, and
given that the imputation corporate taxation environment favours
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distributions to gross shareholders, some distribution assumption is
necessary.
3. Inflation assumptions: Since inflation causes the nominal money stock
to rise, and thereby puts pressure on a bank's ability to finance its stock
of reserves, some future inflation assumption is necessary.
4. Short-term interest rate assumptions: Since reserves have earning
power, this variable is directly linked to the inflation assumption.
5. The insolvency probability 6%.
6. The timescale over which the model simulates.
Relevant output (assuming VAR-related reserve requirements) is the reserve
requirement, in respect of an individual bank.
Key variables are the bank specific inputs, the choice of 6%, the relevant
timescale, and the resultant reserves. For short-term simulations (e.g. 1
year), profitability is simply stated net of taxation and dividends, and interest -
rates and inflation are ignored. This greatly simplifies the use of such a
model, with only minor associated approximation error, and provides an
estimate of minimum permissible VAR.
The equation used for such short-term solvency calculations is deterministic
in form, is a direct application of the collective theory of risk, and is as follows
(Daykin, Pentikainen and Pesonen ((1994) p159):
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Pr	 are the specific required reserves
Ye	 is the unit normal variate corresponding to s%
r2, r3 are risk indices obtained by dividing the relevant moment of the
cost of one default about the origin by mean default cost to the
relevant power.
0- 2	 is the variance of the mixing variable.
is the mean expected default cost for all defaults i.e. m.n where
m is the mean expected cost of one default and n is the number
of defaults expected.
Ry	 is a term which corrects for the skewness of the distribution
Yq	 is the skewness of the mixing variable
With the exception of the choice of E, this equations inputs are bank-specific.
For common s, reserves are strictly decreasing in and strictly increasing in n
(the number of defaults), m (the average cost per default), r2 and r3 (the
variability of default cost), and Ry (the skewness of overall default cost).
Thus required reserves are reducing in profitability, increasing in both risk and
volatility of risk, and are proportionate to observed risk adjusted for volatility
and skewness. Such short-term reserves are likely to prove highly responsive
to short term movements in default rates, so that a relevant timescale must be
chosen for a full simulation exercise. Note that the equation explicitly allows
for non-stationarity (through the existence of the mixing variable q) of the
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Poisson parameter n, and that covariance is built into the equation by the
assumption that the structure variable q produces movements in risk intensity
which are 100% correlated between changes in risk intensity. When risk
intensity is moving rapidly, the portfolio covariance increases; when risk
intensity is stable or moving slowly, portfolio covariance decreases.
A model form has been established which is proportionate to risk, responsive
to risk, is the result of a uniform equation, and is fitted using non parametric
procedures. An important research aim of this thesis is, of course, to
establish whether this methodology produces a sufficient improvement in
present practice to justify a (proposed) change in that practice.
Conclusion
Loan related risks have been discussed, focusing on the treatment of credit
risk in loan pricing models. Existing regulation with regard to credit portfolios
has been outlined, and a clear distinction drawn between regulatory and
economic capital adequacy. The shortcomings of existing pricing and
regulation have been identified, and the possibility of using a bank-specific
VAR methodology to address these shortcomings has been discussed.
Some necessary preconditions for a successful VAR approach have been set
out, together with a risk theoretic equation which, a priori, appears to satisfy
these preconditions. Consideration is now directed towards an empirical
dataset within which present practice may be compared to that implied by the
proposed VAR model, with respect to loan pricing and capital adequacy.
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Chapter 4
Dataset Used for Empirical Analysis
Introduction
It is proposed to compare the methodology of this thesis with present practice
in the context of an existing bank creca povtfdio. To set ti sioctecAo
context, trends in credit conditions are discussed over the time period
1980/94. The bank and portfolio comprising the dataset are profiled, and
some exploratory data analysis is effected. The limitations and strengths of
the dataset are discussed. Finally the specific deployment of the dataset
within this study is clearly specified.
4.1
	 Trends in Bank Provisioning: The Credit Cycle
The following table illustrates five UK major banks' provisions excluding LDC
provisions, as a percentage of !bans outstanding since 1980.
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Table 4.1
Annual Provisions as a Percentage of Loans Outstanding
Year Bank 5 Banks
Bank of
Scotland
Barclays Lloyds National
Westminister
Royal
Bank of
Scotland
Overall
Unweighted
Average
1980 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.54 0.47 0.51
1981 0.59 0.39 0.42 0.14 0.28 0.36
1982 0.82 0.73 0.83 0.58 0.50 0.69
1983 0.84 0.70 0.76 0.62 0.56 0.70
1984 0.85 0.94 0.80 0.67 0.46 0.74
1985 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.69 0.47 0.74
1986 0.96 0.76 0.61 0.71 0.87 0.78
1987 0.33 0.53 0.37 0.35 0.67 0.54
1988 0.55 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.45
1986 0.70 0.46 0.14 0..63 0.48 0.68
1990 1.18 1.23 1.21 1.24 0.97 1.17
1991 1.32 0.55 3.19 2.06 1.60 1.94
1992 1.45 2.09 2.69 1.52 1.84 1.92
1993 1.20 1.55 1.53 1.11 095 1.27
1994 0.77 0.52 0.77 0.54 0.51 0.62
Overall
Average 0.86 0.88 1.07 0.79 0.74 0.87
Source: Smith New Court United Kingdom Clearing Bank Research (1995)
The average provisioning rate on total loans outstanding over 15 years for our
sample of 5 banks was 87 basis points, with the highest provisioning bank at
107 basis points and the lowest at 74 basis points (23% higher and 15%
lower than average). In short, no two banks are typically the same in this key
area. These data confirm that it is entirely possible (indeed typical) within one
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regulatory system to have reporting banks up to 20% more or less risky (if
one measures risk by provisioning rate) than average over a long period.
There is some evidence of cyclical behaviour, with provisioning rates reaching
low points in 1981, 1987/88 and 1994, relative to immediately preceding
experience. On the evidence of the above table (which does represent a
significant part of the UK banking industry), one might posit that the duration
of the bank credit cycle over 1980 to 1994 was approximately 6 years, from
trough to trough.
There may also be some evidence from the same data that the amplitude of
the credit cycle is increasing. The average provisioning rate for the sample
peaked in 1986 at 78 basis points. The next peak, in 1991/2, was at
approximately 193 basis points, around 150% higher than the 1986 peak.
Measuring risk by provisioning, then, one can suggest that lending activity
became apparently more risky in the early 1990s in the United Kingdom than
at any point in the 1980s. Whether the United Kingdom domestic recession
of the early 1990s had unique features which make this increase in amplitude
a temporary phenomenon, the present researcher cannot state. However, it
is a fact that UK banks (compared with most other European banks) did suffer
particularly badly from domestic loan losses during the recession of the late
1980s and into the early 1990s.
UK banks lending, then, apparently became a substantially riskier activity in
the early 1990s compared with earlier periods. This has implications for loan
pricing and for solvency, and these are examined in subsequent chapters.
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4.2
	 The Bank and Dataset Employed
4.2.1	 Bank Profile
The bank used in the current study is one of the UK "Big 4". It has a large
market price to book asset value per share ratio, (its shares trade at a
substantial premium to asset value), reflecting inter alia management ability,
and holds substantially in excess of the 8% minimum capital requirement
under existing regulation (Basle 1988). The bank's current capital adequacy
ratio is 11%. The sample bank, then, is inferred to have large reputational
capital (from its market to book ratio) (Sinkey 1992). At present capitalisation
it has apparent substantial positive charter value and low default risk (Keeley
1990). For this particular bank insolvency risk appears to be substantially
less important than the efficient use of its capital.
In the practical, contemporary management of its loan portfolio, the bank is
interested in the pricing of its loan guarantees (Merton and Bodie 1993), the
mean, variance and skewness of its provisions (Daykin, Pentikainen and
Pesonen (1994)), and, the future development of its loan portfolio
performance (Daykin and Hey 1989). During recent years, the bank's
management has attached high priority to and devoted considerable
resources to these key areas. Management clearly recognises the
(differential) portfolio effects of different configurations of its loan portfolio and
their respective policy implications. Credit risk appraisal is apparently
sophisticated by bank practice standards and risk-based loan pricing (see
Chapter 3) is being developed.
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4.2.2	 The Dataset Employed
The dataset comprises an average of 59,000 loans, and is the UK corporate
loan book (comprising loans greater than £20,000), of the above bank.
Overall performance is available in respect of each of the years 1990/93
inclusive, while a detailed breakdown is available for the 21-month period July
1993 to March 1995.
Loan pricing throughout has been conducted by the bank using a credit
scoring model, with an algorithm reflecting Argenti l scores (Argenti (1976)),
tangible net worth, gearing and other variables; this algorithm remains
confidential to the bank. The model allocates loans to 10 risk grades, and
produces target pricing ranging between 100 and 650 basis points above the
floating London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for the relevant reset period.
LIBOR is taken as a good proxy for returns available on corresponding
government securities. The bank states that it has a consistent 20% share of
the relevant market, and that the dataset is representative of that market.
4.3
	 Details of Dataset
4.3.1	 Description of Dataset
In respect of the calendar years 1990/4 inclusive, the following information is
available on the specific loan portfolio used in this research:
1. Portfolio size at beginning and end of the calendar year.
2. Weighted (by loan amount) average margin income per annum.
3. Provisions per annum.
Argenti (1976) assessed management quality by survey, and incorporated his results into a
management quality scoring system.
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In respect of the period July 1993/March 1995 the following data are also
available:
1. Records of individual loans, in detail.
2. Records of specific defaults by loan, in detail.
3. Records of specific provisions by loan, including defaults outstanding as
at July 1993.
The reason that detailed records are not available prior to mid-1993, is that
the bank in question did not maintain a statistical database in this form prior to
that time. The detailed loan records themselves contain all financial
information relating to the customers' own accounts, including the respective
Argenti scores, industry codes, collateral levels, industry status, risk grade,
whether under report (early watch), whether accounts are up to date, target
loan margin, existing loan margin, existing loan margin and facility size
In addition, the detailed default records provide date of default in respect of
those loans in default. The specific provision records detail provisions to date
in respect of unresolved defaults, with total provisions in respect of resolved
defaults.
The statistics available from July 1993 onward permit the researcher to
engage in detailed loan pricing and provisioning analysis over a 21 month
period; they also permit the parameterisation of a simulation model for longer
time periods.
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4.3.2	 A Necessary Assumption
One of the major reasons for using the insurance approach for analysing cost
in terms of frequency and severity is the belief that providing the nature of the
insured risk does not change and providing that claim data are immunised
against changes in monetary values, the distribution by amount of the cost of
one claim should remain constant or change very slowly through time (Daykin
Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994 p57)). Thus, changes in risk intensity
manifest themselves through changes in default frequency, causing total
amount payable to fluctuate. Applying this assumption enables one to use
the entire database, by fitting implied default frequencies to observed total
default costs. It may be noted that this assumption is rendered invalid if there
has been a fundamental change in lending type or business risk within the
portfolio over the 5 year period. Effectively, it is assumed that the type and
business mix have remained proportionate to that observed by the researcher
in detail over the 21 month period July 1993 to March 1995 for the five years
1990/94 inclusive, and that fluctuations in provisions have been caused by
changes in default frequency only.
4.4
	
Exploratory Data Analysis
4.4.1	 Summarised Portfolio Experience
The following table 4.2 shows loan portfolio performance over the period
1990/94. Administrative expenses have been assumed at 0.50% of
outstanding balances throughout; the researcher does not have detailed
calculations of such expenses, since they form part of the banks overhead,
and they are not specifically allocated to this portfolio. The level of 0.50% is
chosen for the following reasons:
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1. Other studies (i.e. Asay and Albertson 1990), have identified overall
administrative expenses in corporate lending in the range 0.75%-1.00%.
2. This portfolio is confined to larger loans, and therefore would be
expected to have lower than average overhead, due to economies of
scale. For this reason, administrative expenses lower than those in
earlier studies have been assumed.
Table 4.2
Portfolio Experience 1990/94 (calendar years)
Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Overall
Average
Average Portfolio Size £BN 11.4 11.5 11.0 10.5 11.2 11.1
Average Loan Margin % 2.20 2.30 2.35 2.40 2.28 2.31
Average Provision % 1.10 2.06 1.31 0.48 0.25 1.04
Margin Net of Provision % 1.10 0.24 1.04 1.92 2.03 1.27
Administrative Costs % 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Net Margin 0.60 (0.26) 0.54 1.42 1.53 0.77
Implied Excess Return on
Regulatory Capital % 7.5 (3.2) 6.8 17.8 19.1 9.6
Source: Empirical
The portfolio has averaged £11.1BN in outstandings. The average loan
margin has been 231 basis points, ranging between 220 basis points in 1990
and 240 basis points in 1993. The average provision has been volatile
around a mean of 104 basis points, ranging from 206 basis points in 1991 to
25 basis points in 1994. Net
 margin has been correspondingly volatile.
Implied excess return on regulatory capital (ERORC) has been obtained by
dividing net margin % by the 8% minimum capital requirement.
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The last row illustrates how difficult a target short term return on capital is,
and may illustrate that such targeting may only be reasonable in the medium
term.
4.4.2	 Utilisation
Using the 21 month (July 1993-March 1995) detailed dataset, the following
table sets out average utilisation by risk grade.
Table 4.3
Average utilisation by risk grade
Risk Grade Average Utilisation %
1=Best 8.42
2 15.72
3 19.60
4 28.16
5 43.63
6 59.55
7 72.06
8 78.79
9 85.42
10=Worst 90.76
Average 36.01
I
Source: Empirical
Note: Average utilisation defined as average observed drawdown.
Table 4.3 illustrates a bias in utilisation toward higher risk loans. It suggests
that utilisation itself may be a significant risk factor, and that portfolio studies
should be conducted more by reference to amount utilised rather than by
facility size if correct allocation of cost to risk is to be achieved.
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4.4.3	 Turnover
Again, using the detailed database over the same 21 month period, the
following table 4.4 sets out recent turnover statistics.
Table 4.4
Portfolio Turnover Statistics (number of loans)
6 month period to Jan 1994 July 1994 Jan 1995
Average number of accounts 58627 55122 62403
Number of leavers 11229 (19.1%) 19320 (35.0%) 16286 (26.1%)
Number of Joiners 11342 (19.3%) 15724 (28.6%) 23589 (37.89%)
Source: Empirical
Table 4.4 above, admittedly over a short time period, suggests average
annual withdrawal rates ('leavers) of 53.5%, and annual entry rates ('joiners')
of 57.2%, implying very high client mobility. Either the portfolio comprises a
stable core of clients, with an extremely mobile non core element, or all .
clients are equally mobile. If the latter is the case, then work on the durability
of banking relationships and on the benefits accruing to borrower's in a long
term relationship (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995) may
only apply to a tiny minority of loans, and may not have a significant impact
on loan pricing. For example, if all clients are equally mobile, then only 2% of
relationships last 5 years, and only 0.05% of relationships last 10 years.
Even if these calculations are only partially correct, it seems that only a small
fraction of borrowers succeed in maintaining a long term banking relationship.
Pricing by duration of relationship, then, may only affect a small proportion of
loans.
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4.5	 Relevance of Dataset
4.5.1	 Applicability of Dataset
The dataset using the necessary assumption discussed earlier (section
4.3.2), is representative of large UK bank corporate lending in the years
1990/94 inclusive. It comprises approximately 2.5% of the dataset size
explored by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) in the
case of the United States NSSBF Data. Therefore, while the data are of
sufficient volume to permit the exploration of basic loan pricing and solvency
relationships, it cannot be used for more detailed research necessitating
richer data, such as researching the rate at which information benefits accrue
to the borrower in a long term relationship. The dataset used in this research,
however, does represent a portfolio of real banking relationships, and permits
inferences to be made about risk factors in pricing and about risk in a capital
adequacy context.
4.5.2	 Genera usability of Dataset
The statistics calculated from the portfolio are specific to the portfolio itself, so
that loan pricing and insolvency risk calculations may not be wholly applicable
to other bank lending portfolios. Nevertheless, given the similarity of
provisioning patterns evident when one compares the 1990/94 data in Table
4.1 with Table 4.2, results calculated using this dataset are likely to be
indicative of the general order of risk within UK corporate banking. Although
the size and timing of provisions vary between portfolios and banks, default
risk appears to be subject to similar influences over time. Thus, while
calculated risk for a specific portfolio may not be generally applicable, the
principles underlying the calculations are, and given the evident correlation
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(calculated at 0.88) between provisions within the dataset and UK bank loan
loss provisioning generally, the dataset may be interpreted as broadly
indicative of prevailing default risk conditions within the UK corporate bank
lending market over the 1990/94 time period.
4.5.3	 Strengths of the Dataset
The dataset provides an extremely detailed breakdown of each individual loan
within the portfolio, both for loans which remain good and those which have
defaulted. This enables the consideration of all plausible risk factors and
combinations thereof in using the building block insurance approach to the
production of a default frequency model. With respect to default cost, the
dataset provides 3,887 observed resolved defaults, of which 910 gave rise to
a provisioning need. This is equivalent to 911 individual data points mapping
the distribution of the cost of one default. In loan pricing applications, this
wealth of data points allows one to consider the portfolio subdivided by
collateralisation and size of loan, retaining sufficient data points in each case
to fit empirically the resulting distribution. The dataset thus permits the pricing
of loans by reference to a significant number of risk factors, and allows the
researcher to calculate with substantial accuracy required reserves for the
portfolio in question over the relevant time period.
4.5.4	 Limitations of the Dataset
The methodology used in this thesis is to develop and calculate portfolio-
specific loan pricing and capital adequacy models. While the calculations in
respect of this portfolio are accurate, it must be borne in mind that the
detailed results apply only to this portfolio and its respective period in time.
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One must be extremely careful (despite the potential generalisability of much
of this research in the context of big UK bank's loan provisioning policies) not
to draw unwarranted detailed and specific inferences about other banks or
portfolios from the results. In this context it as well to emphasise that this
dataset is to be used primarily for comparing methodologies, rather than in
parameterising general models.
4.5.5	 The Dataset in Perspective
It may be as well to re-emphasise that this dataset is effectively and first and
foremost a simulation lestbed' for the system proposed in this thesis. The
essence of the research approach is to test and compare the proposed
system to current practice. Given the selected dataset and respective bank
involved, and for the reasons argued in this chapter, we assume (at best) that
these data are broadly representative of bank corporate lending practice. At
the very least (and worst) they represent a 'snapshot' of practical loan
management for a major bank player during the specific period spanned by
the selected dataset. Even in this kind of 'worst case scenario' ( from a
research methodology view point) the proposals still have significant potential
merit since they may suggest the need to explore further more general
improvements over current practice.
4.6	 Uses of Dataset
The described dataset, then, provides a real credit environment which may be
used as a testbed for hypotheses. In Chapters 6,7, and 8 of this thesis, the
dataset is used for three distinct purposes. These are summarised below.
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4.6.1	 General Solvency Model Application (Chapter 6)
The statistics calculated from the dataset are input into equation 3.4, enabling
the calculation of relevant mathematical reserves associated with an
assumed insolvency probability. From Section 4.1 it is observed that
portfolios may be more or less risky than the dataset itself. Two additional
portfolios are hypothesised, 20% more risky (by number of defaults) and 20%
less risky respectively, and used to demonstrate that for given reserves,
insolvency probability varies monotonically, though not linearly, with risk.
Holding insolvency probability constant, reserves are shown to vary
monotonically but not linearly, with respect to risk.
Loan pricing is then allowed to vary, by assuming margins 20% greater and
20% less, respectively, than those in the dataset. The responsiveness of
reserves to loan pricing is shown to be linear and monotonically decreasing. A
smaller portfolio is also examined, permitting greater random variation.
Finally, linear control of pricing and reserves is discussed using the dataset to
illustrate differing scenarios.
4.6.2	 Loan Pricing Application (Chapter 7)
The detailed testing and analysis of significant risk factors are carried out
using the individual loans which make up the dataset. On construction of a
default frequency model, loans are allocated to risk cells, each cell
representing a specific combination of risk factors. Expected costs per
default are allocated to each cell, using the dataset's own default experience.
Finally, an economic loan pricing model is developed by assigning required
return on capital to cells, weighted by observed default cost experience by
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cell. The loan pricing model thus obtained is directly compared to the bank's
existing pricing, and differences between the two are examined.
4.6.3	 Simulation Applications (Chapter 8)
A regulatory environment is hypothesised, containing a universe of banks,
ranging from 20% more risky to 20% less risky than the specific dataset used.
Using historic dataset parameters, together with future taxation, dividend,
inflation, interest rate and expense assumptions, the behaviour of our group
of banks is observed under the following two scenarios:
1	 existing regulation;
2.	 a regulatory system where capital adequacy relates to bank specific risk
measures.
The second scenario, using equivalent assumptions, should effectively sort
the universe of banks, so that required reserves vary, but insolvency
probability is relatively constant; thus permitting the application of a level
premium deposit insurance scheme. The result of this sorting should be to
produce fewer insolvencies (as a proportion of simulations run) than under
the first scenario.
It may be noted that the dataset used in this application is assumed to
represent the centre of a universe of portfolios with respect to risk. The
dataset is used to illustrate the relative superiority of the second form (i.e.
bank specific regulatory capital), which is derived by applying a standard
model to bank-specific risk measures. This application of the dataset simply
assumes that the dataset is representative of a banking environment, which
of course, may and does vary substantially as simulations progress. As
emphasised earlier (section 4.5.5) a principle is being illustrated, using real
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numbers, and no particular significance (other than its use as a 'realistic' or
'practical-based' simulation testbed) should attach to the choice of dataset.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter discussed UK banking provisions, the dataset used by the
researcher, and its proposed uses. Before proceeding to empirical study,
there is a need to establish that the application of insurance methodology to
loan pricing produces identical results, given common assumptions, to those
produced by conventional option pricing models so that the results are directly
comparable. This is demonstrated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Unbiased Corporate Loan Pricing In The
Presence of Risky Collateral
Introduction
The pricing of corporate debt, where the issuer is subject to default risk, is
investigated. The research extends the work of Merton (1974), who defined a
risk structure of interest rates using the isomorphic relationship between the
levered equity of a firm and the value of a call option on that firms equity.
In Section I Merton's approach is summarised. In Section II Merton's
valuation formula is replicated, valuing debt as a deductible, using insurance-
based mathematics and conventional calculus. In Section III a distribution-
free approach is derived, which solves directly for risk interest rates,
eliminating an acknowledged bias in Merton's work. Section IV deals with
collateral in both fixed and variable forms. The first form may be dealt with
easily, and involves a simple adjustment to either Section ll or Section III
methodologies. The second form does not permit a closed form solution
using either methodology, but is accurately handled using insurance
mathematics, which is free of distributional assumptions.
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In fact most collateral is variable. Therefore, the approach using insurance
methodology to define a risk structure of interest rates, is advocated over
Merton's original work, as being inherently more flexible and permitting more
accurate solutions.
5.1	 Option Based Loan Pricing
This section concentrates on the development of a theory subsequently
referred to as the "risk structure of interest rates", as opposed to the
traditional "term structure of interest rates", used in pricing bonds where there
exists a significant probability of default. An attempt is made to account for
unanticipated changes in a firm's default probability as opposed to
unanticipated changes in interest rates.
Merton (1974) proposes an operational formula for the risk structure of
interest rates. He uses the isomorphic price relationship between the levered
equity of the firm and a call option on the value of equity and incorporates
weak perfect market assumptions in addition to the following:
(a) trading in assets takes place continuously in time;
(b) the risk structure of interest rates is flat and known with certainty;
(c) the force of interest equals r per unit time;
(d) the dynamics for the value of the firm, V, through time is
described by a diffusion type stochastic process with the
stochastic differential equation.
dV = (aV — c)dt + o-Vdz 	 (5.1)
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where a is the instantaneous expected rate of return on the firm per
unit time, c is the total payouts by the firm per unit time 0-2 is the
instantaneous variance of the return on the firm per unit time, dz is a
standard Gauss Wiener process. Assumption (d) requires that price
movements are continuous and that the (unanticipated) returns on the
securities be serially independent consistent with the efficient markets
hypothesis.
Merton assumes that there exists a security whose market value at any point
in time can be written as a function of the value of the firm and time. By Ito's
Lemma, the instantaneous returns on the security and firm value are shown
to be perfectly correlated. A three security portfolio comprising the security,
the firm and riskless debt may be constructed with a value of zero in
aggregate investment terms at any point in time, thus giving rise to a non-
stochastic (zero) return in order to avoid arbitrage profits.
If Y = F[ti,t] is the value of the debt security, then from Merton's assumptions
the following holds:
0= Y 2a2 V 2 F, +(rV — C)F, —rF + F, +C	 (5.2)
Equation (2) is a parabolic partial differential equation for F2, which must be
satisfied by any security whose value can be written as a function of the value
of the firm and time.
In order to distinguish debt from equity, a complete specification must include
two boundary conditions and an initial condition. All parameters are available
at the outset except for variance, which may be estimated.
2 Note that F, the value of debt, depends on the interest rate, the variance of firm value, the payout
policy of the firm, and the expected collateral payout, in addition to firm value and time. F does not
depend on the expected rate of return on the firm, the risk preferences of investors or, any other assets
available to investors.
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Consider a Firm with:
(a) a single homogeneous class of debt
(b) equity
Suppose the debt provisions specify that:
(i) the firm promises to pay a total of B to debt-holders on a
specified calendar date T,
(ii) if this payment is not made, debt-holders immediately take over
the company,
(iii) the firm may not engage in share or debt issue or share
• repurchase.
If there are no payouts, then F, the value of the debt issued equals:
1/2 cr2 V 2F, + r VF„ — rF — Fn.	 (5.3)
where:
T = T- t represents the length of time to debt maturity
In order to value debt, Merton requires an initial condition and two boundary
conditions to be defined:
The initial condition is:
F[V ,01= MIN1V , Ill	 (5.4 a)
The first boundary condition is:
F(0,T) = f (0 , t) = 0	 (5.4 b)
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F(V, r) 
1
V
(5.4 c)
Debt F, and Equity f, can only assume non negative values.
The following regulatory condition may substitute for the second boundary
condition:
Equations (5.4a) through (5.4c) allow one to solve equation (5.3) directly for
the value of debt. Note also that the value of equity is simply the value of a
call option on the value of the firm, with exercise price B. From this fact, and
noting also that F = V - t the value of the debt is as follows:
F[v, , '1]= Be 
	 [h2(d , 2 r) +	 [h1 (d , o- 2 r)] (5.5)
where:
d = 
B "
v,
[1/2
(d , cr2 r) =
log (d)] 
7
afi"
h2 (d , cr2 t) = 
--r/2 o- 2 r + log (d)] 
al;
Restating (5.5) in terms of yield, instead of prices, results in equation (5.6):
R(r) — r = —+ log 10 [h 2 (cl,o- 2 0] +	 0 [ h 1 (d, o- 2 r)j) (5.6)
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where:
e -R(r)t = F[V,1-11 B
and R(T)-r is a loan margin. In Merton's framework 3 , the risk structure
of interest rates depends only on the variance of firm value and the
ratio of the present value (at rate r) of the promised payment to the
value of the firm d.
The work of both Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes (1973) have been
subject to empirical tests with some success. Empirical results support the
hypothesis that the distribution of future firm value is lognormal.
5.2	 Reinsurance Based Loan Pricing
Consider a bank which owns the entire single homogeneous class of debt
with provisions as specified in Section I. To ease comparison with Merton's
work, firm value is assumed to be lognormally distributed with time dependent
parameters, such that:
Log (V) — N(rz + j-cy 'r, 45-21-)
2
The process about to be described may be envisaged, from the shareholder
viewpoint as a negative claim, standard excess of loss contract. From the
bank's point of view its claim on firm assets is to an extent a mirror image of
the shareholder claim (i.e. F=V-f when the firm remains solvent), but varies as
firm value falls below its claim (i.e. min(V, B) when the firm defaults). Thus,
two distinct scenarios are considered, when developing a valuation for debt in
3 Merton proceeds substantially further to analyse the term premium, bankruptcy costs, perpetual and
callable bonds. However, this further analysis is not of concern at present.
(5.7)
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j— ( w+r+c52 )2r	 1	 I
Jn ' cr,r27z-
this section: one where the firm remains solvent, the other where the firm
defaults. In Section IV, when collateral is considered, additional outcomes /
scenarios are included in the valuation of debt. A standard excess of loss
contract may be described as follows4: Ammeter (1953).
E (y) = j: (V — LO f (v)d v 	 (5.8)
where E(y) is the expected (negative) claim, V is current firm
value, B is the bond payment at time T, f(v) is the lognormal
P.D.F (rr,c2 1), and cash flows will be discounted to the present,
using a rate of interest r per unit time.
From the shareholder viewpoint, evaluation of the integral by parts yields
equation (5.9):
fop 	 1	 {—(logV—rr)2/(202r)){—( w—rr) 2 /2cr2 r} ,,
e	 dv = r  1 _.e	 e dw
B 0,1-271-	
'1 B. o-42/r
where:
W = log V, dW =(-1 )dV , dV = e w dW
V
Completing the square in W, Currie (1993) yields the following:
(5.9)
1 dw rr+a2Se 	 = E(v) x PROB(W, >-- B . )	 (5.10)
' This begins the process of evaluation of the first expression in Merton's formulation, i.e. when the
firm remains solvent, using reinsurance based mathematics and conventional calculus, in the valuation
of debt.
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where WI
 — N(rr + cr2 r, cr2r)
In all such cases, the payment to the bank will be limited to B so that the
present value of B may be substituted for E(V) in order to present the bank's
outcome.
Thus for the bank we have:
Be-" x PROB(W,>- W)	 (5.11)
For non negative values, the natural logarithm of firm value is a monotonic
increasing function of firm value, allowing us to manipulate the probability
statement algebraically.
Examining the statement, PROB (W 1 > B*),in isolation (allowing for growth in
V), at exercise, the present value of the firm is:
PROB(LogV +rr + —1 o-2r >-- LogBj
2
rr+igcr2r
= PROB(Ve	 4>- Bj (5.12)
=PROB(Ve Y' '2 ' ›- Bel,
Bl
= PROB(eY 	 e 2 'ir ›-
V	 '
-rr
=PROB(Y 2 a2 r >- log Be
V ) '
=PROB (1/2 CP r›- log (d)), as defined by Merton,
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= PROB (1/4 o- 2 r — log (d)›.- 0) , 2s N ( CT t, CT 2 t)
after discounting at r
= 0
(1/4 o- 2 r — log (d) — o- 2 I-)
Crj	
2
a- 2 r +log (d)]1 a-Tr) .
Thus, the bank's outcome in this eventuality (i.e. where the firm remains
solvent) is:
Be' 0 [h2 (d , a- 2 r)]	 (5.13)
corresponding exactly to the first term in Merton's expression for the value of
debt (see equation (5.5)).
To evaluate the second eventuality,-that is, where the firm defaults,-it must be
remembered that if firm value falls below B at expiry, the bank only receives
the residual value of the firm. From the shareholder viewpoint, the second
part of the integral is (suspending the concept of limited liability for
shareholders, the bank always gets paid, and a residual positive claim exists
momentarily):
-ri
BC" re f (v)dv = BC" x PROB (ve il ci2r -‹ BC") =
BC" X PROB(Log(V)+ —1 a, r --‹ Log(Bel
2 (5.14)
where: Log(V) — MO, cr 2 r), after discounting at rate r.
This represents a probability density function , normally distributed, with parameters cs 2 T, 62 T.
126
That is, the residual positive claim is equal to the discounted value of the debt
multiplied by the probability that the log of the discounted expected value of
the firm, at maturity, is less than the log of the discounted value of the debt.
Substituting the bank outcome, the following is derived:
V * PROB (log(v)+ a' r log(Be))	 (5.15)
Again, examining the probability statement in isolation, and valuing at
present, but allowing for growth in V in excess of the valuation rate r, we
have:
PROB (Log V +1/4 cr 2 r < log (Be))"
= PROB (Tie' cr2 < Bej
<
= PROB(e'4 2t BeT
V
= P ROB (Y 2 cr 2 r < log (d))	 N(0, a-2r)
= qs (--[(v2 cr2 — log (d))] I C	 (5.16)
Thus the bank's outcome in the second eventuality (i.e. where the firm
defaults) is:
V 0 [121 (d, a2 r	 (5.17)
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which corresponds exactly to Merton's (1974) second term, as defined in
equation (5.5), given that there are no other possible outcomes by our
application of reinsurance mathematics, i.e. the firm remains solvent or
defaults. Thus, equations (5.13) and (5.17) replicate Merton's valuation
formula for corporate debt, as defined in equation (5.5), through the use of
insurance mathematics, in contrast to grounding this value in option theory.
The use of stochastic calculus by Black and Scholes may have been driven
by a desire to specify absolutely the process by which firm values change, but
any empirical observation that a firm's value through time follows a lognormal
distribution would have permitted the straightforward application of
conventional calculus.
It may be necessary for continuous trading to take place in order to establish
instantaneous variance, but in truth, reinsured assets such as firms lent to by
banks are rarely traded, the vast majority of such firms being unquoted.
This application of insurance mathematics sets out to demonstrate its
equivalence to option pricing methodology under similar assumptions, and
shows that the bank credit process may be described, at least in part, as an
insurance implementation. There may be substantial opportunities for the
application of actuarial and insurance techniques, not only in bank lending,
but in many other areas of finance. The value of the firm using reinsurance
methodology may be assumed to have a wide variety of distributional forms,
permitting closed form solutions in many cases. Conventional calculus
provides substantially more flexibility than stochastic calculus, is easier to
apply, and does not suffer any loss of accuracy under similar assumptions.
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VI -rR(r)2.4 e
i.1
(5.18)
5.3	 An Alternative and More Accurate Calculation of
the Pricing of Corporate Debt.
Although the equivalence of pricing methods using Merton's assumptions in a
reinsurance setting has been demonstrated, the biased upwards estimate of
initial gearing, resulting from Merton's procedure of discounting risky debt at
the risk-free rate of interest, has yet to be addressed. Effectively, Merton's
assumption produces a uniform gearing slope throughout the term of a loan
regardless of the level of R(z-). This produces substantial bias with increasing
R(r), by systematically overstating gearing in the early part of a loan's term.
An alternative calculation solves for R(r) directly, and thus avoids the need for
Merton's assumption.
Consider an arbitrarily large portfolio of N independent identically distributed
firms, each with an obligation to pay 1 at time T if each firm is valued
identically, then the total portfolio of debt has value at present of:
where R(z) is the appropriate force of interest for the valuation of the
risky debt.
In order to satisfy non-arbitrage conditions, the portfolio must return a risk-
free force of interest r(r) to an investor; once the arbitrarily large portfolio size
has resulted in the disappearance of random variance, the outcome of any
investment in such a portfolio is predefined.
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The portfolio in fact returns the risk free rate IFF:
e"(r) = e rR(r) PROBN (r) ›- 1) — f (1 — x) f (x , r) dx 	 (5.19)
The profits resulting from successful payers for loans of term t (first term in
right hand side expression) are assumed to offset exactly the shortfall on
those who fail to make the payment (second term). The first term of the right
hand side shows the appropriate discount rate applied to risky debt multiplied
by the probability that the value of the firm, at exercise, remains solvent (i.e.
>1), while the second term of the right hand side represents the shortfall in
payment multiplied by the probability density function appropriate, the
resulting expected value being integrated over the range of possible shortfall
values. Rearranging (5.19) results in the following:
"(r) + COST(r) 
, — erR(r)
1— PROB(V(r) -< 1)
r R(r) = LN[
"(r) ± COST(r)  ]
1- PROB(V(r) -‹ 1)
[  COST (z) + el')  ]R(r) = + LN
1— (PROB V (r) <1) (5.20)
where COST (T) is the expected cost of defaults per unit lent per period
t (i.e. the second right hand term in equation (19))and (PROB V (t) <
1) is the probability of default at end period T, i.e. the appropriate force
of interest is simply that which recoups the shortfall from those who fail
to make full payment from those who succeed. Clearly, the higher the
proportion of successful firms the lower the shortfall and the closer the
force of interest to the risk free force.
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Interest rate margins resulting from this computation are directly compared to
those computed using Merton's methodology in Tables 5.1(a) through 5.1(c).
Clearly the bias in Merton's method is substantial over the range of gearing
levels considered appropriate for banks.
Accordingly, the method outlined in this section is used to price loans,
ignoring collateral, while collateral is taken into account in the next section.
This method assumes that the contract is always expressed as a loan, and
does not consider conversion to equity in the event of a default. Merton on
the other hand, assumes conversion of debt into equity by means of a lender
taking over the firm once its residual value falls below zero. Thus, for highly
geared firms (outside the normal range of banking activities) this R(r) exceeds
Merton's, because debt/equity conversion is not assumed, however a certain
proportion of successful firms continuing to subsidise those who fail is
assumed; The issue of debt by negative net worth firms is in any event
unlikely, and therefore we propose the use of this method throughout. This
method has the advantage of providing a valuation interest rate directly,
which is applicable to the nominal value of outstanding indebtedness.
The choice of probability density function used for the estimation of future firm
value is entirely open to choice, although for direct comparison with Merton's
estimates, the lognormal distribution is used herein.
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Table 5.1
Pricing Discrepancy resulting from the Options Approach as opposed to
the Reinsurance based Approach
Firm value is always assumed to be lognormally distributed, and the risk free rate of interest is taken as
6% throughout. In Panel A the volatility of firm value is 25% and loan term is I year. Firm value
volatility is increased to 40% in Panel B, with the loan term remaining constant at I year. Panel C
keeps the volatility of firm value at 25% as in Panel A, though increases the loan term to a period of 3
years. An a corresponds to banker's gearing of 300%, while b indicates all debt, no equity, prior to
discounting debt, and C refers to a level of debt outstanding twice firm value, also prior to discounting
debt.
Loan Margin % Bias
BN Option
Approach
Reinsurance
Approach
Absolute
Panel A
0.10 0.000 0.000
0.20 0.012 0.007 0.005 71
0.30 0.169 0.115 0.054 47
0.40 0.769 0.577 0.192 33
0.50 2.079 1.703 0.376 22
0.60 4.202 3.765 0.437 12
0.70 7.094 6.987 -0.107 2
0.75a 8.793 9.091
-0.298 -3
0.80 10.638 11.606 -0.968 -8
1.00b 19.120 25.358 -6.238 -25
1.20 28.639 45.609 -16.970 -37
1.50 43.399 87.063 -43.664 -50
2.00c 66.654 174.312 -107.658 -62
Panel B
0.10 0.004 0.002 0.003 +142
0.20 0.180 0.095 0.085 +90
0.30 0.980 0.596 0.384 +64
0.40 2.670 1.819 0.850 +47
0.50 5.230 3.949 1.280 +32
0.60 8.510 7.077 1.432 +20
0.70 12.330 11.247 1.084 +10
0.75a 14.400 13.728 0.668 +5
0.80 16.540 16.471 0.068
1.00b 25.620 29.990 -4.637 -15
1.20 35.050 42.607 -12.184 -26
1.50 49.010 78.555 -29.542 -38
2.00c 70.560 138.893 -68.330 -49
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Table 5.1 Continued
Loan Margin % Bias
BN Option
Approach
Reinsurance
Approach
Absolute I %
Panel C
0.10 0.056 0.028 0.028 +102
0.20 0.469 0.290 0.178 +61
0.30 1.281 0.905 0.376 +42
0.40 2.375 1.850 0.525 +28
0.50 3.644 3.077 0.568 +18
0.60 5.018 4.540 0.478 +11
0.70 6.446 6.201 0.245 +4
0.75a 7.171 7.095 0.077 -1
0.80 7.900 8.026 -0.127 -2
1.00b 10.804 12.060 -1.256 -10
1.20 13.637 16.458 -2.821 -17
1.50 17.678 23.451 -5.773 -25
2.00c 23.793 35.446 -11.653 -33
Source: Calculated values in line with assumptions
As a result of the uniform gearing slope assumption discussed above,
substantial over and under-pricing discrepancies arise with changing gearing
rates when following Merton's approach. The reinsurance based approach
lakes account of the effect of gearing alterations when pricing debt. As can
be clearly seen from Tables 5.1 (Panel A through Panel C), overpricing
occurs in the earlier stages of gearing, with the interest rate differential rising
up to the 0.6 gearing mark and falling thereafter, with underpricing dominating
'ram the 0.8 gearing mark. Overpricing is substantially greater in the higher
tolatility categories with a maximum interest rate differential of 143 basis
)oints, arising in the 40% firm volatility, 1 year time frame category. Longer
ime frames appear to diminish substantially the pricing discrepancy arising
rorn the uniform gearing slope assumption.
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5.4
	 Loan Pricing with Collateral
Consider the existence of collateral independent of the firm. The bank is
assumed to make no action while firm value exceed indebtedness, but to
reserve the right to foreclose should firm value fall below indebtedness, and
to maintain that right should the sum of firm value and collateral fall below
indebtedness.
Two specific types of collateral are considered: The first is fixed: for example,
the capital amount of a risk free investment, pledged against the loan. The
second, and more common form, is independent of the firm and the loan and
its value is stochastic over time. The first type involves a relatively simple
adjustment to both Merton's and the reinsurance formula, but can have a
dramatic effect in reducing the loan margin. The second involves a
convolution, and does not permit a closed form solution. However, numeric
techniques do permit solutions, and their comparison with examples without
taking collateral into account again indicates reduced loan margins.
5.4.1	 Fixed Collateral
This would be the case where a capital sum, but not the interest thereon was
pledged as collateral. If the collateral value exceeds indebtedness, then the
bank is absolutely certain of its repayment. The mathematics are trivial, and
using either Merton's or the reinsurance pricing technique produces no loan
margin, i.e. the bank's investment is free of credit risk.
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(B — S)C"
V
(5.21)
Where collateral (S) is less than indebtedness, a relatively simple adjustment
in both cases produces a revised loan margin. In the Merton case, simply
alter the definition of d to:
i.e. substitute
(B — S)C" for Be"	 (5.22)
The mathematics proceed as before. Fixed collateral in this case simply
lowers the gearing ratio, or the proportion of firm value represented by debt
payment commitments. This is equivalent to lowering the exercise level of
the option from B to B - S, and will produce a corresponding reduction in
delta. The relative levels of V, B, and S will produce differing reductions in
loan margins (see Table 5.2).
In the reinsurance case, the bank's contract is modified by the inclusion of a
deductible S. The starting integral is modified to:
j: s (V —(B — S)) f (v) dv 	 (5.23)
and its integration by parts, with substitution of the bank outcome proceeds as
before, to produce identical results to Merton, as modified herein.
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TABLE 5.2
Loan Margins per annum, expressed as a percentage
Merton's definition of gearing, which is the ratio of bond to firm value (including bond) is used. This
differs from the Bankers definition of gearing i.e. bond/equity. As expected the required loan margin
is reduced with increased collateral, with greater effect as the debt ratio (BN) is raised. Loan margins
are calculated on the basis of a one year loan term, with firm volatility of 40%, a risk free rate of 6%
and fixed collateral.
BN Collateral
0%
Collateral
25%
Collateral
50%
Collateral
75%
20% 0.095 0.030 0.002 0.000
40% 1.818 0.596 0.095 0.002
60% 7.070 3.004 0.596 0.032
80% 16.453 7.077 1.819 0.095
100% 29.995 13.728 3.949 0.346
Source: Calculated values in line with assumptions
* All debt, no equity
It is clear from Table 5.2 that the addition of collateral (in this case fixed)
substantially reduces the required loan margin, with the greatest absolute
basis reduction occurring upon initial introduction of collateral, and with the
significance of the reduction rising with higher debt levels (i.e. a 1600 basis
point fall occurs at a debt level of 100% upon inclusion of 25% fixed
collateral).
5.4.2	 Stochastic Collateral
Stochastic collateral occurs when the collateral pledged is not risk-free, but is
independent of firm value. There is no straightforward method of modifying
Merton's approach to allow for a second stochastic potential source of
repayment to the bank. Because the bank may only consider collateral in the
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event of firm value falling below B, the first term of Merton's expression
remains valid. The second term becomes a conditional probability multiplied
by an option for which there is no closed form solution. Much of the appeal of
Merton's formula is lost, as it can at best be represented by:
F[V , t] = B e [^[h 2 (d , cr2 .0]1 + 0[111 (d , o.2
{Be -" EF (k_ B) f (k) dk + Ke -" , (k_ B) f (k) dk}
	 (5.24)
where K = V+ S and F(k) is the joint density of the sum V+S. This joint
cumulative function of V+S is derived by the convolution:
f F, (K — f (s) ds or f Fi. (K —V) f (v) dv 	 (5.25)
depending on which of V and S is selected. As f(v) is presumably already
available, it is likely that the second form of convolution would be chosen.
The distribution function of S is required. Note that even the adaptation of
Merton's formula only applies where V has the lognormal density function. A
return to conventional calculus is appropriate, as it allows a valuation
expression to be developed free of distributional assumptions.
Adopting reinsurance methodology to equation (5.23), the valuation formula
becomes:
Be —rr [PROB V >- Be]—r  + [PROB V -‹	 x
[Be —rr[PROB(K)>- Bel+ K[P ROB(K) Be_]]1
(5.26)
Any valid distributional form may be chosen for V and S, leading to a similar
convolution calculation of the distribution of K. Equation (5.26) defines the
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value of risky debt as: the discounted value of debt by the probability of
remaining solvent, plus the probability of default multiplied by both the
discounted value of debt by the probability that firm value and collateral
exceed the present value of debt obligations, and the joint firm and collateral
value by the probability of a shortfall arising between this value and the
present value of the debt obligations. Effectively, the existence of collateral
broadens the range of outcomes in which the bank can expect full payment.
The extent of this broadening is a function of the size of collateral pledged,
and its probability density function of future values.
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Table 5.3
Loan Margins, % per annum for differing firm and collateral volatility levels
Firm value and collateral value are both assumed lognormally distributed. Collateral is assumed to be
independent of the firm. Loan margins are based on a one year loan term and a risk free rate of 6%
throughout. Panel A calculates these loan margins on the basis of firm volatility and collateral volatility
of 25%, while Panel B revises these margins on the basis of a higher firm volatility and collateral
volatility of 40%. In Panel C firm volatility is maintained at 40% while collateral volatility has risen to
60%.
BN Collateral Collateral Collateral Collateral Collateral
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Panel A
.20 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
.40 0.577 0.102 0.022 0.006 0.002
.60	 . 3.765 0.840 0.209 0.061 . 0.020
.80 11.606 2.864 0.769 0.238 0.082
1.00 25.358 6.608 1.829 0.587 0.210
Panel B
20% 0.095 0.019 0.006 0.002 0.000
40% 1.818 0.482 0.163 0.065 0.029
60% 7.070 2.090 0.748 0.313 0.146
80% 16.453 5.111 1.870 0.800 0.381
100% 29.955 9.567 3.510 1.516 0.731
Panel C
20% 0.095 0.021 0.008 0.003 0.002
40% 1.818 0.502 0.200 0.096 0.051
60% 7.070 2.135 0.886 0.437 0.240
80% 16.453 5.148 2.162 1.082 0.602
100% 29.955 9.515 3.982 2.000 1.122
Source: Empirical
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It is clear from Table 5.3 (Panel A through Panel C) that stochastic collateral,
as with fixed, can significantly reduce the required loan margin, hence the
price of debt, with the greatest impact occurring upon initial introduction of
collateral. Thus, the required loan margin continually reduces, as the level of
collateral increases, but at a decreasing rate. Obviously the larger the S the
smaller the loan margin.
The relationship between risky interest rates and the volatility in underlying
collateral is not so obvious. In general, the more volatile the collateral the
higher the loan margins demanded, with the differential between the margins
based on a low and high volatility level, increasing with increased collateral. In
certain circumstances, the asymptotic right hand tail of the lognormal
distribution of future collateral values can reduce the risk interest rate
chargeable as volatility of collateral rises. This would clearly occur only when
the right hand tail of the lognormal distribution was operative i.e. when:
(a) collateral has relatively small values,
(b) the ratio BN is at high values,
(c) volatility in underlying collateral is at high absolute values,
Study of the ratio x„ 2 r indicates that beyond a threshold of 20% in this ratio,
loan margins will increase monotonically with a.,2
 z.
These considerations lead directly to the following propositions:
1: the existence of positive value independent collateral (S)
reduces the riskiness of individual loans (Table 5.1),
2: risk is monotonic decreasing in S, and limits at 0, for given V,
B, and constant volatility in S (Tables 5.1 & 5.2),
3: for values of the ratio x, , 2 r in excess of 20% risk is monotonic
increasing in the volatility of S, for given S, V, and B (Table 5.3).
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The development of a full model is unnecessary, because propositions (1)-(3)
are evident from the preceding discussion. For an illustration of stochastic
collateral loan margins, see Table 5.3; for a discussion of the partial
derivatives of R(x), see section 5.6.
With respect to the stochastic nature of the collateral, comparing Table 5.2
with Table 5.3 ( Panel B), it is evident that for low levels of collateral volatility,
stochastic collateral gives rise to lower required margins than for its fixed
counterpart (given the level of debt), whereas for high levels of collateral,
fixed collateral yields cheaper loans than stochastic since the riskiness of the
stochastic collateral outweighs the potential benefits. For minute levels of
collateral, the more volatile the collateral the better, since there is a higher
chance that a very small amount of collateral can yield a significant amount.
5.5	 Applications of Stochastic Collateral
As Devinney (1986) has pointed out, if collateral is in fact fixed and risk free,
and accounts for a significant proportion of loan finance, then the self-
financing option would require greater study.
Collateral value in general is volatile. When recession occurs, it can have two
distinct effects on collateral value. If recession is accompanied by inflation
(which, apart from the most recent recession in the UK (1989/91) it has been),
collateral values are often enhanced to the point that loan losses in many
cases are made good, and overall loan losses are manageable. As in the
1989-1991 UK recession, if inflation does not stand alongside recession,
asset prices fall in many instances, leading to a shortfall in collateral arising
as the risk intensity of the default function increases. Thus, a rise in risk
intensity is sometimes accompanied by a rise in loan loss severity, producing
large loan losses.
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In fact, a double stochastic process is at work. The amount at risk in the case
of a loan with stochastic collateral is a function both of firm value and
collateral value. To confine consideration to firm value would be remiss. It
should be possible to examine collateral by type, and to group type of
collateral in ascending order of risk.
5.6	 Note on the Partial Derivatives of R(T)
In simple terms, and free of distributional assumptions:
R(r)= 3. LN (COST (z) + el ') )
1-(PROB V (z)<1)
dR(r) 
with the derivative 	
 equal to the following:
cl*
(5.27)
COST(r) 1* (1- PROB V(z) <1) + (COST (z) + e l") (PROB V(r)< 1) 1 * (5.28)
(1- PROB V (z)< 1) 2
where:
* represents the relevant variable,
1* represents the partial derivative with respect to that variable,
R(T) is the risk interest rate actually charged,
T is the term of the loan,
Cost (Os the expected cost function of defaults per unit lent for term T,
r(t) is the risk free rate interest rate, and
PROB V (t) is the probability density function of default appropriate for
period T.
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And because LN is monotonically increasing in positive R(T) for T constant, its
partial derivatives will behave in similar manner to those of R(T). Initially, both
T and r(T) are assumed constant, meaning that the partial derivative with
respect to other variables will affect the COST (T) term and the PROB V (T)
term only.
Considering each of these variables in turn, with respect to their likely effect
on the probability of default and the expected cost of default, hence on the
appropriate risk interest rate to be charged, the following results:
a). V or firm value. As firm value increases, the probability of default must
not increase and will normally reduce. Similarly for greater firm value,
expected cost must reduce, so that the partial derivative must reduce,
leading to the conclusion that R(T) is decreasing in V.
b). B or size of indebtedness. As B increases, so must the probability of
default and the expected cost of default. The net effect is to increase
the value of R(T), and thus we can conclude that R(t) is increasing in B.
c). S or size of collateral. As S increases, the probability of default and its
expected cost reduce. The effect is to decrease the value of R(T) and
we can conclude that R(T) is decreasing in S.
d). 0-2v or volatility of firm value. As the volatility of firm value increases, so
does the probability of default, for all realistic combinations of V and B,
and so also does the expected cost of default. The effect is to
increase the value of R(T), and it can be concluded that R(T) is
increasing in a2v (in the range of values likely to be taken by V and B).
e). Cr .2v or volatility of collateral value. As the volatility of collateral value
increases, the probability of default may either increase or decrease,
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depending on the size of collateral relative to firm value. For extremely
small values of S%, the impact of a .2, is likely to be trivial in any event,
while for large values of s73/, , the effect would be to increase the
probability of default. A problem arises since this function is not well
behaved through its range for all combinations of S, B and V.
This problem is analogous to the following example. Suppose a bank
has lent £100 against £5 collateral. Paradoxically, the £5 collateral
held in oil exploration shares (high o-) has a greater cost-reducing
effect than if the £5 were held in cash, in which case the £5 reduction
in expected cost would be trivial in the context of the loan. Therefore,
for small collateral values, high cr! can be preferable to low 632 values,
from an R(T) perspective. Similar problems could theoretically arise in
the case of cr 2„ but only where firm value was extremely small in
proportion to indebtedness.
Allowing T, and r(T) to vary, produces slightly more complex partial
derivatives, but the following is readily observable.
Be-R(r)rWith respect to T, as t increases, the ratio 	  on average is
V
lowered, thus reducing the average probability of default through the
loan term. Similarly the expected cost is expected to reduce. The
longer discount period has a similar effect to a continuous reduction in
the ratio of % throughout the term. R(T) is therefore a decreasing
function of term.
With respect to r(T), increases in the risk free rate of interest will be
matched almost pan i passu by increases in R(T). The secondary effect
of lower average gearing with higher r(T) will be of a substantially lower
order. Therefore R(T) will be an increasing function of r(T).
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With respect to [R(T) - r(T)], the risk margin, the rate of increase in
margin with respect to r(t) will be a decreasing function due to the
second order effect referred to above. Thus [R(T) - r(t)] is a decreasing
function of r(i).
Conclusion
Re-insurance based credit pricing, using an expected value of loss approach,
has been shown to produce identical results to option-based credit pricing,
under identical assumptions. The expected value approach enables a
numeric solution to the double stochastic firm value/collateral problem, which
is not feasible using the option-based approach. An existing and
acknowledged bias in the option-based approach has been eliminated, and
the re-insurance based approach permits a choice of distributional form.
This chapter has shown that individual loans may be evaluated usefully as
insurance contracts. Thus the collective theory of risk may be applied directly
to portfolio evaluation and individual loan pricing.
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Chapter 6
Modelling Bank Lending as an Insured Risk
Process
Introduction
In the previous chapter it has been demonstrated that the building blocks of
the insurance process, under similar assumptions, produce identical results to
the option pricing approach in the case of individual loans. In this chapter,
the performance of a collective of such building blocks is examined, using
portfolio historic performance to parameterise endogenously the default cost
function, unique to a particular portfolio. Having estimated the appropriate
default cost function, the reserve requirement for a bank operating such a
portfolio can now be specified. In this respect, the additivity of the Poisson
parameter is a powerful feature, allowing one to decompose portfolio
performance over time and homogeneous portfolio subsections. The current
.capital adequacy requirement is discussed in the context of the above
mathematical reserve requirement, and methods of control of reserves and
pricing are suggested.
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Major differences between current practice within the UK bank dataset used
in this study and the modelling approach developed in this and succeeding
chapters are set out below:
Calculation Current Practice Proposed Model
Capital adequacy
Loan pricing
ROE
RORAC
Basle (1988)
MDA-type Algorithm
10% per annum
(historic experience)
Not used
Portfolio specific VAR
using standard formula
Multi-factor rating
10% per annum on VAR
Directly calculated
6.1	 Background Development
Santomero (1984) states "If one accepts" the "view that bank liabilities are
essentially 100% insured, then the entire issue of bank capital and risk taking
should be recast in terms of a discussion of insurance pricing". He continues
(1984 p 604):
"Literature on optimal bank capital is a bit vague and very model
specific".
If the current, minimum capital-adequacy requirement of 8% (capital to risk
weighted assets) appropriate to lending of the type included within our
dataset is taken as indicative of required reserves, then this reserve level
appears to be amply sufficient (based on our dataset bank's empirical
experience) to ensure the de facto 100% insurance of bank liabilities, even
without deposit insurance, since the probability of insolvency (i.e. liability
excess) is extremely small for the chosen portfolio, and also for riskier
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portfolios. It is possible to hypothesise the existence of portfolios which would
have significant insolvency probability at a reserve level of 8%, but average
provisions for these portfolios would be at 3-5 times the level observed in the
portfolio under examination.
The 8% capital adequacy requirement is a permanent minimum excess
required for asset portfolios. Regulators may have insisted on this level for
the following reasons:
1. To ensure that an asset excess existed, or to reduce substantially the
probability of a deficit, even where loan portfolios were compulsorily
liquidated.
2. To allow for any systematic overvaluation of assets which might be a
feature of banks under regulatory pressure.
3. To control the rate of credit creation by means of bank lending. In this
case, the imposition of capital controls would slow the rate at which
banks could finance credit creation internally.
4. The required asset excess may form a pool, which can be drawn on by
asset recomposition (effectively, selling loans and buying government
securities). To the extent that asset recomposition may take time to
effect, the regulators may have been taking a medium term view of bank
insolvency probability, rather than the short term view implied by the
regularity of required reporting.
Points 1) to 3) are not considered here, as the relevant information is not
available which would enable us to comment on average realisation proceeds
in bank insolvencies; nor are the economic consequences of an 8% capital
requirement in terms of credit creation within this remit.
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With respect to 4), the likely medium-term reserve requirement is examined,
and is concluded to be larger than the short term requirement, and may
provide an insight into the choice of the 8% level.
The model introduced in Chapter 1 is now developed.
6.2
	 Development of Model
6.2.1	 Underlying Logic
In the preceding chapter, with respect to individual loans, it was argued that
the valuation process consisted of evaluating an integral representing the
continuous distribution of future firm value multiplied by the cost resulting from
the particular firm value. Such a product integral only takes positive values
when the cost resulting is positive, so that the range of the integral covers
only those values for which indebtedness exceeds firm value.
Algebraically
18 (v_B)f(V)dV	 (6.1)
represents the integral of the product of the probability that firm value (V) is
below indebtedness (8), and the firm value corresponding to that probability
.(f(v)).
For a risk collective, this integral is summed, giving:
± r (V — B)f(V)dV 	 (6.2)
,.0
for an N loan portfolio.
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Recognising that, in a risk collective, numbers of loans defaulting, as well as
numbers of loans exposed to risk of default, are available, the insurance
approach is to approximate the probability of default for an individual loan by
dividing the observed number of defaults by the number of loans exposed to
risk of default. For a portfolio, multiplying through by the total number of
loans produces simply the observed number of defaults.
Thus for an individual loan:
Number of Observed defaults Probability of default —
Number of loans exposed to risk of default
for homogeneous loans.
For a risk collective, the observed defaults are the result of only one sample
path followed by the portfolio. They form a maximum likelihood estimator, for
the mean of a Poisson or Polya distribution of all possible sample paths. In
the Poisson case, the maximum likelihood estimator for the mean number of
defaults is simply the number of observed defaults. A probability density
function is thus built:
E„Pk
k=0
where n/DK is the probability of observing exactly k defaults where the mean
expected number of defaults equals N.
This approximates:
r(V-	 (6.3)
E.0
the first part of (6.2).
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With respect to cost, the insurance assumption is that the distribution of cost
of one default is independent and identically distributed. This is equivalent to
stating that the knowledge that K defaults have occurred does not yield any
information other than the mean expected cost of K defaults i.e. one default, a
priori, does not differ from another with respect to expected cost or other
moments.
Thus, total default cost is conditional on the number of defaults observed, and
arises as follows:
F(X)= PRO13(x X). „PK X PROBrizi
K=I
	
i=1
= E „ PK .S K. (X)	 (6.5)
K=I
F(X) is the cumulative total default cost, evaluated at X.
In respect of an N loan portfolio, where EZ, is the distribution of cost of
1=1
exactly K defaults, and S'(X) is the Kth convolution of the common default
cost function S for 1 default.
.Note that the approximation to (6.2) represented by (6.5) is dependent on the
accuracy of the two underlying statistical assumptions with respect to a)
observed default numbers, and b) default cost in respect of 1 default having a
common distribution.
Permitting default cost numbers to vary through time (i.e. the Polya process),
introduces a further variable h, which is a measure of the volatility of the
(6.4)
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underlying Poisson parameter, and is again estimated from portfolio
observation.
Thus, the collective risk approach approximates the summation of the integral
(6.1), parameterising the approximation by using the method of moments, the
relevant moments being calculated directly from the underlying portfolio.
6.2.2	 Criticism of the Above Approach
6.2.2.1
	 Distributional Assumptions
It has been suggested that the Binomial distribution may be appropriate to
default frequency as either a loan defaults or it does not. Firstly, it is possible
for a loan to default more than once, so that a loan may recover and
subsequently default a number of times. Secondly, the rate of default per
quarter must be a low order (maximum of 2 - 3%), in order for the bank to
survive (although high margin loans could theoretically default at higher
rates), so that the loss of accuracy in using the Poisson approximation to the
Binomial distribution is not substantial. Thirdly, the Poisson distribution, being
additive with respect to both size and time, does provide substantial
mathematical tractability.
The use of the Poisson process as an approximation to what is essentially a
part Binomial process may lead to a maximum specification error set out in
Table 6.1 (Taylor 1986).
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Table 6.1
Maximum Specification Error: Poisson V's Binomial
Binomial Poisson
( 1 )
Error*
(2)
,
Mean
_
Np n
Variance NPR n +0.4% +2.2%
Coefficient of
Skewness
(q-p)/ ITATM 1/ ji +0.4% +2.3%
Source: Empirical
*	 Error:
1. For default frequency 0.4% per quarter (current experience)
2. For default frequency 2.2% per quarter (maximum historic experience).
In both cases, the Poisson approximation produces an overestimate of the
last two parameters, the overestimate being broadly proportional to default
frequency. The Poisson approximation is deemed to offer sufficient flexibility
to compensate for possible low order specification error (Feller, 1950).
Variance in excess of mean leads to estimation error both in the underlying
Poisson parameter and in the structure variable chosen for fitting.
Simultaneous fitting is used in order that the mixing distribution fits the first
three moments of the underlying distribution.
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6.2.2.2	 Methodology
Cummins (1986, p 285) has suggested
"In spite of its mathematical sophistication, actuarial ruin theory has
been of limited practical applicability. The principal problems are:
(1) The mathematical intractability of most of the results.
(2) The nearly universal tendency to ignore investment risk.
(3) The failure to recognise that insurance companies operate in a
market economy where insurance premiums and asset prices
are determined by the interaction of supply and demand".
Derrig (1989, p 303/304) observes that "Increasingly complex techniques
were developed, mostly in Europe, under the rubic of "Ruin Theory" which
sometimes seemed to show that surprisingly low levels of surplus were
needed to keep the probability that liabilities would exceed assets ("ruin") at
low levels".
Even though the above refer to insurance companies, they must be directly
addressed in any real world model of bank lending as an insured credit
process. In order:
(1)	 The mathematical tractability or otherwise of the results is not of major
import providing the model accurately reflects portfolio development.
Parsimony in modelling is greatly to be desired, and general risk
theoretic results are assumed easily understandable.
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(2) Given a building block presentation investment risk is subject to a
separate reserve requirement (93/6/EEC), and is thus considered
separate to credit risk.
(3) Cummins (1986) and Derrig (1989): both authors refer to the
stationarity assumption implicit in risk theoretic insurance models.
Cummins suggests indirectly a cyclical model, whereby premiums and
asset prices vary through time, while Derrig refers to "surprisingly low
levels of surplus".
Any model which purports to represent the credit process accurately must
allow for non-stationary parameters, reflecting the cyclical tendencies referred
to by Cummins (1986), Horwiz (1983). In our proposed model, default
probabilities will only be assumed constant within quarter, and may vary
substantially between quarters. With respect to Cummin's suggestion that
premium rates vary through time, making loan pricing levels a random
variable conflicts with one of the main aims of this thesis, which is to establish
a consistent medium-term loan pricing structure.
In a control sense, the effects of allowing premiums to vary are examined, but
a particular strategy is not recommended. We shall model current loan
pricing against stochastic default rates, and impute required reserves. Thus,
modelling the adequacy of loan pricing, as opposed to .modelling solvency in
the conventional sense, is proposed.
Having addressed Cummins and Derrig's criticisms, a risk theoretic model is
proposed that is mathematically tractable and which will impute a risk free
return to reserves. The model, referred to as the General Solvency Model, is
intended to be a stationary reserve model.
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With regard to the General Solvency Model, extensive estimation of the
pattern of past defaults was necessary, due to the paucity of pre-May 1993
data within our dataset. Therefore, the model results should be interpreted as
an indication of required reserves for this branch of the credit process, rather
than an absolute reserve requirement. It does at least partially address the
criticisms in the previous section in recognising that credit conditions are not
stationary with regard to risk.
6.3	 The General Solvency Model
6.3.1	 Choice of Default Frequency for Estimation
The underlying construct that loans are independent with respect to default
risk over short time periods, but 100% correlated with respect to changes in
risk intensity between time periods, yields an approximate test as to the time
period for which to assume independence. The longer the time period
chosen, the less correlated is loan performance and vice versa. Over the 21
month period for which detailed statistics are available from the dataset used
by the researcher, the average loan correlation within the portfolio is
estimated to have equalled 97% (100 samples of size 1,000 were taken at
random, and the average correlation calculated).
This would imply that fitting the correlation estimate as the thesis model, only
• 3% (100% - 97%) of total variance should be represented by the Poisson
parameter. Table 6.2 illustrates the effect of time period choice on variance.
It may be noted that this implies the portfolio is dominated by changes in risk
intensity.
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Table 6.2
Percentage of Variance Represented by Poisson Parameter
Time Period 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year
Poisson Parameter
4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 0.4%Total Variance
Source: Empirical
Based on Table 6.2, the 3 month period would appear most representative of
portfolio performance.
Other practical reasons for the choice of a 3 month period are:
1. The variability of monthly default rates does not in general have an
impact on reserves of sufficient size or duration to render its study
worthwhile.
2. The continuation of trend (if any) reflected in quarterly data is judged to
correspond more closely to perceived reaction time in terms of loan
pricing, and thus little benefit would be gained by studying very short
term variability in provisioning.
3. A quarterly analysis corresponds to the time period chosen for financial
analysis of the insurance business (Cummins (1986), Cummins and
Harrington (1989)).
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6.3.2	 Estimation of Quarterly Default Frequencies
In respect of the time period 1.1.90 to 30.6.93, crude annual default rates
exist for the portfolio. A moving average process was applied to calculate
implied quarterly default frequencies, required as an input to the thesis
model. Independent verification for these implied frequencies was obtained
by requiring the residual defaults outstanding implied by these frequencies
coupled with a default resolution table to reconcile to defaults outstanding as
at July 1993.
These implied quarterly default frequencies are assumed accurate subject to
the composition of the underlying portfolio not having substantially altered
over the last 5 years, and the pattern of default resolution also not having
markedly changed (for reconciliation purposes only).
Table 6.2 sets out these estimates, the actual observed data, and the
variance calculation for the estimation of the Poisson parameter n and the
incomplete gamma variable h.
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Table 6.3
Estimated Historic, Actual Current Default Frequencies and Implied
Parameter Variance
Quarter Frequency Contribution to Variance Sum
1 90-13 740 497
2 90-12 850 7691
3 90-11 970 43139
4 90-10 1100 114041
1 91-9 1210 200435
291-8 1320 311029
3 91-7 1440 459277
4 91-6 1340 333737
192-5 1240 228192_
292-4 1150 150311
3 92-3 1050 82771
4 92-2 840 6037
1 93-1 640 14957
2 93 0 430 110423
3 93 1 353 167526
4 93 2 278 234546
1 94 3 277 235516
2 94 4 245 267599
3 945 152 372466
4 94 6 219 295175
1 95 7 164 357963
AVE:	 762.3 TOTAL:	 3993333
Source: Empirical
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Notes: Table 6.3
A
a)	 i) n = 762.3
A	 (;;) 2
ii) h derived from a- n2 =199667 = n+	 h= 2.9
iii) o- 2q , y q derived from o
•
q = , y q = *	 Crq2 = 0.342
yq = 1.170
Methodology from Daykin, Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994 pp 45-54)
b)	 A h value of 2.9 implies wide dispersion of the underlying parameter, i.e.
highly variable default rates through time.
c)	 A yq of 1.17 implies that the distribution of the default rate parameter is
highly positively skewed.
6.3.3	 Cost Per Default
Using in the General Solvency Model the approach suggested by Daykin,
Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994), the first three moments of the cost per
default may be estimated direct from empirical data. Underlying assumptions
are that cost of default is crystallised at the instant of default, and that after
indexing for inflation the cost per default remains relatively stable over time,
'implying a slow changing or constant mix of underlying loans.
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Table 6.4
Moments and Risk Indices of the Distribution of Cost
of One Default
(1) MEAN COST = m = £2.9966x i0
(2) ± (Co sTy = a2 = £5.59x1r
(3) te (COST)3
o
= a3 = 2.9316x10"
(4) E (COST) 2 (2)
-
63.36
2 - 1.2(MEAN COST) 2- (1)
(5) E (COST)2
= 
(3) 10920.8
(MEAN COST) 2 ( 1
3
)	
—r3
Source: Empirical
Notes to Table 6.4:
a) Based on 3887 resolved defaults of which 910 resulted in
provisions being raised.
b) This is a "risky" distribution, high risk indices (r2 , r3) being
occasioned by several large (£5-£15 million) individual
provisions.
6.4	 Estimation of F(x), for the Dataset
One could proceed to the recursive estimation of F(x), the cumulative
distribution of total default. This estimation procedure could involve up to
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5x109 individual arithmetic operations, and therefore a reasonable
approximation is sought. Daykin, Pentikainen and Pesonen (1994 p 129)
suggest the approximation formula:
F(X):-:, 4--3 + 11 +1+ -LM)
Y  x	 Y '
which is valid where the coefficient of skewness does not exceed 1.2. Note
that the co-efficient of skewness yq at 1.17 is close to the upper feasible limit
for this approximation, so that relative error may be large. However, note also
that small proportions of the total function in reserve estimation are being
dealt with, so that even though relative error may be large, absolute error in
relation to size of reserves or required loan pricing is likely to remain small.
This approximation formula (6.6) allows one to specify the upper tail of the
distribution function F(x) as a transformed quadratic standard normal
distribution, and permits the application of equation 3.7 directly to the
calculation of reserves. The following assumptions underly the given results.
a) Insolvency probability is set at two differing levels, approximately one in
40, (7, =2.0) and one in 800 ((ye =3.09, allowing for relative error of 25%
in our approximation of F(x)).
b) Interest earnings are ignored. Alternatively, an equivalent assumption
would be that a dividend equal to the risk free rate of interest earned on
reserves is paid each year.
c) The portfolio earns returns of 0.77% of loans outstanding (historic
experience).
(6.6)
d)	 Administrative expenses total 0.50% of loans outstanding.
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Table 6.5 below illustrates required reserves as a percentage of loans
outstanding for given ruin probabilities.
Table 6.5
Required Reserves and Ruin Probabilities for
Dataset/Portfolio Reserves % Loans Outstanding
Ye Time Period
1 Year 5 Years
2.0 0.86 4.10
3.09 2.22 10.78
2.75 1.68 8.00
6.63 8.00 N.R.*
Source: Empirical
*Not relevant
Notes: Table 6.5
a) Ruin is defined as loss of more than stated reserves.
b) Required reserves increase with time.
In terms of interpretation, the portfolio requires excess reserves of 0.86% of
loans outstanding in order to avoid regulatory constraints on its asset choice
at one in 40 probability on a one year view. At one in 800 probability it would
require excess reserves of 2.22%, again on a one year view. This would
imply a total reserve of 8.86% or 10.22% respectively.
If rapid recomposition of assets were possible, the minimum capital adequacy
requirement of 8% would imply an infinitesimal probability of insolvency in any
one year (y, =6.63 corresponds to approximately 1x10-7). On a 5 year view,
excess reserves of 4.10% of loans outstanding (1 in 40) and 10.78% (1 in
800), respectively, would be required to avoid regulatory constraints. This
would imply a total reserve of 12.10% or 18.78%, respectively. The insight
provided by the 5 year view is that regulators may expect banks which
become asset constrained to remain so, and wish to provide themselves with
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resources sufficient for a medium term workout, financed by asset
recomposition.
In this context, the minimum capital adequacy requirement of 8% would imply
yE = 2.75 corresponding to approximately 3.0x10 -3 ruin probability (on the
artificial assumption of no asset recomposition). Asset recomposition would
commence when the ratio dipped below 8% and would continue until
regulatory capital was exhausted; the bank at that stage possessing an asset
portfolio comprising only government securities.
In practice, observation of current capital adequacy ratios of UK clearing
banks would imply adherence to the first interpretation above, so that
sufficient asset excess is held by these banks to ensure that regulatory
constraints on asset choice have less than a 1% probability of occurrence.
Quite small excess reserves thus ensure unconstrained asset choice for
these banks, at the margin and in the short term.
6.4.1	 Comparative Static Analysis
Given that the 8% minimum capital adequacy requirement is uniform, it is
interesting to explore the variability of mathematical reserves in response to
changing provisions, loan margins and size. 20% greater and lesser
provisions, 20% higher and lower average loan prices, and a bank 10% of the
size of this portfolio are hypothesised, and the effect of these on reserves are
examined.
This is equivalent to the assumption that there exist, within the uniform
regulatory environment, banks which are 20% more and less risky (see Table
3.1), 20% more and less expensive in terms of loan pricing and 90% smaller,
and examine the effect of these on reserves.
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Table 6.6 below, shows reserves required as a percentage of loans
outstanding for specified ruin probabilities.
Table 6.6
Reserves Required: Unchanged Policies at Given yg
y, (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (0
Bank
(i) 1 year time period. Reserves % loans outstanding
2.0 1.39 0.33 0.86 0.36 0.30 1.34
3.09 3.03 1.44 2.22 1.72 2.73 3.08
(ii) 5 year time period. Reserves % loans outstanding
2.0 6.74 1.78 4.10 1.88 6.32 4.36
3.09	 . 14.7 6.83 10.78 8.56 13.00 11.16
_
Source: Empirical
Key: (a) and (b) 20% higher and lower provisions respectively.
(c) The actual observed portfolio.
(d) and (e) 20% higher and lower loan prices respectively.
(f)	 10% of portfolio size, permitting greater random variation.
Clearly, mathematical reserves are influenced both by provisions and loan
pricing, with provisions having a non-linear impact on reserves and loan
pricing a linear impact. Profitability appears as a direct reduction in required
reserves in equation (3.4). A small size effect is also apparent.
Table 6.7 below illustrates the yg levels associated with Table 6.6 banks, in
this case assuming a uniform capital adequacy requirement of 8%.
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Table 6.7
ys Values Associated With 8% Uniform Capital Adequacy
Bank
Time Period (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (0
1 Year 5.84 7.67 6.63 6.87 6.39 5.53
5 Years 2.28 3.42 2.75 3.19 2.32 2.68
Source: Empirical
Evaluating the unit normal variate in the 5 year case, produces insolvency
"probabilities" of 1.13%, 0.169%, 0.298%, 0.071%, 1.02%, and 0.321%,
respectively. These insolvency "probabilities" differ substantially, and indicate
the potential difficulties associated with uniform capital adequacy
requirements. These "probabilities" considerably overstate the true ruin
probability, as risk would have been sharply reduced by asset recomposition
prior to the 5 year horizon. Given timely asset recomposition, true ruin
probability would remain infinitesimal, and quite close to 5 times the 1 year
unit normal variate probability values.
6.4.2	 Toward a VAR System
The preceding calculation (simulations) have been on an artificial basis, since
they do not take into account the risk reduction effects of asset recomposition.
The shareholders would have lost their entire investment in the bank some
' time before the asset recomposition process was complete, as their claim on
bank assets would be subordinate to that of debt holders. Clearly, the major
risk faced by shareholders is asset recomposition risk, associated with the
loss of part of their invested capital, rather than insolvency risk associated
with the loss of all of their invested capital.
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The feasibility of total asset recomposition into a portfolio of government
securities must be open to question, as the bank would have ceased to be a
bank at that stage and would have transformed itself into a mutual fund
(Fama (1980)). Evidence from the United States (Allen and Saunders (1993))
would suggest that regulators would foreclose prior to completion of the
process.
Asset recomposition risk may be defined as the risk that the bank's asset
choice becomes constrained by capital adequacy. Under present regulation it
is a real risk for safer banks, whose true mathematical capital requirement is
likely to be lower than the 8% minimum {Banks (b) and (d) Table 6.6). Bank
(b) in particular may have decided to make low risk loans, and may have
accepted returns on those loans commensurate with the lower risk on its
portfolio. It could thus find itself in a position where it was unable to
remunerate its regulatory minimum capital at a competitive rate. Of course, if
information asymmetries did not exist, its shareholders would accept lower
and safer expected returns. However, if profit is the only observable output,
investors may not recognise bank (b)'s relatively safer strategy. Banks (a)
and (e) might also find it difficult to remunerate their regulatory capital, but for
entirely understandable reasons. Bank (a) is relatively risky, while Bank (e) is
relatively less profitable.
What is required is a system capable of discrimination between Banks (a) to
(f) inclusive, with respect to the specific nature of their credit portfolios.
Required reserves should be a function of a portfolio-specific VAR calculation,
sensitive to provisions and profitability.
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6.4.3	 Investor Choice and CAPM Inputs
The existing regulatory system does not recognise any difference between
Banks (a) to (f). The following table sets out the CAPM (capital asset pricing
model) inputs generated by each of these banks, and presents the
opportunity set available to investors.
Table 6.8
Set of Available Investments
Bank Expected Return to
Equity
0/0
Standard Deviation of
Equity Investment
0/0
(a) 12.0 16.25
(b) 19.0 10.9
(c) 15.5 13.6
(d) 23.8 13.6
(e) 7.2 13.6
(f) 15.5 17.3
Source: Empirical
Assumptions: 
1. Each bank has capital adequacy of 10% (6% equity, 4% debt).
2. Debt yields 5% in excess of risk free rate.
3. Expected excess return = Average of last 5 years excess return.
4. Risk free rate = 6% per annum
5. Standard deviation calculated as
{0.5 (1 year reserves (ys = 2.0) + Profit)}/ .06
CAPM would value these banks, from a shareholder viewpoint as follows:
(d) ^ (b)>(c)>(f)>(a)>(e).
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If CAPM can so easily sort these hypothetical banks by value, why not the
regulator? The regulator may have a differing opportunity set to the investor,
but should still be capable of ranking these banks by relative insolvency risk.
6.5	 A specific VAR Computation
From Section 3.4.2, a VAR formula is required which is directly proportionate
to risk, which responds to movements in risk, has a standard calculation
framework, calculates for the "whole book", and is a justifiable improvement
on present practice.
From Section 6.4, the formula to incorporate provisioning and profitability
measures is required. Taxation has thus far been ignored, and simplifying
assumptions have been made about dividends. Taxation and dividends both
reduce the extent to which reserves may be financed out of internal
resources. Taxation effects are included in the computation, and a generous
dividend constraint is imposed. To ease comparison, and also to assuage
regulators, the formula is constrained in order to produce an identical capital
adequacy requirement to that operative at present in the case of the original
dataset.
The proposed computation formula is as below:
5 5
VAR Capital % = [ 2 x E Provisions % — (1 — OE Margins %
•	 1	 1
x	 Loans Currently Outstanding
Subject to a minimum value of 2% (to avoid infinitesimal or negative values)
where:
(6.7)
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i) VAR CAPITAL (Y0 is the computed value at risk capital
requirement, expressed as a percentage of loans currently
outstanding,
5ii) E provisions % is simply the sum of the past 5 years provisions
1
expressed as a percentage of loans then outstanding,
5iii) E margins % is the sum of the past 5 years margins,
1
expressed as a percentage of loans then outstanding and,
iv) t is the operative corporate profit taxation rate, currently assumed
to equal 38%.
The margin calculation would take the form
Interest Income - Administration Expenses - ProvisionsMargin % —
Average Total Amount of Loans Outstanding
The provision calculation would take the form 6 :
Provision % — Provisions
Average Total Amount of Loans Outstanding
This computation produces results as outlined in the following table.
6 Both these formulae relate to the year in question.
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Table 6.9
VAR Reserves and 5 Year Probability Measures
Bank (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (0
VAR Reserves % 10.82 5.28 8.00 6.45 9.55 8.00
Insolvency	 y, 2.75 2.91 2.75 2.92 2.63 2.68
Probability Measure % 0.298 0.181 0.298 0.175 0.427 0.368
Source: Empirical
The effect of the VAR computation has been to reduce substantially the
observed variation in the probability measure. This measure does not reflect
real insolvency probability, but is nevertheless an index of relative risk.
Variation in this measure has been reduced by 98% from its pre VAR spread
(Section 6.4.2).
In declaring dividend payments, if banks were limited in their declarations by
directly attributable streams of income as follows:
5	 5
0.005 x (1— t) vA	 average interbank rate % per annumE mRarcglanpsita%,,. 	 00	 I,	 1+
1
this has the effect of reducing the observed variation in the probability
measure by constraining loss making banks, while allowing profitable banks
to distribute a high proportion of their net earnings.
The reasoning behind this dividend formula is that reserves earn both margin
• as computed plus an opportunity cost equal to the inter-bank rate. At least
theoretically, some small proportion of reporting banks could distribute more
than their annualised net return, thus reducing their capital base by excess
distribution. This would only apply in the case of banks with little or no
provisioning requirement from year to year.
(6.8)
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The following table illustrates the probability measures resulting from this
dividend restriction.
Table 6.10
5 Year Probability Measures for VAR Computation
with Restricted Dividends
Bank (a) (b) (e) (d) (e) (0
Insolvency	 y, 2.45 2.53 2.42 2.50 2.41 2.36
Probability Measure % 0.71 0.59 0.78 0.62 0.80 0.91
Source: Empirical
The probability measure has increased, because permissible dividends are
on average, larger than those assumed in the earlier computations. However
the variation in this measure has reduced by a further 65%.
One is now very close to a "level playing field" in terms of probability
measures, the variation in these measures being only 0.7% of its level as
calculated using conventional capital adequacy. Thus a VAR capital-
adequacy-fixed premium deposit insurance scheme seems feasible. Whether
this proposed approach actually represents a viable improvement on present
practice awaits a full simulation approach and comparative evaluation 'tests',
developed in Chapter 8.
It is now appropriate to turn our attention to the responsiveness of the VAR
calculation to changes in current credit market conditions.
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6.6	 Premium Control
Many authors (e.g. Rubenstein and Yaari (1983), Rosen (1985) Cooper and
Hayes (1987)) have discussed implicit contracts and multiperiod insurances.
Essentially, the acceptance of a customer by an insurance company, or bank,
carries with it the implicit contract that the customer will be acceptable in
future time periods, subject only to no material adverse change in customer
circumstances. Thus, for example, insurance companies offer no claims
bonus systems to clients with superior claim records (Rubenstein and Yaari
(1993)) thus countering the moral hazard problem. Similarly banks will
informationally capture clients (Sharpe (1990)) and will make continuing
reputable client offers of credit which will render their departure to a
competitor bank unlikely.
If, however, the underlying risk intensity is unstable, and banks do not
propose to lose money, then some form of control must be a feature of the
system. Banks will require relatively stable pricing to avoid alienating their
client base. Thus, banks must take long term views of client credit
worthiness, and must be prepared to honour the implicit future contract at a
price not markedly different to that on a current contract. Banks
responsiveness to changes in credit market conditions is circumscribed by the
desire to offer clients a stable credit environment. This obviously requires the
bank to operate as a kind of "shock absorber" and indeed is one of the main
reasons for regulatory and actual reserves.
UM (1983) has described the situation prevailing for many banks. Using his
notation, if GN is the accumulated surplus, then
"It should be so big that the risk that annual claims cannot be met is
sufficiently small. The premium should not vary too much in time. GN
should not grow too large and it is good if it does not vary too wildly. In
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particular GN ought to be stable (equitable) i.e. if XN (annual claims)
does not have an increasing trend and bounded fluctuations, the same
ought to be true about GN".
Faced with unstable risk intensity, banks require large reserves. However
they remain open to the simultaneous criticism of being lemming-like (all
lending too cheaply when risk intensity rises) or of profiteering (when risk
intensity falls and is unmatched by a reduction in charges).
Neither Ruin Theory, which requires large and increasing GN to avoid ultimate
insolvency, nor Credibility Theory (which ultimately leads to large and
increasing G N), satisfactorily address the above problem.
The requirement of control is to smooth premiums and reserves
simultaneously, and LOfs proposed method is an application of linear control
theory.
Firstly, assume the system is stable. Shareholders require excess returns of
10% per annum to compensate them for risk. Administration charges amount
to 0.25% on loans. Then the relationship between GN, GN_i and P (on the
assumption that "Pure Premium" is paid away in default cost) is as follows:
GN =.9091 GN_i +PO + 2) — P	 (6.9)
For stable reserves we have:
0909 +P(1 +X)-P= 0	 (6.10)
G = Reserves
P = Pure Premium
X = Safety Loading
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V =4
P P U') (6.11)
V =4—V)
G
(6.12)
Assume P = 1, G = 8P
A minimum safety loading of 73% plus administration costs is required in an
absolutely stable system. This is very similar to the current average situation
prevailing in the dataset, although the system is unstable.
Llif introduced coefficients of variation for both premium and reserves, directly
analogous to Gelles risk measure of profit. These are defined as:
=	 (Genes)
	 (6.13)
V
and permit random variation of claim, V (in the Poisson case — =1) LOf
X
imputes a reserve target, and in the specific case where --(7	 1 the direct
G
implication is that the coefficient of variation for reserves may not exceed g.
V.Extending the model to banking, we see that — is substantially larger than
X
1 (variance substantially exceeds mean). Making the assumption that
(—V ) = 2, then the coefficient of variation of reserves is reduced to 1/16,X
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directly implying that premiums must be responsive to changes in risk
intensity.
In our dataset, regulatory reserves are set at approximately 8 times pure
premium. Gelles observes that average loan loss provisions in the US in
years 1985-89 amounted to 0.982%. Current capital adequacy standards on
this basis, would amount to 8 times pure premium.
This directly implies that a permitted coefficient of variation of 1 /16 , in reserves
allows reserves to fluctuate quite widely in terms of premium. The excess
reserves carried by banks may allow them to smooth loan charges, and to
absorb the resultant reserve volatility.
Because of the inherent volatility of default cost, there must be a shock
absorber within the system. If reserves are targeted, risk (to the bank) is held
to a low order, and price shocks are immediately absorbed into loan charges.
Alternatively, if loan charges are targeted for stability, extremely volatile
profits and somewhat volatile reserves result.
An ideal solution would spread risk so that some volatility was apparent in all
measures, but not as much as would be the case if each measure bore the
entire risk on its own.
The regulator faces a reserving problem in deciding the appropriate time
period over which shocks will be absorbed by reserves. The suggested VAR
approach in Section 6.5 assumes that 20% of any shock is absorbed each
year, for 5 years after the shock. A shorter time period over which to sum
provisions and margins implies greater variability in reserves.
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The choice of a 5 year time period was the result of observation of provision
and profitability changes in the early 1990's. The capacity of banks to absorb
changes greater than approximately 80 basis points per annum in capital
adequacy requirements is limited. Thus, any greater permitted change would
require them to shrink their balance sheets, or to seek additional capital. It is
assumed that the regulator would not seek such developments and therefore
would choose a time period which permitted banks to absorb such shocks
internally. Hence the choice of a 5 year period.
The optimisation problem facing the banks is how much volatility to absorb on
its own account, and how much to pass to the customer. Clearly the absolute
boundary on its own absorption is set by the market. A solution to the
problem is achievable, but only when boundaries have been specified. This
represents a major strategic hurdle for any bank, but the solution in the case
of an individual bank is beyond the scope of this thesis.
An illustrative example is presented below. Premium control is one aspect of
a fuller simulation process discussed in Chapter 8.
Using the dataset to illustrate:
G	 = £920 million (i.e. 8% of £11.5 Bn)
X 	 = £120 million (i.e. 1.04% of £11.5Bn)
P	 = £208 million
i.e. {(2.31%-0.50%) (margin income - expenses) x £11.5Bn}
R	 =	 £88 million
V	 =	 3
Vp	= 	
.05 b). Unspecified elsewhere
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VG 	= 	 .0625 a). Unspecified elsewhere
Vr	 =	 Unspecified
V„	 =	 0.59 calculated from dataset
Scenario:
a). Maximum permitted reserves move 19.3% per annum (y, = .001).
b). Maximum permitted charges move 15.5% per annum.
c). 50% of variance absorbed by reserves, balance through charges.
d). All variance absorbed by reserves.
The following Table 6.11 sets out the implications for the Gel/es measure for
each of the above scenarios.
Table 6.11
Co-efficient of Variation of Profit Under Differing Assumptions
a). b). c). d).
a r
,
R 0.65 0.69 0.42 0.80
Source: Empirical
Obviously, the simple illustration could be significantly enhanced if it was
equipped with the strategic decision parameters appropriate to an individual
bank. None of the above scenarios eliminate the probability of losses
occurring. Scenario c) is the safest (probability of loss 0.9%), and d) the
riskiest (probability of loss 10.5%) However c) implies an ability to raise
charges by 50%, which may not be feasible.
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Scenario d) would be appropriate if charges were to remain permanently
fixed. By observation, b) would be the scenario closest to the present
operation of the portfolio, implying a probability of loss of 7.5% in each year of
operation.
Conclusion
The solvency model first discussed in Chapter 1 has been parameterised by
values calculated from the dataset. Using the spread of performances
observed in Table 4.1, the existence of a number of banks differing from the
bank represented by the dataset has been hypothesised. A probability
measure of insolvency risk on unchanged policies for these banks has been
developed and it is shown that this measure differs significantly between
banks under current regulation.
An alternative VAR model for capital adequacy is proposed, using bank
specific risk measures. The application of the model is simplified so that only
readily available figures are used in its computation. It has been shown that
this VAR model produces relatively uniform insolvency probability measures,
permitting the possible introduction of fixed premium deposit insurance.
Finally, aspects of control have been discussed, with reserves, loan pricing
and profit acting as shock absorbers within the system.
The next logical step is to develop a detailed individual loan pricing model
which is then compared to current pricing within the dataset in order to
establish whether existing credit pricing is efficient or may be improved. The
following chapter proceeds to this next step.
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CHAPTER 7
Development of an Individual Loan Pricing
Model
Introduction
In the preceding Chapter, concentration was focused on overall portfolio
measures, e.g. default frequency, cost per default, current loan provisioning,
overall margin income, profitability and reserves. While of interest in their
own right, these measures do not permit the bank to price individual loans,
other than very crudely. This chapter seeks to develop a model to enable
loans to be priced by reference to several categorical variables (Altman
(1969) Altman et al (1981)).
7.1	 Structure of Model
The model structure which follows was chosen for the following reasons:
1.	 All rating factors may be shown to be theoretically justified
(Merton (1974), Devinney (1986)).
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2. Empirical research has shown that these factors have a practical
risk effect.
3. The number of factor levels has been chosen as a direct result of
tests of the data.
This preliminary presentation of structure is further developed below:
Defaults are grouped by gearing (2 levels), utilisation (8 levels) security (2
levels) and size (2 levels, for severity only), giving a total of 64 (2 x 8 x 2 x 2)
cells within which an individual loan may be categorised. The underlying
assumption is that the four chosen variables are of substantial value in
subdividing (or segmenting) the riskiness of loans. Techniques to be used in
developing the model are identical to those used in statistical insurance work
[Brockman & Wright (1992)1 (See Chapter 6 for justification of use).
The basic insurance relationship, valid for cells and for the overall
portfolio is:
Pure Premium = Claim Frequency x Claim Severity
This form of relationship is valid for solvency calculations, as in Chapter 6
where the entire historic experience is being used, and also for estimates of
overall current profitability where 21 month past data are aggregated.
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7.2
	
Assumptions and Methodology Underlying the
Loan Pricing Model
7.2.1	 Assumptions:
1. In any future time period, loans are independent. It is not possible, a
priori, to determine which loans are about to default, and default on any
loan does not confer any information about other loans.
2. The portfolio composition remains stable over time. This assumption
applies to industry grouping etc., but allows the gearing, utilisation and
size to vary over time, as these factors are inbuilt.
3. Changes in risk intensity apply uniformly across the portfolio
7.2.2	 Methodology
For the portfolio as a whole, and for each specific subsection, the provisioning
rate in future time periods is modelled as a weighted average of provisions
made within the time period, the weights being historic default frequencies,
and the provisions being the average provision in respect of the time period
for a single defaulting loan.
7.3	 Practical Difficulties
The assumptions and methodology proposed are identical to those used by
Brockman & Wright (1992), and are subject to their shortcomings. In addition:
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1. The assumption that loans are independent with respect to their single 
period risk of default depends very much on identifying associated risk
successfully. If this is not done correctly, then the independence
assumption is open to question.
2. The paucity of observations of actual default costs (spread over 64
cells) means that in practice security is assumed constant over broad
ranges of loans differing only with respect to size of loan and size of
security %. Examination of the portfolio indicates that this assumption
is reasonable.
3. Assumptions about portfolio composition and risk intensity are open to
accusations of oversimplification, and unless true, will be a further
source of pricing error.
4. A very small tail of large cost defaults exists, substantially increasing
the variance of cost amount.
Addressing the difficulties in order:
1. Loans are currently grouped to exclude known associated risk. The
fact that risk covaries across the portfolio is known, but is assumed to
be dealt with by the common risk intensity forecast. Loans are
assumed 100% correlated with respect to changes in risk intensity, and
100% correlated by cell, but totally uncorrelated within cell. Overall
estimates of covariance or correlation may be produced by summing
total variance, and allocating the variance to the three headings just
discussed. A correlation estimate will be given by the ratio of the sum
of variance by risk intensity and by cell, to the total sum of variance.
Thus, even though the assumption of independence appears less than
credible, it is only applicable to the cells within which loans are
categorised, and not to the process as a whole.
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A minor difficulty with respect to correlation is the now standard
assumption of correlation by industry group, leading to a regulatory
requirement for portfolios of loans diversified among industries.
Detailed examination of the portfolio has produced no evidence that
such diversification works, as all loans seem broadly correlated, with
industry grouping being irrelevant, at least in the short term. Hence
industry group is not a rating factor in the model. In this respect this
thesis differs from Dale (1993), who did find evidence that provisions
vary by industry over the period 1976 to 1991. There is some
evidence in Dale's (1993) illustrations that covariance increased
markedly towards the end of his period of observation. Industry
differences in provisioning may have been obscured by the fact that all
industries entered the recession of 1989 to 1992 simultaneously, and
the resulting high covariance masked underlying industry differences
over the years 1990 to 1994 inclusive. Even if this were the case,
relying on diversification by industry was apparently ineffective in the
latter period.
2. Examination of provisioning rates across cells provided little evidence
that these rates differ, other than by size of loan and in the case of
secured loans. The difference between provisioning rates on secured
and unsecured loans will be taken into account.
3. Once again, examination of the portfolio indicates relative stability, with
migration by risk group being of a relatively low order and almost
cancelling over the period under review.
There remains a risk, however, that the nature of the banks business
might change in future periods in a way which renders the above
assumption invalid.
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4. The existence of a few large defaults may mean that the loan pricing
model is appropriate up to a certain loan level, with case-by-case
estimation being appropriate above a certain size of loan. Loan prices
were produced for the whole portfolio, and for the portfolio excluding
loans above £5 million. Only overall pricing for the whole portfolio is
illustrated below, as pricing is similar whether or not such loans are
included. The impact on risk and resultant required reserves has been
referred to in Chapter 6.
If the truncated portfolio is considered, then the relevant subsection produces
lower required reserves, and greater statistical accuracy in provision
forecasting, but a residual portfolio of large loans remains to be dealt with on
a case-by-case basis.
7.4	 Choice of Risk Factors
Under credible conditions, Merton has shown that the price of loan
guarantees is a function of volatility of firm value and the ratio of debt to firm
value including debt (Merton 1974, Chapter 5). In the vast majority of cases,
both firm value and debt are not traded - in fact non traded loans may be a
necessary condition for banking intermediation (Diamond (1984), Sharpe
(1990) eta!).
The volatility of firm value is not available to us. However, a proxy measure
of this volatility-and more important, the loan portfolio's sensitivity to volatility-
has been derived by observing a measure of risk intensity, (Chirinko & Gull,
1991, Chapter 6).
The allocation of risk intensity among loans concentrates on measures of the
ratio of debt to firm value.
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a). Gearing: This is essentially given by an accounting calculation. As
given in the data, it is the ratio of debt to equity, corresponding to the
bankers definition. This definition is modified to the following:
Debt
Equity + Debt
prior to being incorporated as a rating factor. Thus, the rating factor
used corresponds to the Chapter 5 definition of gearing. As individual
loan files are only updated on average once each year, current gearing
figures will on average be at least 6 months out of date. However,
observation indicates that gearing changes only slowly, so that gearing
may be interpreted as a measure of broad default risk relative location.
The reason for modification of the definition of gearing is that certain
firm values are comprised of debt only, equity having disappeared
effectively. Using the bankers definition of gearing produces a debt
equity ratio of infinity, rendering valuation using gearing as a risk factor
impossible in these cases.
b). Utilisation: Avery and Berger (1991) have analysed commitments in
detail. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the direct analogy to commitments
in US banking is undrawn facilities in UK Banking. Utilisation is used
as a measure of financial stress because there is an observed
correspondence within the portfolio between utilisation rates
approaching 100% and default.
c). Security: As pointed out in Chapter 5, security has the direct effect
of lowering potential default losses, given that default has occurred.
The reason for its inclusion in a frequency model is that in many cases,
firms with negative net equity (bankers definition) are kept out of a
default situation by the existence of independent security or resources
which enable the firm to continue trading. Thus, security in this
particular case is assumed to have an effect on default frequency.
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d).	 Size of loan: considered only by reference to severity.
The choice of rating factors is one among many possible choices. If they
correctly subdivide by "true" risk, then a bank using a model of the above type
will find it possible to select potentially profitable business from the universe
of banks not using such models, or at worst, to avoid being selected against.
The rating factors have been theoretically justified in earlier chapters; their
empirical justification will appear as a difference in loan prices between cells,
and ultimately in improved performance, reflecting the banks choice of new
business from the lower risk/higher profit cells, relative to current portfolio
structure.
7.5	 Number of Levels Per Risk Factor
The starting point for the number of levels is the portfolio itself. Repeated
queries of the database were necessary to produce the chosen number of
levels. Historic portfolio experience must differ by level for choice of levels to
have any validity. Secondly, the increasing/decreasing risk associated with
the chosen factor must have a theoretical and practical justification. Finally
the rate of increase/decrease of risk with respect to the factor under
consideration and the overall risk associated with the factor indicate the
relative sensitivity of the factor to risk.
With respect to the factors chosen, all factors and levels produced differing
observed historic loan pricing. All factors are theoretically justifiable. With
regard to gearing, Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 illustrates its effect on loan pricing.
Fitting gearing independently as a one factor model produced low empirical
default costs for low levels of gearing, with an exponential increase. On the
basis of gearing alone, 6 levels would have been appropriate (see Table 7.1)
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Table 7.1
Parameter for Gearing Levels
(Multiplicative Poisson)
Gearing
Level %
Gearing
Factor
Parameter
-4.646
<50 1 0.000 (Aliased)
50 ^ G< 100 2 0.7493
100 ^ G< 150 3 1.146
150 ^ G <200 4 1.054
200 ^ G <500 5 1.267
500 ^
 G 6 1.503
Scaled deviance	 986.42 Residual Degrees of Freedom 	 191
Single Factor Gearing	 630.17 Residual Degrees of Freedom	 186
Source: Empirical
However, when utilisation was fitted in conjunction with gearing, all gearing
levels other than the first became statistically indistinguishable. This may
mean that utilisation itself has very substantial explanatory power vis a vis
increased gearing. Intuitively, we would expect high levels of gearing to be
associated with high levels of utilisation (assuming the bank was prepared to
lend to some prudential limit) and vice versa. This appears to be the case
when empirical evidence is considered (see Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2
Parameters for Gearing and Utilisation
(Multiplicative Poisson)
Gearing
Level
%
Gearing
Factor
Parameter
-5.210
S.E.
0.1542
G <50 1 0.000 (Aliased)
50.^ G<100 2 0.518 0.1290
100.^ G 150 3 0.730 0.1315
150 ^ G 200 4 0.594 0.1475
200 ^ G < 500 5 0.718 0.1227
500 ^ G 6 0.615 0.1162
Utilisation Level
%
V ^ 25 1 0.000 (Aliased)
25<V5_35 2 0.364 0.1901
35<V ^ 45 3 0.542 0.1859
45 <V ^ 60 4 0.822 0.1638
60<V ^ 75 5 1.191 0.1590
75 <V ^ 83 6 1.354 0.1619
83<V9090 7 1.666 0.1646
90 < V 8 2.022 0.1667
Source: Empirical
Note: Table 7.2:
Smooth progression of utilisation parameters, with irregular and
approximately constant gearing parameters as follows:
Scaled deviance 986.42 Residual degrees of freedom 191
Single factor utilisation 354.06 Residual degrees of freedom 184
Two factor utilisation and gearing 310.24 Residual degrees of freedom 179
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The final choice of 2 levels for this factor was influenced by its relatively
insignificant effect on pricing for low levels, its exponential increase mid-range
(accounted for in the factor model by utilisation levels) and its theoretical
maxim urn.
Utilisation as a measure of financial stress proved highly responsive. The
greatest number of levels (8) was chosen for this factor, as empirical
observation indicated substantially differing experience by utilisation.
Security (as intimated in Tables 5.1 - 5.3, Chapter 5) has a substantial effect,
in many ways inverse to gearing. The choice of only 2 levels for this factor is
as much a response to the way in which loans are granted as to its risk
significance. In fact, loans are generally either unsecured (by independent
security), or fully secured, with few partly-secured loans in existence. The
choice of 2 levels was dictated by the clear distinction between unsecured
and fully secured loans. Security, by investigation, has proved stochastic, as
the range of outturns for realised security as opposed to its book value has
proved highly variable. For the purposes of claim frequency analysis, security
is taken as an accounting entry. Its variability will be addressed as part of the
default cost amount analysis, to follow.
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The full table of rating factors and corresponding levels is set out in Table 7.3
below:
Table 7.3
Multiplicative Poisson: Rating Factors
Rating Factor Gearing
%
Utilisation
%
Security
%
Size
Severity Only
Level
	
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0<G ^ 50
50<G ^ c0
U ^ 25%
25%<U35%
35%<U ^ 45%
45%<U ^ 60%
60% < U ^ 75%
75% <U ^ 83%
83% < U ^ 90%
90% < U
0 ^ S < 100
100 ^ S
<£100,000
.^. £100,000
Source: Empirical
Unequal intervals are a function of observation; intervals are chosen by
reference to observed risk.
7.6
	 Choice of Default Frequency Model
In Chapter 6 using Daykin, Pentikainen & Pesonen's (1994) underlying
structure, defaults were hypothesised to follow a Poisson process. Brockman
& Wright (1992) comment on Johnson & Hey's (1989) specification of a
Poisson process with regard to claim frequency, followed in that case by a
constant variance claim frequency model. Brockman & Wright themselves
propose a Poisson error structure, whereby the variance of claim number is
equal to the cell mean. They further point out that variance may be allowed to
exceed mean by means of a simple model adjustment, which allows mean
claim frequency forecasts to remain unaltered, but increases overall variance.
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They do warn that the "fit" of the model in terms of the explanatory factors,
must be good in order to permit the variance constraint to be eased.
With respect to the default frequency model to be used, it is proposed to
follow Brockman and Wright's (1992) blueprint (i.e. to assume that defaults
are Poisson distributed): firstly constraining variance to equal cell mean, and
secondly permitting variance to exceed mean. Standardised residuals are
produced for the first assumption only, as results were found to be
acceptable.
The software used is the GLIM package, and a multiplicative model is
proposed in order to investigate interaction of factors. Where variance equals
mean, a pure Poisson process is being proposed; where variance is not so
constrained, a distribution of negative binomial type results.
There exists a key difference between the motor insurance claim frequency
model of the above authors and the default frequency model proposed by the
present author: A motor vehicle can have more than one accident, whereas a
single loan may only default once (under normal circumstances)!
Firstly, it is in fact possible for a loan to default more than once. Loans may
enter and leave the default state through recovery in the firms finances and
subsequently re-enter the default state (and thus be counted as a separate
default) should the recovery prove temporary. Secondly, the fact that a large
portfolio is involved means that the effect of approximating a part Binomial
(for single defaults), part Poisson (for more than 1 default) distribution using a
Poisson assumption is not likely to be substantial, given that residual
heterogeneity within cells may already have invalidated the strict 1.I.D.
assumption, and that we know the default frequency to be bounded by
operational factors at quite low levels. What is faced is a trade off "between
accuracy and simplicity" (Brockman & Wright 1992) (see also Chapter 6), and
the simplicity of the Poisson assumption is chosen at the expense of a small -
and conservative loss of accuracy. For a full discussion of the Poisson
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approximation to the Binomial for large N, see McCullagh and Nelder (1989,
Chapter 6 p103 - 107 and Appendix B).
The data used, as mentioned earlier, is the default experience arising from a
portfolio of approximately 59,000 loans over a 21 month period. Parameter
estimates, significance levels and residuals are shown in Tables 7.4, 7.5 and
7.6.
Table 7.4
Parameter Estimates: Default Frequency Model
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Name
1 -5.124 0.155 1
0 aliased UTIL(1)
2 0.3966 0.1901 UTIL(2)
3 0.5921 0.1858 UTIL(3)
4 0.8851 0.1636 UTIL(4)
5 1.262 0.1583 UTIL(5)
6 1.426 0.1599 UTIL(6)
7 1.716 0.1601 UTIL(7)
8 2.066 0.1626 UTIL(8)
0 aliased GEAR(1)
9 0.5966 0.1091 GEAR(2)
0 aliased SEC(1)
10 -0.3019 0.05003 SEC(2)
Source: Empirical
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Q1-1)/F statistic — D1_ D1)1). Q,
Table 7.5
Significance Levels: Analysis of Deviance
Model Degrees of Freedom D Scaled Deviance Q F Statistic
No Factors 31 738.70
Utilisation 24 106.34 3.797
Gearing 23 68.25 8.597
Security 22 30.75 12.638
Source: Empirical
Notes: Table 7.5
2). All factors significant at 99% level
3). No product factors significant
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Table 7.6
Standardised Residuals: Default Frequency Model
Cell G-U-S Observed Fitted Standardised
Residual
Exposed to
Risk
1 1-1-1 0.005738 0.005953 -0.147 2,788
2 1-1-2 0.006401 0.004402 1.13 1,406
3 1-2-1 0.00432 0.008851 -1.638 1,157
4 1-2-2 0.006844 0.006544 0.11 877
5 1-3-1 0.011923 0.010762 0.29 671
6 1-3-2 0.004809 0.007958 -0.882 624
7 1-4-1 0.015367 0.014426 0.219 781
8 1-4-2 0.011686 0.010667 0.289 856
9 1-5-1 0.014980 0.021034 -1.023 601
10 1-5-2 0.014178 0.015554 -0.293 705
11 1-6-1 0.034217 0.024777 0.648 117
12 1-6-2 0.023690 0.018321 0.515 169
13 1-7-1 0 0.033107 -0.444 6
14 1-7-2 0 0.024481 -0.390 6
15 1-8-1 0.254372 0.046984 5.366 31
16 1-8-2 0 0.034742 -1.108 35
17 2-1-1 0.010546 0.010810 -0.108 1,802
18 2-1-2 0.005934 0.007993 -0.669 843
19 2-2-1 0.016234 0.016071 0.060 2,218
20 2-2-2 0.015702 0.011884 1.218 1,210
21 2-3-1 0.019733 0.019542 0.065
22 2-3-2 0.014986 0.01445 0 .161 1 ,401
23 2-4-1 0.026737 0.026196 0.233 4,862
24 2-4-2 0.018092 0.019370 -0.529 3,316
25 2-5-1 0.039714 0.038196 0.595 5,867
26 2-5-2 0.027324 0.028243 -0.392 4,259
27 2-6-1 0.043914 0.044991 -0.367 5,215
28 2-6-2 0.034233 0.033268 0.323 3,739
29 2-7-1 0.057426 0.060119 -0.714 4,232
30 2-7-2 0.048656 0.044454 1.054 2,795
31 2-8-1 0.087869 0.085318 0.413 2,231
32
_
2-8-2 0.055211 0.063087 -1.171 1,395
Note: Residuals well behaved, with the exception of one outlier associated
with very small exposed to risk.
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7.7	 Conditional Default Cost Model
Brockman & Wright (1992) advocate a multiplicative gamma error structure
model for fitting to motor claim severity data, with coefficient of variation
assumed constant. For a variety of reasons, an overall model is impractical
for loan portfolio analysis. Firstly, it cannot be claimed in respect of loans,
that a similar severity distribution applies regardless of size. Secondly the
existence of security on some loans and not on others must have
repercussions on the severity of default cost. In the light of information under
loan size and security, the global allocation of default cost across the portfolio
appears sub optimal; a better overall fit should be attained by fitting
piecewise.
The default cost data made available is, not surprisingly, more detailed than
simple frequency data. It is ultimately proposed to produce loan margins on
an annualised basis; it is insurance industry practice to index historic default
costs to today's date, and to produce an annual average default cost in
today's prices in order to immunise the portfolio against already observed
changes in monetary values and to produce a pricing structure appropriate to
current default cost.
The combination of frequency and default cost models will give us a pricing
structure, but one which is not yet applicable to loans granted presently.
The piecewise fitting referred to above, involves fitting 4 separate distributions
(2 for each security level x 2 for each loan amount) to 16 cells (2 for each
gearing level x 8 for each utilisation level) in each case.
The data available comprise 3,533 defaults, of which 829 gave rise to
provisioning need.
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Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 give a breakdown of the default data by security and
loan amount.
Table 7.7
Breakdown of Default Frequencies by Security and Size of Loan
Security
Factor
Level
Loan Size
Factor Level
Number
Zero Cost
of Observations
Positive Cost Total
1 1 998 (70.0%)	 ' 427 (30.0%) 1425
1 2 481 (60.9%) 309 (39.1%) 790
2 1 786 (94.4%) 47 (5.6%) 833
2 2 439 (90.5%) 46 (9.5%) 485
Total 2704 (76.5%) 829 (23.5%) 3533
Source: Empirical
Note: Security increases the proportion of zero cost defaults
Table 7.8
Conditional and Unconditional Mean and Variance of
Default Cost Amount
Security
Factor
Level
Loan
Size
Factor
Level
(on positive
£
Mean
Conditional
cost)
Variance
£
Mean
Unconditional
Variance
1 1 34725 554.59.10b 10405 419.13 x 10b
1 2 254055 349.80.109 99371 151.97 x 109
2 1 25812 507.68.10b 1456 63.58 x 10°
2 2 453423 186.90.1010 43005 191.46x 109
61.80.109Total 139205 248.78.109 32664
Source: Empirical
Note: Security reduces unconditional expected cost, but its stochastic nature
is revealed, when we consider the conditional large loan mean cost.
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Table 7.9
Higher Moments of Default Cost Amount
Loan
Security Size
Factor Factor Conditional (on positive Cost) Unconditional
Level Level
a3 Skewness Kurtosis a3 Skewness Kurtosis
£ £
1 1 1.1718.10'4 1.3527 5.860 3.5113.10u 2.4369 9.9980
1 2 1.8357.108 7.5089 73.4076 4.6932.10 17 11.3424 169.3275
2 1 8.4634.1013 2.5317 11.9770 4.7753.10 12 8.8653 112.0520
2 2 1.2515.1018 3.8881 18.0992 1.1870.10 18 13.8736 210.6419
Total 1.3787.10'5 10.2531 127.4226 3.2351.10" 20.6603 518.8445
Source: Empirical
Notes: Table 7.9
1) Based on defined, indexed default costs. Excludes 354 defaults
included in Table 4.6, of which 81 gave rise to provisioning cost.
2) Extremely high skewness and kurtosis point to a distribution asymptotic
to both X and Y axis, and give rise to great difficulty in fitting
distributions, particularly to the important "body" of the distribution.
3).	 Best fit provided by the logistic distribution, but insufficient accuracy
obtained.
As may be observed from the moments of the default cost distribution in
Tables 7.8 and 7.9, the combination of relatively low mean with high 2nd, 3rd
and 4th moments, and the fact that the distribution is effectively asymptotic to
both X and Y axes, mean that the loss of accuracy entailed in fitting a smooth
curve to the empirical distribution is unjustified. Using the "Best Fit" software
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package, no acceptable fit was found among 22 distributions tested, and thus
it is proposed to fit the distribution empirically.
The above findings are now applied to price loans currently being granted.
7.8	 The Transition Matrix
The observation of default cost per cell and the basing of loan prices on cell
experience does not allow for the migration of loans between cells. The
correct loan pricing formula is a probability weighted average of all cells, so
that a loan is appropriately charged throughout for its underlying probability of
improvement or disimprovement in quality. A transition matrix is necessary to
calculate the current state probabilities of cell movement. This transition
matrix is unlikely to be stable over time, but deviations from its implied levels
will provide a valuable insight into changing portfolio conditions.
Based on most recent experience, the appropriate current transition matrix is
set out in Table 7.10. This matrix is effectively the probability that a loan
retains its current risk rating, or moves to another risk rating group within a
12-month period. (As loans are reviewed annually, the underlying
assumption is that appropriate charges on a 2 year loan may only be adjusted
once, at the mid point of the loan term). If monitored, changes in this matrix
over time can provide information as to how portfolio risk is changing over
time. An increase in the probability that a loan moves to a higher risk grade,
ceteris paribus, would indicate that either the current pace of improvement in
credit conditions was slowing, or that credit conditions were beginning to
disimprove. The corollary is obviously also the case.
Table 7.10 is appropriate only to loans currently being granted if there is no
change in the rate of improvement in credit conditions currently operative (see
Table 6.1, Chapter 6, for overall portfolio default frequency by quarter). The
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high turnover noted in Table 4.4, Chapter 4, effectively means that any initial
selection effect is not likely to be large.
All loans will be adjusted by the relevant transition matrix entries prior to final
pricing.
Table 7.10
Current probabilities of Risk Grade Movement within 12 months.
1 2 3 4 5 I	 6 7 8
1 61.88% 14.92% 7.15% 7.68% 5.19% 2.11% 0.82% 0.25%
2 18.21% 42.05% 11.54% 13.44% 8.68% 3.96% 1.68% 0.44%
3 8.67% 13.10% 37.92% 19.96% 11.69% 0.53% 2.63% 0.78%
4 4.52% 7.73% 10.29% 46.64% 18.28% 8.12% 3.16% 1.26%
5 2.33% 3.64% 5.42% 17.65% 47.21% 15.11% 6.58% 2.07%
6 1.31% 2.20% 2.64% 8.79% 21.08% 45.42% 14.30% 4.26%
7 0.84% 1.17% 1.73% 5.31% 11.25% 16.34% 52.00% 11.37%
8 0.45% 1.15% 1.54% 3.33% 6.78% 10.81% 19.83% 56.11%
Source: Empirical
7.9	 Loan Pricing
The construction of loan pricing, follows directly from the preceding
discussion. Provisioning rates allied to default frequencies produce an
expected cost per cell, which must be at least equalled by cell income, so that
overall portfolio income prior to administrative expenses and return to capital
exactly equals expected cost, i.e. a "Pure Premium" calculation.
Tables 7.11-7.12 set out estimates of loan pricing on a "Pure Premium" basis,
applicable to current loans. Note that no margin is taken to compensate bank
shareholders for risk, and that no allowance is made for costs.
200
Table 7.11
Loans <£100,000: Pure Risk Premium
Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear 1 Sec 2, Gear 2
1 1.22% 2.19% 0.11% 0.22%
2 1.15% 2.08% 0.11% 0.22%
3 1.08% 1.90%
-
0.11% 0.22%
-
_
4 1.08% -	 1.90% 0.11% 0.18%
5 1.15% 2.04% 0.11% 0.22%
6 1.18% 2.26% 0.11% 0.22%
7 1.26% 2.69% 0.14% 0.25%
8 1.86% 3.26% 0.18% 0.32%
Source: Empirical
Table 7.12
Loans >= £100,000: Pure Risk Premium
Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear 1 Sec 2, Gear 2
1 0.32% 1.00% 0.29% 0.72%
2 0.39% 1.15% 0.25% 0.68%
3 0.47% 1.15% 0.25% 0.54%
4 0.57% 1.29% 0.25% 0.54%
5 0.90% 1.61% 0.36% 0.61%
6 1.40% 2.19% 0.36% 0.75%
7 3.23% 2.62% 0.64% 1.11%
,
8 2.55% 3.05% 0.86% 1.36%
Source: Empirical
For illustration purposes only, if, for example total excess capital of 8% of
loans outstanding were to require a return of 10% per annum to compensate
for risk, and if administration costs were assumed to amount to 0.50% per
annum for all loans, the annual margins payable would be as set out in
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 (excess return to capital levied proportional to observed
default cost).
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Table 7.13
Loans <£100,000: Expense Loaded Premium
Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear 1 Sec 2, Gear 2
1 2.54% 4.19% 0.70% 0.86%
2 2.44% 4.02% 0.69% 0.85%
3 2.31% 3.82% 0.68% 0.83%
4 2.31% 3.80% 0.68% 0.82%
5 2.45% 4.06% 0.69% 0.84%
6 2.51% 4.32% 0.70% 0.86%
7 2.61% 5.02% 0.73% 0.94%
8 3.65% 5.99% 0.81% 1.04%
Source: Empirical
Table 7.14
Loans >= £100,000: Expense Loaded Premium
Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear	 J Sec 2, Gear 2
1 1.01% 2.20% 0.97% 1.71%
2 1.16% 2.42% 0.93% 1.64%
3 1.26% 2.43%	 - 0.91%
_
1.42%
4 1.45% 2.68% 0.92% 1.42%
5 2.01% 3.22% 1.10% 1.57%
6 2.85% 4.21% 1.12% 1.77%
7 5.99% 4.95% 1.59% 2.36%
8 4.81% 5.73% 1.95% 2.80%
Source: Empirical
7.10	 Using The Results: Comparison with
Existing Pricing
Tables 7.15 and 7.16 set out the difference between the banks current
charging structure, and that produced by the loan pricing model, with
reasonable allowance for return to equity and administration costs. The
proposed pricing model has been constrained to produce approximately
existing revenues, so that direct comparison is possible, to establish whether
systematic relative overpricing/underpricing of specific cells exists.
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If existing pricing is representative of the market, then scope may exist for
concentrating marketing effort on areas offering attractive risk/reward ratios,
and de-emphasising areas which are relatively less attractive.
Table 7.15
Loans <£100,000: Current Margin Less Proposed Margin
Utilisation	 , Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear 1 Sec 2, Gear 2	 I
1 0.40 -1.21 2.15 1.92
2 0.39 -0.70 2.10 2.30
3 0.62 -0.37 2.27 2.47
4 0.69 -0.22 2.33 2.51
5 0.70 -0.37 2.50 2.65
6 0.30 -0.52 2.58 2.67
7 0.11 -0.92 3.21 2.76
8 -0.16
_
-1.77 1.99 2.92
Source: Empirical
Table 7.16
Loans >= £100,000: Current Margin Less Proposed Margin
Utilisation Sec 1, Gear 1 Sec 1, Gear 2 Sec 2, Gear 1 Sec 2, Gear 2
1 -0.56 -1.01 0.69 0.00
2 -0.43 -0.98 0.62 0.40
3 -0.37 -0.91 0.74 0.46
4 -0.13 -0.87 0.67 0.53
5 -0.50 -1.16 1.09 0.57
6
-1.50 -1.68 0.87 0.57
7
-3.99 -2.38 2.41 0.33
8 -2.07 -2.98 0.28 0.03
Source: Empirical
203
Broadly speaking, smaller loans appear substantially more profitable than
larger loans. Two major differences between the algorithm used by the bank
at present, and the model presented in this chapter are:
1.	 Collateral
Secured loans are priced by the bank substantially higher than their
cost. All of columns 3 and 4 in each of Tables 7.15 and 7.16 are
positive, indicating that excess returns are being generated in secured
lending: all but 1 of columns 1 and 2 in each of these tables are
negative, indicating that unsecured lending is failing to generate the
returns implicit in our model.
The pattern is consistent, and suggests that some proportion of charges
be moved from secured to unsecured lending. In practical terms,
charges for secured loans should be reduced, and those for unsecured
loans increased, until column entries in Tables 7.15 and 7.16 are
balanced closer to zero; in this case columns 1 and 2 taken together,
should approximately equal columns 3 and 4 taken together.
2.	 Gearing
There is evidence that the risk reduction effect of low gearing is
insufficiently taken into account in current pricing. Highly geared
lending, whether secured or unsecured (i.e. columns 2 and 4) produces
lower excess returns than low geared lending (i.e. columns 1 and 3).
This would imply that charges should be increased for the former and
reduced for the latter, similar to the procedure followed for collateral.
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The algorithm presently used by the bank seems otherwise effective, with
relative stability in patterns of overcharging/undercharging relative to cost,
when each column is analysed. One exception to this effectiveness is the
pattern in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.16 where undercharging increases
exponentially with utilisation. For higher utilisation levels, this may be a
function of the bank's maximum margin of 650 basis points.
However, while it may be argued that the algorithm merely requires
adjustment, and therefore that the loan pricing model does not represent a
significant improvement on present practice, it must be pointed out that a loan
pricing model of the type proposed herein was necessary to identify
anomalies in the algorithm, and its continued application would be necessary
to ensure that the revised algorithm continued to represent underlying
experience.
7.11	 Comparison of Portfolio Mean Income and
Standard Deviation
The proposed scale of charges produces higher mean income. There are
several reasons for this.
The proposed scale of charges assumes weighted average gross margin
income of 2.34% in order to remunerate regulatory capital at 10% per annum
over the entire 5 year period. Current charges, on the other hand, have
recently reduced, reflecting improved provisioning trends, and produce
weighted average gross margin income of 2.20%. This would produce
charges on average 6.4% higher under the proposed scale than those
currently being operated.
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The choice of 10% per annum for remuneration of regulatory capital is
dictated by the fact that this is the actual rate of return achieved by the
dataset over the last 5 years. This rate is chosen to enable direct comparison
of models.
The size of cross subsidisation within the existing portfolio is such that deficits
on loans for which such deficits exist, more than absorb surplus profits on
loans which are charged a higher than proposed margin. This has the effect
of reducing current mean income by 8.0% relative to its level were the
proposed scale of charges to operate.
At present, the proposed scale of charges would produce mean income after
provisioning of £65.05 million per quarter, versus £56.22 million per quarter at
present. The reader is cautioned that these figures represent specific results
for the portfolio in question, and no general inferences may be drawn from
them. To the extent that cross subsidisation exists within bank portfolios,
mean income may be increased by the elimination of subsidies, and the
continuation of charging at least the observed economic cost in all risk
groups.
For the specific bank in question, effort might be directed towards increasing
the pricing of unsecured lending, with any reduction in volumes resulting from
such increases giving rise to resources which might then be directed toward
secured lending. Clearly, the current cross subsidisation is significant, and
might allow the above effort to continue for some time, rather than as an "at
the margin" exercise.
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With regard to portfolio standard deviation, the proposed scale of charges
produces a standard deviation of profit of £2.0 million at present, versus £1.6
million for the market responsive charges operative at present. If we
constrain the proposed scale of charges to equate to existing charges by
eliminating 1. above, then the associated standard deviation of profit falls to
£1.88 million, and mean income after provisioning to £61.16 million. It may
be inferred that the latter mean standard deviation combination would be
preferable to that currently operative.
In practice, what would emerge would be a hybrid portfolio, retaining or
slightly reducing excess profits where these are currently a feature, and
reducing or eliminating opportunity losses. The size of excess profits and
opportunity losses are estimated to be significant, so that the current portfolio
would not be efficient in a Markowitz framework. The actual portfolio resulting
from the effort referred to above cannot be estimated, as the elasticity of
credit demand for each risk group is unknown. Equally, it would be unrealistic
to assume perfect credit markets, because we know that the existing portfolio
represents 20% of its total market.
It should be cautioned again that the above observations apply to a specific
portfolio over a relatively short time period. Such effects as have been
observed may or may not be a feature of other credit portfolios. If
subsidisation is present, so that some loans are charged less than opportunity
cost, then the income characteristic of any portfolio may be improved. In this
specific portfolio, subsidisation has been identified and its elimination would
enhance profitability.
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Conclusion
A factor model for loan pricing has been derived, based on expected cost.
The results of this model have been applied to impute a scale of operative
charges. These charges have been compared to those currently operative;
reducing or eliminating differences could enhance portfolio profitability, and
might improve portfolio allocation in favour of those areas producing revenue
in excess of expected cost. A fundamental assumption is that expected cost
remains in line with historic experience of actual cost.
Simulation of the operation of a number of credit portfolios over longer time
periods is now pursued.
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Chapter 8
Simulation of the Credit Process
Introduction
A framework for a VAR computation of reserves has been developed in
previous chapters. This computation involves only observable measures, is
developed by reference to a risk theoretic equation, and has been
constrained to produce equal regulatory reserves to those currently operative
in the case of the dataset. The range of banks reporting to a regulatory
authority has been hypothesised to contain 6 in total, with banks with
provisions 20% higher and lower than this dataset, banks with profitability
20% higher and lower than this dataset, and finally a bank 10% of the size of
this dataset. The operation of such a range of credit portfolios under both the
present and proposed regulatory requirements will now be simulated. With
equivalent assumptions, the superiority of the proposed VAR regulatory
requirement should manifest itself in fewer observed insolvencies.
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8.1	 Discussion of Models and Statement
of Common Features
The volatility of underlying loan losses requires any simulation to possess
significant feedback, in order to constrain outcomes into a reasonable
stochastic bundle. One significant area of difference in the credit process
compared with simulation models in insurance is the relatively simple nature
of investments undertaken by banks, so that reduced variability of investment
returns may partly compensate for the volatility of default losses.
Daykin and Hey's (1989) paper is taken as the starting point due to its
expositional simplicity. Modifications are required and are discussed while
proceeding. Viewing the credit portfolio in isolation from the bank's other
activities we have:
Inflow:	 Loan Margin Income
Short Term Interest Income on Reserves
Outflow	 Loan Provisions
Administrative Expenses
Taxation
Dividends
Thus a simple model, with only primary variable input, would be:
A(t). A(t -1)+R(t)(A(t-1))+ L(t)— P(t)— E(t)—T(t)— D(t)	 (8.1)
Where:
A(t) is the amount of assets at end year t.
R(t) is the average short term interest rate in year t.
L(t)	 is the loan margin income in year t.
210
P(t)	 is the provision requirement in year t.
E(t)	 is the administration expense in year t.
T(t)	 is the taxation charge in respect of year t - 1.
D(t) is the dividend payable in respect of year t-1.
Reserves are assumed to be held in short term deposits, and taxation and
dividends are assumed paid after a 1 year lag. Loan provisions are a slow
moving average, with an average 2 years run off. Thus, on average current
loan provisions are assumed to relate to loans made 2 years ago. In an
inflationary environment this can make a significant difference to the
simulation. Most of the flow variables would be expected to bear some
relationship to inflation over time, so that a model for future inflation is
necessary. Daykin and Hey's model is:
LN (1 + i(t))— Lf q = a q [LN (1 + i(t — 1)) — Ug 1 + cr q Z6,(t)	 (8.2)
Where:
i(t)	 is the rate of inflation.
lig 	 is the average inflation rate.
aq	 is the serial correlation of last years inflation rate with this
years.
aq 	is the amplitude of random "white noise".
Zq (t) is a sequence of independent identically distributed unit normal
variables.
Note: This corrects Daykin and Hey's misstatement of the underlying
equation (J.I.A. 116 1989).
Values suggested by Wilkie for the above on the basis of 60 years data are:
lig = .05, cc q = 0.6 and CY q = .05. These have been criticised by Daykin and
Hey as producing too many negative inflation observations. For more recent
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experience they suggest lig
 = .07 aq = 0.6 and aq = .03. The author
suggests (with 5 low inflation years added to the experience!): li g
 = .05, aq =
0.6 and aq = .03.
The average short-term interest rate in any year is assumed to be normally
distributed around a mean 2% above current inflation, with standard deviation
of 1.5%, making negative interest rates possible, but extremely unlikely.
Loan margin income growth is assumed to be normally distributed around a
mean of current inflation plus 2.5%, with standard deviation of 5% per annum.
Administration expenses are assumed to be normally distributed about
inflation with standard deviation of 2% per annum.
It is assumed that negative taxation is possible, and that taxation is at an
annual rate of 38%. The negative taxation possibility assumes that the
overall bank does not operate at a loss over prolonged periods, and thus
either tax can immediately be reclaimed by offset against other currently
profitable areas, or tax losses can be offset against taxable income, after a
short time lag. Taxation may be expressed as follows:
T(t) =.38[L(t —1)— P(t —1) — E(t —1) + R(t —1)A(t —2)]
	
(8.3)
assuming interest income on reserves subject to tax.
Dividends are assumed payable in arrears, based on (6.8). The basic
simulation equation thus becomes:
A(t) = A(t -1)+ R(t) A(t - 1) + L(t) — P(t)— D(t —1) — E(t)
(8.4)
—.38[L(t —1)— P(t —1)— E(t —1)+R(t —1)A(t —2)]
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8.2	 Differences in Model Operation
In the previous section, the common features of the proposed simulation
model were set out. The differences with respect to current and proposed
VAR regulation are only with respect to starting reserve values and definition
of insolvency. In other words, exactly identical operating conditions are
assumed to apply, regardless of the regulatory framework.
In the case of the existing regulatory framework, (Model 1), the starting points
for relevant values are as given below:
Reserves :	 11% of loan volumes outstanding
Loan margins :	 Bank dependent
Provisions :	 Bank dependent
Expenses : 	 0.5% of loan volumes outstanding
Short term interest rate :	 6.0%
Dividend :	 Bank dependent
Insolvency in this case is defined as reserves at any point in time falling below
8% of loan volumes outstanding.
In the case of the proposed VAR regulatory framework (Model 2), the starting
points for relevant values are again as given below:
Reserves :	 5	 5
1.375 x [2E Provisions % — (1— OE Margins °A]
1	 1
x Loans currently outstanding
Loan margins : 	 Bank dependent
Provisions :
	
Bank dependent
Expenses : 	 0.5% of loan volumes outstanding
Short term interest rate :	 6.0%
Dividend :	 Bank dependent
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Insolvency in this case is defined as reserves at any point in time falling
below:
	
[
5	 5
	
2E	 Provisions % - (1- OE Margins %]x Loans currently outstanding 	 (8.5)
	
1	 i
One now proceeds to set out the simulation results for the chosen range of
banks under both models.
8.3	 Presentation and Discussion of Results
Table 8.1
Presentation of Results From Simulation of the Credit Process
Bank (a) refers to 20% higher provisions, Bank (b) refers to 20% lower provisions, Bank (c) refers to the original
dataset, and Bank (d) refers to 20% higher margins, while Bank (e) refers to 20% lower margins.
Bank Simulation Model Number of insolvencies observed
after
Percentage insolvencies
observed after
5yrs 10yrs 15yrs 20yrs 5yrs 10yrs 15yrs 20yrs I
' Overall 2500 1 - 10 100 323 - 0.4 4.0 12.9
2 1 31 86 122 • 1.2 3.4 4.9
(a) 500 1 - 2 17 68 - 0.4 3.4 13.6
2 - 5 8 14 - 1.0 1.6 2.8
(b) 500 1 - 4 50 119 - 0.8 10.0	 r 23.8	 1
2 - 7 33 47	 ' - 1.4 6.6 9.4
(c) 500 1 - 1 8 28 - 0.2 1.6 5.6
2
,
- 4 13 20 - 0.8 2.6 4.0
(d) 500 1 - 1 7 28 - 0.2 1.4 4.6
2 1 11 21 28 0.2 2.2 4.1 5.6
(e) 500 1 - 2 18 85 - 0.4 3.6 17.0
2 - 4 11 13 - 0.8 2.2 2.6
Source: Empirical
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A total of 2500 simulations were run, comprising 500 for each of Banks (a) to
(e) inclusive. Bank (f) was not included as random variation caused by small
size does not lend itself to simulation. Overall, substantially fewer
insolvencies were observed to occur in total (122 under the VAR approach as
opposed to 323 under the present 8% regulation). The overall 20-year
observed insolvency rate was 4.9% for the VAR methodology, versus 12.9%
for present regulation. There is a bias present in the simulation which may
involve banks paying dividends under the simulation payment formula which
causes them to become insolvent under existing regulation, but not under the
VAR approach. This bias is estimated at 40% from consideration of the
outturn for the Bank (c) simulation, where identical starting capital and
operating conditions produce a correspondingly greater percentage
insolvencies. Even allowing for this bias, it does appear that the VAR
approach produces fewer insolvencies overall than present regulation.
In the earlier years, however, the VAR approach produces higher numbers of
insolvencies compared with present regulation. This may be explained by the
observation that banks which are under financial strain, either because of
high provisions, low margins or a combination of both, are likely to find
themselves facing a VAR solvency requirement greater than 8% of loans
outstanding as is the case under present regulation. Thus, the need for
corrective action may be signalled sooner under the VAR methodology than
under present regulation. However, a rising capital requirement as credit
conditions disimprove may encourage pro-cyclical behaviour by regulated
banks, causing lending to contract as provisions rise and vice versa. The
extent to which this might occur would be a function of the number of
operationally constrained banks within a regulatory system at any point in
time and could only be quantified by a regulator.
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Examining the individual bank simulations in turn results in the following:
1. Bank (a) (20% higher provisioning rates than standard)
Under the VAR (Model 2) approach, Bank (a) is equipped with higher
initial capital than under the Model 1 approach. Notwithstanding this
higher capital, the VAR requirement is more onerous than 8%,
producing 5 as opposed to 2 insolvencies after 10 years.
Subsequently, lack of profitability causes more Model 1 banks to fail as
time progresses, so that after 20 years 13.6% of Model 1 simulations
are observed as insolvencies versus 2.8% of Model 2 simulations.
2. Bank (b) (20% lower provisioning rates than standard)
Intuitively, one would expect fewer failures than the number observed,
because under both models, Bank (b) is more profitable than Bank (a).
However, this increased profitability permits the payment of
substantially higher dividends than under the previous scenario. High
dividend payments associated with a VAR requirement lower than 8%
precipitates a large number of Model 1 insolvencies, while the over
distribution of excess profits earned also increases Model 2
insolvencies.
It should be pointed out that the dividend formula presented in Chapter
6 is intended to represent a maximum distribution, rather than an
automatic entitlement. Prudent management in Bank (b) would restrict
dividend payouts while solvency was under threat. A minor adjustment
to the maximum permissible dividend could sharply reduce observed
insolvencies for Bank (b), but if applied generally, would see no
insolvencies in other bank types. As the purpose of these simulations
is to observe and compare insolvency experience in all bank types, this
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result has seen been allowed to stand, even though most unlikely to
occur in practice.
3. Bank (c) (Parameters as in original dataset)
Here the evidence of the bias referred to in earlier discussion is seen.
Insolvency rates are some 40% higher for Model 1 than for Model 2,
notwithstanding identical starting capital and operating assumptions.
This is caused by the relationship of dividends to VAR capital, and
again may lead Model 1 banks to overdistribute inadvertently. Once
again, changing the distribution rules by model type invalidates the
observation of identical sample paths, so that this bias cannot be
eliminated.
4. Bank (d) (20% higher margins than standard)
As excess earnings may be paid away as dividends, approximately the
same number of insolvencies as under the previous scenario is
evident. This is the only scenario in which Model 2 does not
outperform Model 1. The explanation for this is that lower initial capital
under Model 2 is not recouped from retained earnings, because these
earnings are fully distributed. Starting with capital of 9.0% of loans
outstanding, versus 11.0% for Model 1, Model 2 banks remain at
higher risk of insolvency throughout. However, total insolvencies in
banks of type (d) are of lower than average proportion, and dividend
policy is available to reduce insolvency risk.
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5.	 Bank (e) (20% lower margins than standard)
This shows the widest discrepancy in observed insolvencies of any
bank type (85 versus 13). Once again, lack of profitability is to blame,
compensated in the case of Model 2, by higher initial capital.
8.4	 Interpretation of Findings
The VAR methodology suggested in this thesis has been observed to
produce fewer overall insolvencies than present regulation, on a 20 year time
horizon. It may be argued, thus, that it represents an improvement on
present regulation.
If, however, the simulation were to have run for 10 years only, the VAR
methodology would have been observed to produce 3 times as many
insolvencies as present regulation, and the opposite argument might hold
sway.
The argument in favour of VAR is more subtle than when the simulation clock
stops; after all, regulation does not affect banking operations in this specific
model, so that one cannot simply claim victory for VAR after 20 years as
opposed to defeat after 10 years.
Viewed overall and in a practical setting, the VAR methodology does appear
to identify weak banks earlier than present regulation. The differential initial
capital associated with VAR permits a larger number of banks to survive the
simulation process. From a regulatory standpoint, fewer weak banks
identified earlier than otherwise has two main advantages; the ability to
concentrate remedial regulatory effort on fewer banks at any point in time,
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and the knowledge that relatively high residual capital will be available within
banks which require their attention due to high provisions, lack of profits or
both. The main disadvantages are the possibility of pro-cyclical action by
operationally constrained banks, and the over-optimistic reporting of
provisions and earnings by the industry, thus reducing its calculated VAR
capital.
The former disadvantage has been discussed. The latter has been
addressed by the requirement that provisions and margins are calculated
over five years. The scope for management of reported earnings (Rajan
(1994)) is substantially reduced the longer the timescale over which such
management is required. The choice of five years is not accidental; it
corresponds to the peak-to-trough duration of the banking cycle (Table 4.1).
From the individual bank viewpoint, Banks (a) to (e) inclusive have much less
variable insolvency probability under VAR than under current regulation
(Table 8.1). This may mean that a level premium deposit insurance scheme
becomes more feasible. Further, VAR allows banks to specialise without
requiring substantial regulatory capital which cannot be compensated without
increasing risk if such specialisation is at the lower end of the risk return
spectrum of private sector banking. Banks are free to price loans in the
knowledge of a closer correspondence between economic and regulatory
capital than exists at present. Efficiencies might be generated, and
informational asymmetries reduced.
Banks are not passive victims in the regulatory process. If the advantages of
VAR outweigh its disadvantages in terms of computation, reporting, and
reduction of scope for adverse selection, then banks can canvass the
regulators for such regulation. The regulator similarly cannot impose
regulation by fiat. Thus, VAR is likely only to emerge provided both the
banking industry and its regulators are in favour. This section has outlined
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the advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of each. These
advantages and disadvantages are summarised below:
Advantages
Regulator
	 : Fewer problem banks identified earlier.
: Concentration of remedial effort.
: Higher asset excess in problem banks than
under current regulations.
Regulated Banks : Reduction in adverse selection.
: No capital 'dead-weight'.
: Ability to specialise.
: Direct link to economic capital.
Disadvantages
Regulator
Regulated Banks
: Greater sophistication required.
: Risk of pro cycle behaviour by regulated banks.
: Resulting possible increase in systemic risk.
: Expense of configuring systems.
: Greater exposure to 'shocks', i.e. sudden
changes in VAR adequacy.
The conclusion of this thesis is now developed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 9
Summary, Conclusions, and Limitations
9.1
	
Summary
The research area addressed in this thesis has been the application of
statistical, specifically actuarial, techniques in credit portfolio management. A
large credit portfolio has been used to illustrate the development and
application of statistical techniques to produce VAR and loan pricing models.
A major portion of the work was concerned with the non stationarity of
underlying risk, and the subdivision of the portfolio into homogeneous cells
with respect to factors already observed to influence risk. This has allowed
mathematical reserves to be calculated, permitted their approximation using
observable portfolio measures and has been employed to develop both VAR
and loan pricing models.
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In summary, the focus of the thesis has been in the following areas:
• A statement of the research aims, objectives and methodology.
• An examination of relevant banking and statistical literature.
• A discussion of current industry practice.
• An introduction to the dataset used to illustrate proposals
concerning VAR methods.
• A demonstration of the equivalence of actuarial techniques in credit
pricing to option based credit pricing, together with some suggested
improvements in the latter.
• The parameterisation of a solvency model, based on the dataset,
and its development into a value at risk (VAR) model.
• The specification of a loan pricing model, its comparison to existing
pricing within the dataset, and the identification of anomalies in
existing pricing.
• The simulation of future portfolio states, for both VAR and existing
regulatory environments.
The main findings are now summarised in more detail
9.1.1	 Value At Risk versus Risk Based Capital
In Chapter 3, risk based capital was shown to be a misnomer in respect of
"other" private sector credit. The requirements of a VAR model were
identified and discussed in the context of a clear distinction between industry
and regulatory definitions of capital.
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9.1.2	 Strengths and Limitations of Dataset
In Chapter 4, a dataset was introduced which was subsequently used to
illustrate numerically the differing models analysed and compared within the
study. To the extent that this dataset is broadly representative of its industry
(UK bank corporate lending over the years 1990 to 1994), models proposed
in this study are potentially generalisable. The latter is reinforced since the
dataset was used to develop and test principles (rather than to forecast or test
specific hypotheses) using some broadly realistic data. 'Hypothetical' data
could also have been used, but the researcher chose to obtain 'real' data for
the 'simulation testbed' developed in the study.
9.1.3	 Option Pricing of Credit versus Insurance Pricing
In Chapter 5, the equivalence of the two approaches under common .
assumptions is demonstrated. The expected value approach of the latter
enabled a known bias to be eliminated. The existence of a second stochastic
process relating to independent security has been explicitly allowed for in loan
pricing in a suggested extension of existing theory. This equivalence allows
insurance mathematics to be applied directly in the evaluation of bank credit
portfolios.
9.1.4	 Empirically Parameterised Models
Using historic portfolio experience, a solvency model relevant to long term
strategy was constructed. An interesting result is that required reserves
compute to a similar order to the operational ratios apparently used in the
banking system, so that the actuarial risk theoretic approach developed
validates rather than alters existing reserve levels.
The reserves computed were expressed in terms of observable portfolio
measures, and subsequently used to illustrate an alternative VAR model of
solvency.
9.1.5	 Loan Pricing Models
Substantial differences between default costs have been shown to exist in
subsections of the portfolio when it is subdivided by factors known to affect
risk. The comparison of the loan pricing model to existing charging structures
indicated that portfolio composition and pricing are sub-optimal, and that
overall returns could be enhanced by the elimination of cross subsidisation.
The bank which provided the dataset has expressed interest in pursuing the
research methodology contained herein, specifically with respect to loan
pricing, thereby providing some evidence supporting its practical application.
9.1.6	 Simulation Results
The simulation of a proposed VAR solvency model compared with existing
capital adequacy standards identified substantial differences in operation.
Some key potential advantages to both regulators and regulated banks were
identified with respect to the proposed model. Disadvantages exist also, and
both parties must be satisfied prior to the introduction of a VAR approach that
advantages solidly outweigh properly addressed disadvantages.
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This thesis cannot conclude that VAR regulation is to be preferred in all
circumstances, but it does offer many apparent advantages not possessed by
the current industry framework.
9.2	 Limitations of the Research
While the thesis has provided an extensive illustration of the applicability of
statistical techniques, it should be stressed that the illustration has been by
reference to a specific portfolio, although the techniques themselves are well
grounded in the literature. One must be cautionary that specific model values
cannot be assumed generally applicable; each portfolio must be evaluated
individually. Nevertheless it must be re-emphasised that a specific loan
portfolio dataset was chosen for the following two reasons:
• The data were made available to the researcher.
• Using the dataset is preferable if the proposals to this thesis are to
have practical merit, rather than 'inventing' a simulation testbed
(which would itself be an acceptable research approach if these
data were not available). As a result, it is the principles of the
proposed methodology which form the major contribution of this
research.
No matter how apparently precise statistical information may be, it cannot be
used as a substitute for sound judgement. This thesis advocates VAR and
loan pricing models as tools rather than solutions, and does not argue that it
has found the answer to all credit problems.
VAR capital gives the manager an estimate of capital requiring remuneration
for risk; it does not equip him with the means of its remuneration. Similarly
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loan pricing models may be priced to remunerate capital at risk regardless of
which type of loan is added at the margin; strict adherence may mean that
few loans are added to the portfolio.
However, these models can and do provide an insight into where capital is at
risk within an organisation, and into how it might be remunerated at least cost
for this assumption of risk.
9.3	 Areas for Further Research
There remain many important areas where the techniques of this thesis might
be extended. Particularly pertinent examples are:
• The investigation of other credit portfolios to produce industry
representative models.
• A comparison of actual versus expected portfolio performance over
an extended period of time, permitting the application of a
RARORAC loan pricing approach, and the further refinement of
control techniques.
• Portfolio optimisation by reference to asset swapping/sharing.
• Testing these proposals and gaining feedback from practicing loan
officers in banks.
In peroration, this thesis has established the relevance of statistical
techniques to the management of solvency and pricing, and may equip bank
management with an effective strategic tool. This contribution has been
made in a challenging and significant area of research and there are other
areas of exploration as defined briefly above.
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APPENDIX A
Historic Income, Default Cost and Gross Profitability
of Selected Bank Dataset
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Facility-
Security-
Gearing
Identifier
Utilisation
Level
Quarter ' Number of
Loans
Outstanding
Debit
Balances
Gross
Margin
Income
Provision.'
ing Cost
Net Margin	 Net Margin
Income	 Income Per
Pound Lent
1-1-1 1 03 93 1,310 13,101,963-	 85,234 0 85,234	 0.6505%
1-1-1 1 04 93 1,468 14,571,568	 94,354 0 94,354	 0.6475%
1-1-1 1 01 94 1,535 15,043,652	 96,572 -13,249 109,821	 0.7300%
1-1-1 1 02 94 1,168 11,358,481	 77,527 0 77,527	 0.6826%
1-1-1 1 03 94 1,090 10,342,219	 77,207 77,207	 0.7465%
1-1-1 1 04 94 1,332 12,638,421	 90,710 90,710
	 0.7177%
1-1-1 1 01 95 1,467 13,483,663
	 98,007 98,007
	 0.7269%
1-1-1 2 03 93 539 8,220,045	 53,953 -8 53,961	 0.6565%
1-1-1 2 04 93 557 8,411,580	 54,657 0 54,657	 0.6498%
1-1-1 2 01 94 550 8,148,659	 52.931 52,931	 0.6496%
1-1-1 2 02 94 490 7,186,906
	 48,427 48,427	 0.6738%
1-1-1 2 03 94 493 7,172,861	 50,841 50,841	 0.7088%
1-1-1 2 Q4 94 574 8,175,723	 57,054 - _	 57,054	 0.6978%
1-1-1 2 01 95 590 8,476,697	 60,399 60,399	 0.7125%
1-1-1 3 03 93 304 6,860,599	 47,532 0 47,532	 0.6928%
1-1-1 3 04 93 336 7,683,825	 51,143 51.143	 0.6656%
1-1-1 3 01 94 346 7,882,050	 52,601 52.601	 0 6674%
1-1-1 3 02 94 294 6,776,105	 46,847 46.847	 0.6914%
1-1-1 3 0394 297 6,816,572	 49,956 49,956,	 0.7329%
1-1-1 3 Q4 94 335 7.645,389
	
55.341 55.3411	 0.7238%1
1 - 1 - 1 3 01 95 343 7.716,484	 56,114 56.114 0.7272"o
A
1-1-1 4 03 93 352 11.260,905	 77.468 0 77,468 0.6879°/o
1-1-1 4 0493 400 12,774,468	 90.490 -852 91.342 0.7150%
1-1-1 4 01 94 420 13,190,524	 96.754 0 96.7541	 0.7335%
1-1-1 4 02 94 375 11,533,569	 86.566 86.5661	 0.7506%
1-1-1 4 Q394 361 11,313,879	 86,511 86.511(	 0.7646%I
1-1-1 4 04 94 425 13,193.059	 100,169 100.1691	 0 7593% ,
1-1-1 4 01 95 464 13,784,598	 102.869 102,8691	 0.7463%
I	
I
• I
0.6877%11-1-1 5 03 93 323 12,087,705	 83,127 83,127
1-1-1 5 04 93 356 13,159,837	 90.994 0 90,994 0.6914%
1-1-1 5 01 94 377 13.995,733	 98,616 98.6161	 0.7046"o
1-1-1 5 02 94 329 12.542,801	 90,657 90.657	 0.7228%
1-1-1 5 03 94 328 11,952,394	 89,731 -1,737 91.468,
	 0.7653%
1-1-1 5 04 94 351 12,356.462	 95.797 0 95,797	 0.7753%
1-1-1 5 01 95 357 12.210,802	 94.546 94 546	 0.7743%
1-1-1 6 03 93 85 3,419,486	 24,411 i	 24411k	 0 7139%
240
1-1-1 6 04 93 -	 86 3,314,958 24,311 24,311
-
0.7334%
1-1-1 6 01 94
-
82 3,262.431 22,816 22.816 0.6993°/0-
_
1-1-1 6 02 94 70 2.706,412 18,972 18,972 0.7010°A"
0.6957%'
0.6726%:
0.6956%
1-1-1 a Q394 60 2,265,924, 15,763 15,763
1-1-1 6 04 94 49 1,911,211 12,855 12,855
1-1-1 6 Q1 95 42 1,736,658 12,080 12,080
1-1-1 7 03 93 5 279,751 2,261 2,261 0.8082%
1-1-1 7 - 04 93 5 320,325 2,515 2,515 0.7850%
1-1-1 7 Q1 94 3 185,931 1,235 1,235 0.6641%
0.6710%'1-1-1 7 Q2 94
-
3 232,058 1,557 1,557
1-1-1 7 03 94 5 263,804, 1,912 1,912 0.7248%
1-1-1 7
,
Q494 4 208,281 1,565 1.565 0.7514%
1-1-1 7 01 95, 4 202,586 1,476 .1,476 0.7286%
1-1-1 8 0393 41 1,879,186 17,797 92 17,706 0.9422%
1-1-1 a Q493 37 1,558,652 -662 15,959 1.0239%
0.9571%'1-1-1 8 01 94 34 1,440,059 13,783 0 13,783
1-1-1 8 02 94 15 607,509 5,467 5,467 0.8999%
1-1-1 8 03 94 14 527,598 4,813 4,813 0.9122%
1-1-1 8 04 94 18 625,980 6,300 6,300 1.0064%
1-1-1 a Q1 95 16 543,951 5,593 5,593 1.0283%
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Identifier
Facility-	 Utilisation	 Quarter
	
Number of	 Debit Balances
	
Gross	 Provision-	 Net Margin	 Net Margin
Security-	 Level	 Loans	 Margin	 ing Cost	 Income	 Income Per
Gearing	 Outstanding	 Income	 Pound Lent
1-1-2	 1	 03 93	 513	 5,099,377	 39,329 	 0-	 39.329	 0.7713%
1-1-2	 1	 04 93	 '	 558'	 5,560,600	 43,377	 812	 42,565	 0.7655%
1-1-2	 1	 01 94	 598	 5,969,370	 46,636	 46,636	 0.7813%
1-1-2	 1	 02 94	 928	 9,180,484	 66,972	 66,972	 0.7295%
1-1-2	 1	 0394 -	 1,217	 11,840,889	 90,972
	 90,972	 0.7683%
1-1-2	 1	 0494	 1,504	 14,175,168	 105,515	 0	 105,515	 0.7444%
1-1-2	 1	 Q1 95
	
1,712	 15,751,295	 117,738	 -216	 117,954	 0.7489%
1-1-2	 2	 03 93	 924	 13,693,222	 106,555	 -765	 107,320	 0.7837%
1-1-2	 2	 04 93	 1,019	 14,856,371	 117,528	 517"	 117,011	 0.7876%
1-1-2	 2	 01 94	 1,057	 15,446,605	 121,578	 -2,464 	 124,042	 0.8030%
1-1-2	 2	 02 94	 1,079	 15,767,139	 121,663	 -34,624	 156,287	 0.9912%
1-1-2	 r	 2	 03 94	 1,135	 16,406,457	 134,224	 4,513	 129,711	 0.7906%
1-1-2	 2	 04 94	 1,331	 18,908,695	 156,163	 0	 156,163	 0.8259%
1-1-2	 2	 01 95	 1,404	 19,979,172	 165.918	 0	 165,918	 0.8305%
1-1-2	 3	 03 93
	 972	 22,931,492	 186,086	 0	 186,086
	 0.8115%
1-1-2	 3	 04 93	 1,069	 24,686,872	 199,260	 -706	 199,966	 0.8100%
1-1-2	 3	 01 94	 1,101	 24,997,518	 201,467	 668	 200.799	 - 0.8033%
1-1-2	 3	 02 94	 1,083	 24,299,216	 198,445	 -137	 198.582	 0.8172%
1-1-2	 3	 03 94	 1,090	 24.045,328	 204 006	 -1	 204,007	 0.8484%
1-1-2	 3	 04 94	 1,180
	 26.280,360	 224.841	 10,136	 214,705	 08170%
1-1-2	 3	 Q1 95	 1,192	 26,784,174	 231.813	 -1,601	 233.414	 0.8715%.
1-1-2	 4	 0393
	
2,215	 69,829,521	 589.388	 1,476	 587.912	 0.8419%
1-1-2	 4	 04 93	 2,413	 75,722,788	 637,298	 -76.2221	 713.520	 0.9423%
1-1-2	 4	 01 94	 2,386	 74,393,830	 620.933	 5.960	 614.973	 0.8266%
1-1-2	 4	 02 94	 2,134	 66,828,456	 555.339	 4.934	 550,405	 0.8236%
1-1-2	 4	 03 94	 2,139	 66,464,136	 582.926	 -4.829	 587.755	 0.8843%
1-1-2	 4	 04 94	 2,353	 73.074.889	 650.455	 35	 650.420	 0 8901%
1-1-2	 4	 01 95
	
2,336	 72,825,462	 648.650	 -60,425	 709.075	 0.9737%
1-1-2	 5	 0393
	
2,899	 112,647,074	 978,418
	 266,817	 711,601	 0.6317%
1-1-2	 5	 Q493
	
3,099
	 119,390,449	 1,025.669	 24,134	 1,001.535
	 0.8389%
1-1-2	 5	 01 94	 3,143	 120,564,787	 1.015,991	 43.229	 972.762	 0.8068%
1-1-2	 5	 Q294	 2,849	 110,602.536
	 929,806	 21,640	 908,166	 0.8211%
1-1-2	 5	 03 94	 2,824	 108,949,358	 974.334	 -11,519	 985.853	 0.9049%'
1-1-2	 5	 04 94	 3,072	 116,629.695	 1,066.551	 -28,129	 1,094,680	 0.9386%
1-1-2	 5	 Q1 95	 2,958	 111,464,494	 1,019.669	 439	 1,019.230	 09144%
,
242
1-1-2 6 Q393 2,883 119,141,117 1,074,992 26,652 1,048,340 0.8799%
1-1-2 6 0493 3,057 125,483,318 1,117,270 -124,128 1,241,398 0.9893%
1-1-2 6 01 94 3,054 125,016,881 1,110,584 -64.017 1,174,601 0.9396%
1-1-2 6 02 94 2,668 109,466,548 980,817 16,035 964,782 0.8813%
1-1-2 6 03 94 2,729 111,119,339 1,076.419 -26,250, 1,102,669 0.9923%
1-1-2 6 0494 3,074 123,576,516 1,217,975 49,678 1,168.297 0.9454%
1-1-2 6 01 95 3,141 125,420,423 1,194,531 -104.902 1.299,433 1 0361%
1-1-2 7 03 93 2,639 112,503,265 1,023,721 -24.734 1,048,455 0.9319%
1-1-2 7 0493 2,808 118,455,046 1,078,168 -26,707 1,104,875 0.9327%
1-1-2 7 01 94 2,762 116,635,315 1,065,065 -45,686 1,110,751 0.9523%
1-1-2 7 02 94 2,402 951,569 -55,058 1,006,627 0.9866%
1-1-2 7 0394 2,613 110,860,293 1,125,952 -34,560 1,160,512 10468%
1-1-2 7 04 94 3,019 126,254,994 1,288,977 8.995 1,279,982 1.0138%
1-1-2 7 01 95 3,097 127,334,406 1,303,417 10,116 1,293,301 1.0157%
1-1-2 8 03 93 1,686 74,225,797 708,080 109,008 599,072 0.8071%
1-1-2 8 0493 1,585 69,270,150 659,347 88,519 570,828 0.8241%
1-1-2 8 01 94 1,465 63,812,448 604,227 -1,025 605,252 0.9485%
1-1-2 8	 " 02 94 1,123 48,344,606 468,116 29,198 , , 438,918 0.9079%
1-1-2 8 03 94 1,339 58,036,569 619,651 -731 620,382 1.0689%
1-1-2 8 04 94 1,613 69.224,020 716,225 -40,703 756,928 1.0934%
1-1-2 8 01 95 1,687 71,330,447 747,833 -145,769 893,602 1.2528%
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Facility-
Security-
Gearing
Identifier
Utillsadon
Level
Quarter Number of
Loans
Outstanding
Debit Balances ' Gross
Margin
Income
Provision-
ing Cost
Net Margin
Income
Net Margin
Income Per
Pound Lent
1-2-1 1 Q3 93 624 6,654,406 41,797 0 41,797 0.6281%
1-2-1 1 04 93 701 7,269,392 44,832 44.832 0.6167%
1-2-1 1 01 94 738 7,506,560 46,265 0 46,265 0.6163%
1-2-1 1 02 94 633 6,233,136 41,093 41,093 0.6593%
1-2-1 1 03 94 660 6,361,266 45,761 45,761 0.7194%
1-2-1 1 04 94 871 8,250,422 57,485 57,485 0.6968%
1-2-1 1 01 95 1,058 9,796,576 69,722 69,722 0.7117%
0.6577°A;
0.6564%'
1-2-1 2 03 93 335 5,207,910 34.251 34,251
1-2-1 2 04 93 361 5,539,260 36,357 36,357
1-2-1 2 01 94 372 5,749,990 37,768 37,768 0.6568%
1-2-1 2 02 94 354 5,480,103 36,381 36.381 0.6639%
1-2-1 2	 . 03 94 384 5,770,305 39,928 39.928 0.6920%
1-2-1 2 04 94 497 7,334,594 50,644 . -	 50,644 0.6905%
1-2-1 2 01 95 616 8,866,963 61,434 61,434 0.6928%
1-2-1 3 03 93 183 4,349,693 29,296 0 29,296 0.6735%
1-2-1 3 0493 218 5,216,112 34,710 0 34,710 06654%
1-2-1 3 01 94 226 5,475,129 35,160 35,160 0.6422%
1-2-1 3 02 94 220 5.446,810 35.956 35,956 0.6601%
1-2-1 3 03 94 244 6,038,150 43,318 43,318 0.7174%
1-2-1 3 04 94 326 7,776,673 56.545 -841 57,386 0.7379%
1-2-1 3 01 95 375 8,569,162 63,354 0 63,354 0 7393%
1-2-1 4 Q3 93 291 9.659.308 67.003 67.003 0.6937%
1-2-1 4 04 93 324 10,770,809 76,158 0 76,158 0.7071%
1-2-1 4 Q1 94 328 10,981,417 78,587 78,587 0.7156%
1-2-1 4 02 94 319 10.537,332 74,618 74.618 0.7081%
1-2-1 4 0394 359 11,733,352 88.825 88,825 0.7570%
1-2-1 4 04 94 460 15.044,843 113.970 113,970 0.7575%
1-2-1 4 01 95 548 17,546,527 133.168 133.168 0.7589%
1-2-1 5 03 93 289 12.159,404 85.803 971 84 832 0.6977%
1-2-1 5 Q4 93 327 13,704,611 96.305 0 96,305 0.7027%
1-2-1 5 01 94 332 13,675.066 95,214 95.214 0.6963%
1-2-1 5 02 94 298 12,081,530 85,676 85.676 0.7091%
1-2-1 5 03 94 315 12,267,943 94.771 94,771 0.7725%
1-2-1 5 04 94 375 14.229,464 110,984 110.984 0.7800%
1-2-1 5 01 95 426 15,472,500 120,524 0 120,524 0.7790%
244
1-2-1 6 03 93 -	 87 4,010,805 33,502 33,502 0.8353%
1-2-1
,
-	
6 Q493 91 4,188,739 34,126 0 34,126 0.8147%
1-2-1 a
-
Q1 94 92 4,111,262 33,050 -'	 33,050 0.8039%
1-2-1 6 Q294 88 4,040.959 31,896 31,896 0.7893%
1-2-1 6 03 94 81 3,739,206 28,158 28,158 0.7530%
1-2-1 6 Q4 94 79 3,573,201 26,856 26,856. 0.7516%
1-2-1
..
6 01 95 66 2,754,847 22.024 22,024 0.7995%
,
1-2-1 7 0393 6 230,207 2,185 2,185 0.9492%
1-2-1 7 04 93 5 203,300 1,748 1,748 0.8598%
-
1-2-1 7 01 94 6 235,190 1,829 1,829 0.7775%
1-2-1 ,	 7 . 0294 3 138,950 784 784 0.5644%
0.8296%1
9.3813%
1-2-1 .	 7 . 03 94 3- 150,909 1,252 1,252
1-2-1 7 0494 5 229,353 1,975,
-
1,97.5
1-2-1 7 Q1 95 4 222,692 2,001 2,001 0.8987%
,
-
1-2-1 a 03 93 28 1,375,468 12.909-
_
12,909 0.9385%
1-2-1 8
,
0493 23 1,075,203 9,843 9,843 0.9154%
1-2-1 8 01 94 22 949,350 8,262 8,262 0.8703%
1-2-1 a 02 94 18 810,487 6,672 • _	 6,672 0.8232%
1-2-1 8 03 94 18 702,782 5,808 5,808 0.8264%
1-2-1 -	 8 04 94 22 844,795 6,763 6,763 0.8005%
1-2-1 -	 8 Q1 95 26.	 1,097,092 8,036 8,036 0.7325%
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Facility-
Security-
Gearing
Identifier
Utilisation
Level
Quarter Number of
Loans
Outstanding
Debit Balances Gross
Margin
Income
Provision-
ing Cost
Net Margin
Income
Net Margin
Income Per
Pound Lent
1-2-2 1 03 93 218 2.296,326 17,623 17.623 0.7675%
1-2-2 1 04 93 265 2,729,842 20,773 20,773 0.7610%
1-2-2 1 01 94 277 2,826,627 21,801 21.801 0.7713%
1-2-2 1 Q2 94 431 4,359,022 30,371 0 30,371 0.6967%
1-2-2 1 03 94 604 5,995,368 43,566 43,566 0.7267%
1-2-2 1 Q494 812 7.795.737 55,896 55,896 0.7170%
1-2-2 1 01 95 991 9,199,696 65,563 0 65.563 0.7127%.
1-2-2 2 03 93 456 7,031,411 51,715 -879 52,594 0.7480%
1-2-2 '	 2 04 93 522 7,959,612 57,630 0 57,630 0.7240%
1-2-2 2 01 94 572 8,756,915 66,156 66,156 0.7555%
1-2-2 2 02 94 _ 615 9,132,298 69,508 69.508 0.7611%
0.7796°A,1-2-2 2 03 94 694 10,334,782 80,571 80,571
1-2-2 2 0494 862 12,673,451 100,046 -113,372 213,418 1.6840%
1-2-2 2 01 95 965 13,817,246 109,354 0 109,354 0.7914%
,
1-2-2 3 0393„ 536 13,213,127 104,143 104.143 0.7882%
1-2-2 3 0493 590 14,694.148 114,979 114.979 0.7825%
0.7712%11-2-2 3 01 94 604 14,917,533 115,040 115.040
1-2-2 3 02 94 604 14,783.648 115,312 115,312 0.7800%
1-2-2 3 03 94 650 15,536,264 127,662 0 127,662 0.82170
1-2-2 3 0494 808 18,852,541 155,772 155,772 0.8263%
1-2-2 3 01 95 947 21,423,886 173.840 173,840 0.8114%
1
1-2-2 4 0393 1.191 40,434,450 323,685 0 323,685 0.8005%
1-2-2 4 0493 1,290 43.814,310 347.019 2.046 344.973 0.7874%
1-2-2 4 01 94 1,324 44.676,594 354.945 0 354.945 0.7945%
1-2-2 4 0294 1,303 43.899,743 346.766 0 346.766 0.7899%
1-2-2 4 Q3 94 1,403 46.469,353 385.662 385.662 0.8299%
1-2-2 4 04 94 1,735 56,363,961 471,627 0 471.627 0.8368%
1-2-2 4 01 95 1,950 61,786,761 516.991 0 516,991 0.8367%
•
1-2-2 5 03 93 1,584 65,705,3891 548,579 -4,500 553,079 0.8418%
1-2-2 5 0493 1,752 72.153,918 601,378 0 601,378 0.8335%
0.8401%1,
0.8486%
1-2-2 5 01 94 1,803 74,514.364 625,980 0 625.980
1-2-2 5 02 94 1,679 69,385.932 588.838 588.838
1-2-2 5 0394 1,776 73,034,376 647,964 647,964 0.8872%
1-2-2 5 04 94 2.093 83,879,992 747,365 2,000 745.365 0.8886%
0.8780%)1-2-2 5 01 95 2.323 90,746,171 796,733 0 796.733
1
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Net Margin
Income
' Net Margin
Income Per
Pound Lent
1-2-2 1 Q3 93 218 2,296,326 17,623 17.623	 0.7675%
1-2-2 1 ' 04 93 265 2,729.842 20,773 20,773	 0.7610%
-
1-2-2 1 01 94 277 2,826,627 21,801 21.801	 0.7713%
1-2-2 1 Q2 94 431 4,359,022 30.371 0 30,371	 0.6967%
1-2-2 1 03 94 604 5,995,368 43,566 43,566	 0.7267%
1-2-2 1 Q4 94 812 7,795.737 55,896 55.896	 0.7170%
1-2-2 1 01 95 991 9,199.696 65,563 0 65,563	 0.7127%
1-2-2 2 03 93 456 7,031,411 51,715 -879 52.594	 0.7480%
1-2-2 2 04 93 522 7,959,612 57,630 0 57,630	 0.7240%
1-2-2 2 01 94 572 8,756,915 66,156 66,156	 0.7555%
1-2-2 2 0294 615 9,132,298 69,508 69.508	 0.7611%
1-2-2 2 03 94 694 10,334,782 80,571 80.571	 0.7796%
-
1-2-2 2 0494 862 12,673,451 100,046 -113,372 213,418	 1.6840%
.
1-2-2 2 01 95 965 13,817,246 109,354 0 109,354	 0.7914%
1-2-2 3 03 93 536 13,213,127 104,143 104.143	 0.7882%
1-2-2 3 0493 590 14,694,148 114,979 114,979	 0.7825%
1-2-2 3 01 94 604 14,917,533 115,040 115.040	 0.7712%
1-2-2 3 0294 604 14,783.648 115.312 115,312	 0.7800%
1-2-2 3 03 94 650 15,536,264 127.662 0 127,662	 0.8217/o
1-2-2 3 0494 808 18.852,541 155,772 155,772	 0.8263%
1-2-2 3 Q1 95 947 21,423,886 173.840 173.840	 0.8114%,
1-2-2 4 0393 1.191 40.434,450 323,685 0 323,685	 0.8005%
1-2-2 4 0493 1,290 43,814,310 347 019	 2,046 344.973	 0.7874%
1-2-2 4 Q1 94 1.324 44.676,594 354,945	 0 354.945	 0.7945%
1-2-2 4 02 94 1,303 43.899,743 346.766	 0 346,766	 0.7899%
1-2-2 4 03 94 1,403 46,469,353 385.662 385,662	 0.8299%
1-2-2 4	 . 04 94 1,735 56,363,961 471,627	 0 471.627	 0.8368%
1-2-2 4 01 95 1,950 61,786.761 516.991	 0 516,991	 0.8367%
-
1-2-2 5 03 93 1,584 65,705,389 548,579	 -4,500 553,079	 0.8418%
1-2-2 5 Q493 1,752 72.153,918 601,378	 0 601,378,	 0.8335%
1-2-2 5 01 94 1,803 74,514,364 625,980	 0 625.980 0.8401%
1-2-2
,
5 Q2 94 1,679 69,385.932 588.838 588,838 0.8486%
1-2-2 5	 --* 03 94 1,776 73,034,376 647.964 647.964 0.8872%
1-2-2 :	 5 Q4 94 2.093 83.879,992 747,365 2,000 745.365
.	
0.8886%
1-2-2 5 01 95 2.323 90,746,171 796,733 0 796.733
.	
0.8780%
. ,
.
-
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1-2-2 6 Q393 '	 1,604 72,221,672 625,715 -9,918 635,633 0.8801%
1-2-2 6 04 93 1,740, 77,472,894 659,406 -22,596 682,002 0.8803%
1-2-2 6 01 94 1,824 80,520,754 681,814 -1,844 683.658 0.8490%
1-2-2 6 - 02 94
-
.	
1,717 75,732,235 646,434 2,496 643.938 0.8503%
1-2-2 6 Q3 94 1,784 76,745,427 703,984 0 703,984 0.9173%
1-2-2 6  Q4 94 2,158 90,974,137 826,542 4,352 822,190 0.9038%
,	
1-2-2 6 Q1 95
,
2,413 99,155,362 888,704 0 888,704 0.8963%
-
1-2-2 '	 7 03 93 - 1,475 66,871,474 591,376 -1,278 592,654 0.8863%
1-2-2 7 04 93 1,586 72,023,581 634,686 42,419 592.267 0.8223%
1-2-2 7 01 94 1,582 71,644, 032 627,242 -14,497 641,739 0.8957%
1-2-2 7 Q294 1,411 64,128,445 568,921 -6,102 575,023 0.8967%
1-2-2 7 03 94 1,579 70,058,802 679,847 5,983 673,864 0.9619%
1-2-2 7 04 94 1,925 83,932,605 796,231 3,913 792.318 0.9440%
1-2-2 7 - Q1 95
-
2,175 92,464,741 873,421 873,421 0.9446%
,
1-2-2 8 03 93 977 45,782,974 427,337 -23,298 450,635 0.9843%
1-2-2 8 04 93 925 42,849,914 398,981 26,894 372,087 0.8684%
1-2-2 8 01 94 886 41,318,187 382,079 -28,542 410,621 0.9938%
1-2-2 8 02 94 713 32,744,767 304,176 3,633 300,543 0.9178%
1-2-2 8 03 94 854 39,178,245 397,426 0 397,426 1.0144%
1-2-2 8 04 94 1,051 47,343,820 466,008 0 466,008 0.9843%
1-2-2 8 01 95 1,184 52,976,800 526,076 0 526,076 0.9930%
Facility-
Security-
Gearing
Identifier
Utilisation
Level
Quarter Number of
Loans
Outstanding
Debit Balances Gross
Margin
Income
Provision-
ing Cost
Net Margin
Income
I Net Margin
I Income Per
Pound Lent
,
2-1-1 '	 1 03 93 1,508 383,356.857 1,091,194 1,091,194 0.2846%
2-1-1 1 04 93 1,603 421,026,452 1,120,017 1,120.017 0.2660%
2-1-1 1 01 94 1,617 478,510,005 1,248.079 1.721 1,246.358 0.2605%
2-1-1 1 02 94 1.316 440.340,035 1,246,161 0 1,246,161 0.2830%
2-1-1 1 03 94 1,253 558,784,389 1.564.601 -1,912 1,566,513 0.2803%
2-1-1 1 0494 1,413 604,895,462 1.519.958 0 1,519,958 0.2513%
2-1-1 1 01 95 1,417 •	 610.065,552 1,517,726 0 1,517,726 0.2488%
2-1-1 2 Q3 93 631 299,039,066 758,738 11,426 747,312 0.2499%
2-1-1 2 04 93 637 297,042,099 755.630 0 755,630 0.2544%
2-1-1
_
2 01 94 640 315,124.386 793,908 0 793,908 0.2519%
2-1-1 2 02 94 566 318.991,592 774,907 774,907 0.2429%
2-1-1 2 03 94 563 300,031,522 862,104 862.104 0.2873%
2-1-1 2 Q4 94 624 377,961,055 1,004.883 •.1,004,883 0.2659%
2-1-1 2 Q1 95 623 421.077,665 1,103,183 f,103,183 0.2620%
2-1-1 3 03 93 348 268,280,434 755,474 8.976 746,498 0.2783%
2-1-1 3 04 93 374 236,687,224 713.630 0 713.630 0.3015%
2-1-1 3 Q1 94 366 240.923,551 665.741 665.741 .	 0.2763%
2-1-1 3 02 94 320 217,219.570 611,047 611,047 0.2813%
2-1-1 3 03 94 329 260.032,427 755.022 755.022 0.2904%
2-1-1 '	 3 04 94 344 266,859,637 656.508 656.508 0.2460%
2-1-1 3 01 95 329 256.649.241 618.730 618.730 0.2411%,
2-1-1 4 Q3 93 391 259,926.520 874,708 874,708 0.3365%
2-1-1 4 04 93 405 269,721,800 865.862 865.862 0.3210%
2-1-1 4 01 94 406 326.128.553 953,149 953.149 0.2923%
2-1-1 4 Q2 94 362 328.901,442 978,033 978.033 0.2974%
2-1-1 4 Q394 354 339.811.669 1,025,268 1,025.268 0.3017%
2-1-1 4 Q494 397 344.473,116 1,106.040 1,106.040 0.3211%
2-1-1 4 01 95 355 335,960,995 1.058,842 1,058.842 0.3152%
2-1-1 5 0393 263 224,090,387 665,729 0 665,729 0.2971%
2-1-1 5 04 93 279 206,706.032 622.589 0 622,589 0.3012%
2-1-1 5 Q1 94 283 171,483,824 554,276 18.713 535.563 0.3123%
2-1-1 5 02 94 258 139,984.617 470.730 470,730 0.3363%
2-1-1 5 03 94 229 142,509,371 499,309 499,309 0.3504%
2-1-1 5 Q4 94 239 142,920,902 510.483 510.483 0.3572%
2-1-1 5 01 95 211 123,125.994 473.801 473,801 0.3848%
,
248
2-1-1 6 03 93 55 16,177,163 81,075 81,075 0.5012%
2-1-1 6 Q493 58 18,721,817 90,298 90,298 0.4823%
2-1-1 6 Q1 94 r	 57 17,243,979 87,674 87,674 0.5084%
2-1-1 6 02 94 51 16,125,879 83,904 83.904 0.5203%
2-1-1 6 03 94 40 10,994,081 60,738 60,738 0.5525%
2-1-1 6 04 94 33 11,806,216 51,998 51,998 0.4404%
2-1-1 6 01 95 26 15,380,918 51,427 51,427 0.3344%
2-1-1 7 03 93 2 313,491 3,076 3,076 0.9813%
2-1-1 7 04 93 2 351,361 3,455 3,455 0.9833%
2-1-1 7 01 94 2 209,848 2,937 2,937 1.3994%
2-1-1 7 02 94 2 •	 307,913 3,763 3,763 1.2221%
2-1-1 7 03 94 1 96,018 1,560 1,560 1.6250%
2-1-1 7 04 94 2 202,793 534 534 0.2633%
2-1-1 7 01 95 2 170,787 534 534 0.3126%
2-1-1 8 03 93 11 3,399,870 23,644 23,644 0.6954%
2-1-1 8 04 93 9 2,661,688 17,156 17,156 0.6445%
2-1-1 8	 . 01 94 6 1,315,415 8,592 •	 8,592 0.6532%
2-1-1 a 02 94 3 624,809 4,013 . -	 4,013 0.6423%
2-1-1 8 03 94 3 596,258 4,631 4,631 0.7766%
2-1-1 8 04 94 4 702,901 5,754 5,754 0.8186%
2-1-1 8 01 95 9 2,976,898 19,757 19,757 0.6637%
249
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_
2-1-2 1 03 93 504 100,552,650 345.026 345.026
'
0.3431%
0.3609%'2-1-2 1
_
04 93 545 92.647,785 334,353 334,353
2-1-2 1
,
Q1 94 552 96,418,521 349,317 349,317	 0.3623%
2-1-2 1 Q2 94 832 160,910,213 506,205 506,205	 0.3146%
2-1-2 1 03 94 1,065 197,355,488 659.234 659,234	 0.3340%
2-1-2 1 04 94 , 1,198 235,869,805 723,338 723,338	 0.3067%
2-1-2 1 01 95 1.244 251,637,847 772,760 772,760	 0.3071%
2-1-2 2 03 93 952 213,076,864 823,236 -848	 824,083	 0.3868%
2-1-2 2 04 93 1,009 214,548,130 809,645 0	 809,645	 0.3774%
2-1-2 2 01 94 1,064 220,746,991 885,138 885,138	 0.4010%
2-1-2 2 02 94 1,090 240,257,737 954,634 954.634	 0.3973%
2-1-2 2 03 94 1,121 255,699,104 1,034,804 1.034,804	 0.4047%
2-1-2 2 0494 1,226 313,374,241 1,173,468 •1_,173,468	 0.3745%
2-1-2 2 01 95 1,171 311.491,613 1,134,960 1,134,960	 0.3644%
2-1-2 3 03 93 1,071 365,936,154 1,547,936 -1,403	 1,549,338	 0.4234%
2-1-2 3 0493 1,150 389,174,219 1,593,496 14.112	 1.579,384	 0.4058%
2-1-2 3 01 94 1,195 432,338,687 1,784,300 -15,383	 1,799,683	 0.4163%
2-1-2 3 02 94 1,141 417,330,340 1,696,683, 502	 1.696,181	 0.4064%
2-1-2 3 03 94 1,185 491.051,123 2,039,351 0	 2.039.351	 0.4153%
2-1-2 3 04 94 1,307 509.491.069 2,092.2551 -16,453	 2.108.708	 0.4139%
2-1-2 3 Q1 95 1,279 505,219,292 1008.528 0	 2.008,528	 0.3976%
I
2-1-2 4 03 93 2.527 998,362.301	 4,524,636	 -11,073	 4,535.709	 0.4543%
2-1-2 4 04 93 2,607 1,061,793,770	 4,900.201	 -10,101	 4.910,302	 0.4625%
'	 2-1-2	 . 4 Q1 94 2.628 1.144,290,568	 5,321.418	 -60,389	 5.381,807	 0.4703%
2-1-2 4 Q2 94 2,504 1,188,139,174	 5,416.823	 36,111	 5,380,712	 0.4529%
2-1-2  4 03 94 2.517 1,195,192,221	 5.403.827	 -47.858	 5.451,685	 0.4561%
2-1-2 4 04 94 2.643 1,261,081,028	 5,577,066 -	-13,799 	 5.590.8651	 0.4433%,
2-1-2 4 01 95 2,530 1,162,881,109	 5,228,865	 17,379	 5,211.486 0.4482%
2-1-2 5 Q3 93 2.951 1,327,998,424	 6,573.047	 1.062,254	 5.510.794	 0.4150%
2-1-2 5 04 93 3.044 1.331,102,408	 6,783,578	 -192.409	 6.975,987) 	 0.5241°01
2-1-2 5 Q1 94 3.006 1,313,312,236	 6,770.588	 69,044	 6,701,544 0.510390
2-1-2 5 02 94 2.722 1.270,531,506	 6,351,166	 312.093	 6.039,073 0.4753%
2-1-2 5 Q3 94 2,711 1.254.296,046, 6,404,860	 -199,095	 6.603.S551 C1.526S'0
2-1-2 5 04 94 2,881 1,317,923,265 6,700,500 -751,841	 7,452,341 0.5655%
2-1-2 5 01 95 2,794 1.308,688.939 6.726,935 -53,950	 6,780,885 0.5181%
,_
250
2-1-2 6 Q3 93 2,517 930,702,148 5,719,812 276,098 5,443,715 0.5849%
2-1-2 6 04 93 2,529 938,919,419 5,600,062 -136,581 5,736,643 0.6110%
2-1-2 6 01 94 2,468 910,380,631 5,348,613 74,102 5,274,511 0.5794%
2-1-2 6 02 94 2,160 829,054,076 4,816,211 1,771,159 3,045,052 0.3673%
2-1-2 6 03 94 2,048 734,551,189 4,424,232 -215,985 4,640,217 0.6317%
2-1-2 6 04 94 2.092 700,899,428 4,299,756 165,471 4,134,285 0.5899%
2-1-2 6 01 95 1,961 573,724,372 3,661,802 -40,236 3,702,038
,
2-1-2 7 03 93 1,601 528,530,698 3,434,710 2.600,456 834,254
2-1-2 7 04 93 1,618 540,457,465 3,478,999 292,542 3,186,457
2-1-2 7 01 94 1,550 543,670,966 3,442,696 -219,103 3.661,799
2-1-2 7 02 94 1,294 447,149,747 2,875,894 -5,034,834 7,910,728 ,
2-1-2 7 03 94 1,362 470,462,963 3,131,049 600,307 2,530,742 0.5379%
2-1-2 7 Q4 94 1,463 496,092,354 3,315,436 430,132 
-253,238
2,885,304
3,346,073
.2-1-2 7 01 95 1,446 469,630,873 3,092,835
2-1-2 8 03 93 889 437,597,979 2,710,227 254,685 2,455,542 0.5611%
2-1-2 8 Q4 93 813 421,785,015 2,608,386 321,361 2,287,025 0.5422%
2-1-2 8 01 94 749 385,277,410 2,336,906 323,273 2,011633 0.5226%
2-1-2 8 02 94 555 257,436,027 1,660,712 76,975 1,583,737 0.6152%
2-1-2 8 03 94 635 296,070,932 1,924,919 374.866 1,550,053 0.5235%
2-1-2 8 Q494 738 302,427,015 2.059,518 1,330,336 729,182 0.2411%
2-1-2 8 01 95 750 277,619,668 1,957,984 3,520,530 -1,562,546 -0.5628%
251
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2-2-1 1 03 93 681 61,850,701 254,441 254,441	 0.4114%
2-2-1 1 ' 04 93 716 68,627,445 275,769 0 275,769	 0.4018%
2-2-1 1 01 94 731 79,246,071 308,155 308.155	 0.3889%
2-2-1 1 Q2 94 601 70,155,077 282,807 282,807	 0.4031%
2-2-1 1 03 94 565 60,510,403 265,383 265,383	 0.4386%
2-2-1 1 04 94 657 68,811,456 284,710 284,710	 0.4138%
2-2-1 1 01 95 695 82.244,756 339.902 339,902	 0.4133%
2-2-1 2 03 93 445 108,034.854 360,495 0 360,495	 0.3337%
2-2-1 2 04 93 480 84,268,237 332,071 0 332,071	 0.3941%
2-2-1 2 01 94 489 71,107,942 303,326 303,326	 0.4266%
2-2-1 2 02 94 444 65,901,775 287,158 287,158	 0.4357%
2-2-1 2 03 94 445 65.589,025 280,716 280,716	 0.4280%
2-2-1 2 04 94 491 91,156,826 357,630 357,630	 0.3923%
2-2-1 2 01 95 502 104,256,082 399,124 399,124	 0.3828%
2-2-1 3 0393 356 101,537,263 431,925 431,925	 0.4254%
2-2-1 3 04 93 385 123,735.553 460,785 460,785	 0.3724%
2-2-1 3 01 94 390 129,256,347 482.688 482.688	 0.3734%
2-2-1 3 02 94 354 119,695,832 453,546 453,546	 0.3789%
2-2-1 3 03 94 356 119.437,025 467.255 467.255	 0.3912%
2-2-1 3 04 94 393 128.653,442 504.206 504.206	 0.3919%
2-2-1 3 01 95 362 104,181,379 446.344 446,344	 0.4284%
2-2-1 4 03 93 488 159.708.932 772.938 772,938	 0.4840%
2-2-1 4 0493 499 170.780.071 787.475 787,475	 0.4611%
2-2-1 4 01 94 477 191,094,164 775,775 775,775	 0.4060%
2-2-1 4 02 94 453 215,785.809 822.630 322.630	 0.3812%
2-2-1 4 03 94 472 218,060.093 886.418 886.418	 0.4065%
2-2-1 4 04 94 525 246.468.016 1,007,238 1.007,238	 0.4087%
'	 2-2-1 4 01 95 507 277,758,625 1,068.886 1.068,886	 0.3848%
2-2-1 5 03 93 420 174,435,642 777,842 777.842	 0.4459%,
2-2-1 5 0493 399 151,574,847 678,924 0 678.924	 0.4479%
2-2-1 5 01 94 394 166,838,837 747,284 747,284	 0.4479"a
2-2-1 5 02 94 367 153.682,870 695,589 695,589 0.4526%
0.4560%12-2-1 5 03 94 337 135,517,815 617,928 817.928
2-2-1 5 04 94 352 139.483,158 688,687 688.687 0.4937%
2-2-1 5 Q1 95 335 105,965,460 564.649 564.649 0.5329%
i
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2-2-1 6 Q3 93 108 33,042,162 168,347 168,347 0.5095%
2-2-1 6 04 93 104 30,558,702 156,475 156,475 0.5120%
2-2-1 6 01 94 98 21,175,863 124,644 124,644 0.5886%
2-2-1 a Q294 84 20,103,620 113,701 113.701 0.5656%
2-2-1 6 03 94 70 20,201,53Y 108,642 108.642 0.5378%
2-2-1 6 04 94 63 30,960,481 163,015 163,015 0.5265%
2-2-1 6 01 95 43- 26,268,362 133,977 133,977 0.5100%
2-2-1 7 03 93 3 461,268 2,410 2,410 0.5224%
2-2-1 7 04 93 3 437,635 2,287 2,287 0.5226%
2-2-1 7 01 94 2 376,987 2,062 2,062 0.5471%
2-2-1	
.
7 02 94 1 209,279 1,177 1,177 0.5625%
2-2-1 7 0394 1 209,279 1,177 1,177 0.5625%
2-2-1 7 Q4 94 1 209,279 1,177 1,177 0.5625%
2-2-1 7 01 95 0 74,031 740 740 1.0000%
2-2-1 8 03 93 22 9,178,105 51,458 51,458 0.5607%
2-2-1 8 04 93 17 6,642,724 36,243 36,243 0.5456%
2-2-1 8 01 94 12 2,821,426 18,701 18,701 0.6628%
2-2-1 8 02 94 6 972,189 7,577 7,577 0.7794%
2-2-1 8 Q3 94 9 1,962,479 10,964 - _	 10,964 0.5587%
2-2-1 8 0494 13 3,130,977 17,734 17,734 0.5664%
2-2-1 8 01 95 13 2,992,740 17,159 17,159 0.5734%
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2-2-2 1 03 93 206 12,677,334 74,112 0 74,112	 0.5846%
2-2-2 1 04 93 213 15,001,613 70,625 70.625	 0.4708%
2-2-2 1 01 94 225 15,589,846 73,954 73,954	 0.4744%
2-2-2 1 Q2 94 353 29,918,715 127,352 , 127,352	 0.4257%
2-2-2 1 03 94 465 46,126,449 198,947 198,947	 0.4313%
2-2-2 1 04 94 524 43,956,580 186,597 186,597
	 0.4245%
2-2-2 1 01 95 553 .	 45,273,324 193,727 193,727	 0.4279%
2-2-2 2 03 93 490 54,300,787 268,234 268.234	 0.4940%
2-2-2 2 04 93 521 55,069,227 280,559 280,559	 0.5095%
2-2-2 2 01 94 512 52,447,718 270,310 270,310	 0.5154%
2-2-2
,
2 02 94 541 61,238,737 306,496 306.496	 0.5005%
2-2-2 2	 . 03 94 560 66,033,215 332,536 332,536	 0.5036%
2-2-2 2 04 94 629 74,245,993 369,887 " -	 369,887	 0.4982%
2-2-2 2 01 95 616 85,046,170 464,300 464,300
	 0.5459%
-.
2-2-2 3 03 93 673 117,092,231 605,256 0 605,256	 0.5169%
2-2-2 3 04 93 705 131,483,513 636,019 3,586 632,433	 0.4810%
2-2-2 3 Q1 94 716 150,127,340 689,866 689,866	 . 0.4595%
2-2-2 3 02 94 708 159.615,028 733.743 733,743	 0.4597%
2-2-2 3 03 94 734 185,157,378 884,875 884,875	 0.4779%
2-2-2 3 04 94 825 208.829,626 1,010,989 1,010,989	 0.4841%
2-2-2 3 01 95 831 289,775,635 1,621.944 1,621,944	 0.5597%
..
2-2-2 4 03 93 1,723 440,399,643 2,363.821 0 2.363.821	 0.5367%
2-2-2 4 . 04 93 1,814 490.899,036 2,634,234 0 2.634.234	 0.5366%
2-2-2 4 ' 01 94 1.840 539,796,930 2.800,157 2,800,1574	 0.5187%
2-2-2 4 02 94 1,789 546.279.765 2,838,563 2.838.563	 0.5196%
2-2-2 4 03 94 1,888 593,248,201 3,126.947 3.126.947	 0.5271%
2-2-2 4 04 94 2,096 663.498,084 3,459,125 3.459,125	 0.5213%
2-2-2 4 01 95 2,083 682.712,735 3,452.248 0 3.452.248	 0.5057%
2-2-2 5 Q3 93 2,454 848,022,257 4,689.885 539 4,689,347	 0.5530%
2-2-2 5 Q4 93 2,492 859.770,199 4,733.406 133.398 4.600.008	 0.5350"o
2-2-2 5 01 94 2.464 835,499,430 4,717,994 -7 536 4.725.530	 0.5656%'
2-2-2 5 02 94 2,297 819,795,507 4.568.448 12 4. 568.436	 0.5573%4
2-2-2 5 03 94 2.309 930.248,937 5,021,191 0 5.021,1911	 0.5398%
5,076.857i
	 0.5388%2-2-2 5 04 94 2,469 942,211,084 5,076,857 0
2-2-2 5 01 95 2,373 896,245,409 4,803,026 4,834 4,798,192 0.5354%
254
2-2-2 6 03 93 2,064 755,466,097 4,470,389 -2,720,030 7,190,419 ' 0.9518%
2-2-2 6 04 93 2,073 771,405,576 4,274,555 -9,163 4,283,718 0.5553%
2-2-2 6 01 94 2,009 704,514,967 4,012,941 -160,832 4,173,773 0.5924%
2-2-2 6 02 94 1,768 540,451,523 3,284,658 1,969 3,282,689 0.6074%
2-2-2 6 03 94 1,696 469,681,367 3,067,900 0 3,067,900 0.6532%
2-2-2 6 04 94 1,766 473,446,010 3,061,247 0 3,061,247 0.6466%
2-2-2 6 01 95 1,646 491,580,684 3,047,371 -10,713 3,058,084
2-2-2 7 03 93 1,251 408,079,102 2,559,348 15,792 2,543,556 0.6233%
2-2-2 7 04 93 1,229 379,974,925 2,430,861 191,604 2,239,257 0.5893%
2-2-2 7 01 94 1,184 349,112,394 2,259,856 25 2,259,831 0.6473%
2-2-2 7 02 94 997 270,671,314 1,737,183 562 1,736,621 0.6416%
2-2-2 7 Q3 94 1,055 304,605,030 1,919,817 9,830 1,909,987 0.6270%
2-2-2 7 04 94 1,130 298,752,256 -	 1,966,831 -31,573 1,998,404 0.6689%
2-2-2 7 01 95 1,155 289,859,409 1,941,993 -4.989 1,946,982 0.6717%
2-2-2 8 03 93 579 163,361,193 1,143,233 15,828 1,127,405 0.6901%
2-2-2 8 04 93 527 148,123,043 1,025,084 83,082 942,002 0.6360%
2-2-2 8 01 94 468 121,014,241 879,984 9,521 870,463 0.7193%'
2-2-2 8 02 94 353 96,783,041 691,500 82,207 609,293 0.6295%
2-2-2 8	 • 03 94 398 112,765,723 777,525 16,684 760,841 0.6747%
2-2-2 8 04 94 462 134,511,981 911,418 8 - 911,410	 0.6776%
2-2-2 _	 8 01 95 461 130,040,359 915,238 32,670 882,568	 0.6787%
255
